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Preface
Discovery consists of seeing what everybody has seen and thinking what nobody has thought.
– Albert von Szent-Györgyi
iii
Abstract
Critical systems such as those found in the avionics, automotive, maritime, and energy
domains are often subject to a formal process known as certiﬁcation. The goal of certiﬁcation
is to ensure that such systems will operate safely in the presence of known hazards, and
without posing undue risks to the users, the public, or the environment.
Certiﬁcation bodies examine such systems based on evidence that the system suppliers
provide, to ensure that the relevant safety risks have been sufﬁciently mitigated. Typically,
generic safety standards set forth the general evidence requirements across different industry
sectors, and then derived standards specialize the generic standards according to the needs of
a speciﬁc industry sector.
Regardless of whether a generic or sector-speciﬁc standard is being used, a key prerequisite
for effective collection of evidence is that the supplier be aware of the requirements stipulated
in the relevant standard and the evidence they require. This often proves to be a very
challenging task because of the sheer size of the standards and the fact that the textual
standards are amenable to subjective interpretation. Notably, suppliers ﬁnd it hard to interpret
the evidence requirements imposed by the safety standards within the domain of application;
little support exists for recording, querying, and reporting evidence in a structured manner;
and there is a general absence of guidelines on how the collected evidence supports the safety
objectives.
This thesis proposes the application of Model-Driven Engineering as an enabler for per-
forming the various tasks related to safety evidence management. The position taken is that
models should serve as the main source of certiﬁcation information - documents, when needed,
should be generated from models. Models are beneﬁcial for the purpose of safety certiﬁcation
in many respects, most notably: (1) Models can be employed to clarify the expectations of
safety standards and recommended practices, and develop concrete guidelines for system
suppliers; (2) Models expressed in standard notations avoid the ambiguity and redundancy
problems associated with text-based documentation; (3) Models provide an ideal vehicle for
preserving traceability and the chain of evidence between hazards, requirements, design ele-
ments, implementation, and test cases; (4) Models can represent different levels of abstraction
and an explicit mapping between the different levels; (5) Models present opportunities for
partial or full automation of many laborious safety analysis tasks.
The main contribution of this thesis is a model-driven process that enables the automated
veriﬁcation of compliance to standards based on evidence. Speciﬁcally, a UML proﬁle is
created, based on a conceptual model of a given standard, which provides a succinct and
explicit interpretation of the underlying standard. The proﬁle is augmented with constraints
that help system suppliers with establishing a relationship between the concepts in the safety
standard of interest and the concepts in the application domain. This in turn enables suppliers
to demonstrate how their system development artifacts achieve compliance to the standard.
Additionally, UML proﬁles are further used to systematically capture how the evidence
requirements of a generic standard are specialized in a particular domain. This provides a
means of explicitly showing the relationship between a generic and a sector-speciﬁc standard.
This tackles the certiﬁcation issues that arise from poorly-stated or implicit relationships
between a generic standards and their sector-speciﬁc interpretations.
Finally, the tool infrastructure needs for supporting the collection and management of
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safety evidence data is tackled by proposing tools for upfront planning of evidence collection
activities and the storage of evidence information outside of modelling environments.
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Summary
1 Introduction
Increasingly, systems incorporating both software and hardware are used to automate highly
complex tasks. Nuclear plants, oil production systems, airliners and automobiles are examples
of such systems. As failures in these systems can cause harm to people or the environment,
it is becoming crucial for these systems to be certiﬁed as safe for operation. A system is
considered safe when it can perform its intended function without posing undue harm to
its operators, the public, or the environment within which it operates. It is becoming the
norm for safety critical systems to be certiﬁed by third-party certiﬁcation bodies. The aim of
certiﬁcation is to provide assurance that the system has been deemed safe for use in a speciﬁc
environment.
A key requirement of safety certiﬁcation is the provision of evidence that a system complies
with the applicable safety standards. The two main aspects under consideration here are:
the standards involved, and the evidence that shows the compliance of the system with the
speciﬁed standards. A common practice in deﬁning standards for certiﬁcation is to have a
generic standard and then derive from it sector-speciﬁc standards for every industry sector
that the generic standard applies to. The idea behind such a tiered approach is to unify the
commonalities across different sectors into the generic standard, and then specialize the
generic standard according to contextual needs.
The standards prescribe the procedures for compliance and system suppliers create the
necessary evidence to meet the compliance requirements. Showing compliance to safety
standards proves to be a very challenging task due to the fact that these standard are presented
as very large textual documents that are amenable to subjective interpretation. If a derived
standard is being used then there is the additional issue of understanding how the evidence
requirements stated in a generic standard map onto those stated in a derived standard. The
lack of a consistent interpretation can lead to misunderstandings about what evidence needs
to be created - crucial evidence that should have been created during system development
can be missed or unnecessary evidence artifacts may be created. This results in suppliers
have to re-construct the required evidence at the time of certiﬁcation - an often expensive and
time consuming endeavour. On the certiﬁer’s side, poorly-structured and incomplete evidence
often leads to signiﬁcant delays and loss of productivity, and furthermore, does not allow
the certiﬁer to develop enough trust in the system undergoing certiﬁcation. It is therefore
very important to devise approaches, which are supported by effective automation, to specify,
manage, and analyse the safety evidence necessary to demonstrate compliance to standards.
Finally, the evidence presented to the certiﬁcation body needs to be highly structured in
1
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order to ensure that it is readable and assessable. In general, there is a large amount of
evidence that is gathered and all of it needs to be structured such that each piece of evidence
and how it relates to other artifacts is clear to the certiﬁer.
This thesis tackles these issues and presents coherent solutions that help suppliers of safety-
critical systems to prepare adequately for certiﬁcation. The solutions presented in this thesis
use Model-Driven Engineering techniques [12] in a novel manner, showing that models can
be used not only for system development but also for managing the evidence needed for
certiﬁcation.
Contributions
The contributions of this thesis are all related to effectively using certiﬁcation standards for the
certiﬁcation of safety-critical systems. The basis of this work is an explicit interpretation of
textual standards in order to promote a common understanding. We use conceptual models to
create this explicit interpretation and to formalize the evidence requirements of a certiﬁcation
standard. The main contribution of this thesis is an approach that uses models to assist
suppliers in managing the evidence required for certiﬁcation according to a speciﬁc industry
standard. Along side this work, three other direction for using conceptual models are explored:
(1) how to make the relationship between a generic and derived standard explicit; (2) how
to use conceptual models to guide planning for certiﬁcation and (3) how to automatically
generate an evidence repository.
There are seven papers included in this thesis. For Papers 1, 2, 3, 6 and 7, I was responsible
for the idea, the implementation and writing. My supervisors contributed to all phases of
the work with general advice and suggestions of improvements. Paper 4 was a tool paper
implementing one facet of my work, I was responsible for the idea and the implementation
was carried out by E. Turella under the guidance of D. Falessi with major contribution and
feedback from myself and my supervisors. Paper 5 is another tool paper implementing another
facet of this work where an evidence repository is generated from a conceptual model of
a standard. The implementation was carried out by T. Skyberg Knutsen under supervision
of myself and M. Sabetzadeh with major contributions from myself and L. Briand, I was
responsible for writing this paper.
All the work presented in this thesis was carried out in collaboration with partners from
industry. Both the suppliers and certiﬁers of safety-critical system were involved. The
problems faced by both parties motivated the work and their needs were considered when
creating the appropriate solutions.
Thesis Structure
This thesis is organized into two main sections:
Summary. This part explains the research conducted for this thesis and introduces the
included papers. In Section 2, background information on the main concepts discussed in this
thesis is presented and Section 3 describes the research goals of the thesis. Section 4 presents
the research method employed, including the data collection procedures. A summary of the
main results is in Section 5, while Section 6 discusses the future direction for this research.
Section 7 concludes.
2
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Papers. The rest of the thesis consists of the seven papers included in this thesis. The
ﬁrst six papers have been published in peer-reviewed conferences. The ﬁnal paper has been
submitted to an international journal. An overview of these papers is presented in Section 5.
3
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Operator Computer
Field Instrumentation
Final Elements
Process
Figure 1: Components of a Safety-Critical System
[9]
2 Background
The main topic of this thesis is to present an approach that aids suppliers of safety-critical
systems to prepare for certiﬁcation in a systematic and structured manner. Before presenting
the research undertaken and its results, it is necessary to deﬁne the concepts under study to
ensure a common understanding. This section presents the concepts related to safety-critical
systems and model-driven engineering.
2.1 Safety-Critical Systems
A safety-critical system is one in which the failure of the system can lead to injury or death
of people and/or damage to property and the environment [9]. The basic form of current
safety-critical systems that incorporate both hardware and software can be represented as
shown in Figure 1 [9].
A safety-critical system is usually used to control some process, this could be the machinery
for operating a drill in the sea-bed to extract oil, or it could be a control system for a car
assembly line. There is a computer based system that monitors and controls the process.
The monitoring is done via the ﬁeld instrumentation in the form of various types of sensors
such as temperature sensors or pressure sensors. The sensors send information of the process
being controlled to the computer system. The computer system has some software application
running that makes decisions based upon the received input. When the computer system
needs to affect a change in the process being controlled, it does so via some type of actuators,
sometimes called ﬁnal elements. The ﬁnal elements are used to affect a change in the physical
parameters of the process under control, e.g. open a valve to release pressure. The operator
is the human presence in this system, who oversees and manages the function of the overall
system.
2.2 Safety Certiﬁcation
Safety-critical systems are typically subject to a safety certiﬁcation process by licensing and
safety regulatory bodies. The aim of certiﬁcation is to provide assurance that a system has
been deemed safe for use in a speciﬁc environment. This is done by setting safety objectives
for the system being constructed. The safety objectives are based on the potential hazards
that can occur during the operation of the system. Suppliers are then required to demonstrate
how their system meets the safety objectives. Demonstrating the satisfaction of the safety
objectives involves gathering evidence during the lifecycle of a system and constructing
well-reasoned arguments that relate the evidence to the objectives. The evidence is then
presented to a third-party certiﬁcation body that assesses the system and issues a certiﬁcate,
4
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permitting the system to be deployed.
In order to regulate the certiﬁcation of safety-critical systems, there are industry recognized
certiﬁcation standards that set out the requirements for creating safe systems. The suppliers
follow the standards to create the evidence for certiﬁcation. Thus it is important that there is a
consistent understanding and an agreed-upon interpretation of the standard being used, and
all parties involved (supplier and certiﬁer) should know what evidence is to be collected and
maintained in readiness for certiﬁcation.
2.3 Standards for certiﬁcation
The certiﬁcation standards used for the certiﬁcation process can be in the form of either
national or international standards. Often, the requirement to adhere to a particular standard
may be part of a contract of purchase for a system. The use of a standard gives the purchaser
of a system some idea of the process that was followed to construct the system and also
conﬁdence in its use - since it comes with a certiﬁcate from a regulation body stating that it is
safe for operation. In some cases the certiﬁcate is also used in legal issues when an accident
has occurred - the owner of the system can use the certiﬁcate to show that the system had
been approved for operation, or the supplier can use it to show that the system had satisﬁed
all the requirements of the requisite standard when it was constructed.
Standards can be either generic standards that apply to a speciﬁc technology used in a
number of diverse domains or they can be domain speciﬁc for a particular technology. For
example, there is the general standard IEC61508 [16] which is used for the certiﬁcation
of electrical, electronic or programmable electronic systems that are used in safety-critical
environments. This standard has been written such that it can be used stand-alone, or
customised for a speciﬁc domain. The IEC61511 is one speciﬁc customization of this standard
for the process industry [15]. There are domain speciﬁc standards that do not originate from
generic standards, such as the DOD 178B standard that is speciﬁcally used for the certiﬁcation
of software used in airborne systems and equipment [23].
As control systems are being used to control increasingly complex systems, it is becoming
the norm to certify safety-critical systems based upon industry relevant standards. Thus, mak-
ing effective use of standards is an important issue for all parties involved in the construction
and operation of safety-critical systems. Some of the issues faced when using standards will
be highlighted in Section 3. In this thesis, the main standard used is the IEC61508 standard
and the next section provides some background information on this standard. The work in
this thesis is based on the 1998 edition of the standard, however, since then a new version has
been released.
2.3.1 The IEC61508 standard
IEC61508 is concerned with improving the development of safety-related electrical/electronic/-
programmable electronic systems (E/E/PES) whose failure could result in harm to people,
equipment, and/or the environment. In this standard, the term safety-related system is used
and refers to safety-critical systems. As stated earlier, the IEC61508 is a generic standard and
can either be used directly or for the creation of domain-speciﬁc standards in industries that
require an equivalent level of safety.
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The standard applies to both low-demand and continuous mode systems. In a low-demand
system, the frequency of demands for operation is low (the standard speciﬁes a precise range).
An example of a low-demand system is a ﬁre & gas protection system, which alerts personnel
if a ﬁre or gas leakage is detected and initiates protective actions either automatically or
through manual intervention. A continuous (or high-demand) mode system is one with a high
frequency of demands for operation. An example would be the dynamic positioning system
that continuously controls a vessel’s movement when the vessel is near a port or rig.
The goal of the standard is to ensure that safety-related E/E/PES systems operate correctly
in response to their inputs in order to either achieve or maintain a safe state of the equipment
under control. This is referred to as functional safety. Functional safety is not all there
is to safety. For example, the activation of an alarm in response to a ﬁre breakout is a
functional safety measure, whereas the use of ﬁre resistant walls to control the spread of ﬁre
is not, although the latter measure protects against the same hazard. IEC61508 deals only
with functional safety. A function that a control system performs to ensure that the system
remains in a safe state is referred to as a safety function. Each safety function speciﬁes what
safety objective is to be achieved (safety function requirement) and the level of integrity with
which the safety function is implemented, known as safety integrity level (SIL). The standard
speciﬁes four different safety integrity levels based on the consequences of the failure of the
system. Level four is the highest level and assigned to systems whose failure could have a
catastrophic impact on people and the environment. Level one is the lowest level and assigned
to those systems whose failure only has minor damage to property.
The IEC61508 standard consists of seven parts, part zero explains the concepts of functional
safety and provides an overview of the other parts that make up the standard. Part one contains
general requirements for the functional safety of E/E/PES systems and part two has speciﬁc
requirements for the hardware components whereas part three concerns the software employed
in E/E/PES systems. Part four contains deﬁnition and explanations of any abbreviations used
in the standard and part ﬁve contains examples of methods for the determination of safety
integrity levels. Part six contains guidelines on how to apply parts two and three and part
seven is an overview of the measures and techniques used to show the different levels of safety
that have been achieved. Thus the actual requirements for functional safety are in parts one,
two and three. To systematically deal with the activities necessary to achieve the required
level of safety (safety integrity level), each of these sections prescribes a safety lifecycle,
part one for the overall system, part two for the hardware components and part three for the
software components. The overall safety lifecycle is shown in Figure 2. The purpose of each
phase of the lifecycle is described below, noting that phases 10 and 11 are outside the scope
of the standard:
1. Concept: To develop a sufﬁcient level of understanding of the Equipment Under Control
(EUC) and its environment in order to enable the other safety lifecycle activities to be
satisfactorily performed.
2. Overall scope deﬁnition: To determine the boundary of the EUC and the EUC control
system; to specify the scope of the hazard and risk analysis.
3. Hazard and risk analysis: To determine the hazards and hazardous events of the EUC
and the EUC control system; to determine the event sequences leading to the hazardous
events; to determine the EUC risks associated with the hazardous events.
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Figure 2: Safety Lifecycle in the IEC61508 standard [16]
4. Overall safety requirements: To develop the speciﬁcation for the overall safety require-
ments necessary to achieve the required functional safety.
5. Safety requirements allocation: To allocate the safety functions in the overall safety re-
quirements speciﬁcation to the designated E/E/PE safety-related systems, other technology
safety-related systems, and external risk reduction facilities; to allocate a safety integrity
level to each safety function.
6. Overall operation and maintenance planning: To develop a plan for operating and
maintaining the E/E/PE safety-related systems, in order to ensure that the required func-
tional safety is maintained during operation and maintenance.
7. Overall safety validation planning: To develop a plan to facilitate the overall safety
validation of the E/E/PE safety-related systems.
8. Overall installation and commissioning planning: To develop a plan for the installa-
tion of the E/E/PE safety-related systems; to develop a plan for the commissioning of the
E/E/PE safety-related systems.
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9. E/E/PE safety-related systems realization: To create E/E/PE safety-related systems
conforming to the speciﬁcation for the E/E/PES safety requirements.
10. Other technology safety-related systems realization: To create other technology safety-
related systems to meet the safety function requirements at the integrity levels speciﬁed for
such systems.
11. External risk reduction facilities realization: To create external risk reduction facilities
to meet the safety function requirements at the safety integrity levels speciﬁed for such
facilities.
12. Overall installation and commissioning: To install and commission the E/E/PE safety-
related systems.
13. Overall safety validation: To validate that the E/E/PE safety-related systems meet the
speciﬁcation for the overall safety requirements.
14. Overall operation, maintenance, and repair: To operate, maintain and repair the E/E/PE
safety-related systems in a way that the required functional safety is maintained.
15. Overall modiﬁcation and retroﬁt: To ensure that the functional safety for the E/E/PE
safety-related systems is appropriate, both during and after modiﬁcation and retroﬁt.
16. Decommissioning or disposal: To ensure that the functional safety for the E/E/PE
safety-related systems is appropriate during and after decommissioning or disposing of the
EUC.
For clarity, activities relating to the management of functional safety (i.e., specifying the
management and technical activities during each phase, and responsibilities of those who
are to carry out the phase), veriﬁcation (i.e., demonstrating that the outputs of each phase
meet the objectives and requirements of that phase), and functional safety assessment (i.e.,
investigating and forming a judgment on the functional safety achieved) are not shown in
Figure 2. These activities can be potentially relevant to all lifecycle phases and need to be
applied wherever necessary.
Phase 9 of the overall safety lifecycle is concerned with the realization of E/E/PE part of
the system. This phase is expanded and shown in Figure 3 (for details of the activities in this
phase, see Part 2 of the standard). The standard requires an explicit safety lifecycle, shown in
Figure 4, for the software deployed on a PES. Thus both the hardware and the software have
their own development lifecycles, following by phases of integration of the two.
In order to comply with the standard, suppliers have to show that all hazards in the system
have been identiﬁed and mitigated according to the safety integrity level assigned. They also
have to show that they followed the development lifecycle using the techniques recommended
by the standard and that competent professionals carried out the work.
2.4 Model-Driven Engineering
This thesis purports the use of models as the foundation of the work presented. Models
have been the basis of all traditional engineering disciplines, where constructing models to
8
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understand and solve complex problems is the norm. Models provide a means of abstracting
away any irrelevant details and focusing on a speciﬁc viewpoint thus helping to alleviate
complexity. As software is being used in increasingly complex contexts, it is no longer
possible to understand the complexity involved without creating useful abstractions of the
system - to both, understand the domain of the system and to create the necessary solutions.
In the context of software engineering, Model-Driven Engineering (MDE), refers to the
use of models and model transformations, at various level of abstraction, for the creation of
software systems [12]. Gaševic´ et al. characterize MDE by two main relations - representation
and conformance. Representation means that a model represents a software artifact or a real
world domain. Conformance means that a model must conform to a higher level model that
describes it - a metamodel. A metamodel is described as the set of constructs and rules needed
to build speciﬁc models within a particular domain of interest.
In choosing a modelling language for the work carried out in this thesis, there were a
number of issues to consider:
(i) An existing, well known modelling language had to be employed. This was important
to the safety-critical system suppliers. They are sceptical about adopting new untried
tools and languages into their development practices as they have to justify the use of
any new tool and language.
(ii) The modelling language had to be able to model very diverse types of information.
There were three requirements here: (1) the need to model a safety standard; (2) the
need to create a domain model of the system, which in this context is all the physical
and abstract components of a family (class) of systems in a particular application area,
the environment in which this family of systems functions, and the key artifacts built
throughout its development; and (3) the need to provide a means of linking the two
types of models together to show how the system satisﬁes the standard.
(iii) The creation of the new models had to integrate easily with the development processes
already being employed by the suppliers. This was important in order to ensure that the
creation of the models did not impact the productivity of the development team - this
point is important in improving the chances of adoption of a new approach.
The main choice was between using a general-purpose modelling language(GPML) or a
domain-speciﬁc modelling language (DSML).
2.4.1 Uniﬁed Modeling Language versus Domain-Speciﬁc Modelling Languages
The most commonly used GPML in software engineering is the Uniﬁed Modeling Language
(UML) [22]. It is a standardized modelling language developed by the Object Management
Group (OMG) [2] and conforms to their metamodel that is expressed in the Meta-Object Facil-
ity (MOF) [3]. UML is used for the speciﬁcation, construction and documentation of software
artifacts. It provides a means for clearly and precisely communicating information regarding
the artifacts of software. UML provides modelling constructs that allow for modelling the
static structure of a system as well its behaviour at different levels of abstraction. All the
constructs can be visualized via a number of different diagrams. The static structure diagrams
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are class diagrams, object diagrams, component diagrams and deployment diagrams whereas
behaviour is presented via activity diagrams, sequence diagrams and state machine diagrams.
UML has a well deﬁned syntax and semantics. The syntax is divided into two kinds: the
abstract syntax that deﬁnes the kinds of elements and how they relate to other elements and
the concrete syntax that deﬁnes what the elements look like. The semantics of UML are
expressed using a combination of formal statements in the Object Constraint Language (OCL)
[1] and informal text. UML is designed to model the diversity that exists across the different
application domains that it can be used in. To allow for this diversity, UML has necessarily
been deﬁned with semantic variation points - these are points of variation in the semantics
of the metamodel that provide an intentional degree of freedom for the interpretation of its
semantics [7]. These semantic variation points may be deﬁned differently in different domains
and are usually of little concern for high-level modelling of systems, however, at a certain level
of detail, there will be a need to use some mechanism to provide the required domain-speciﬁc
interpretation [19]. The UML speciﬁcation provides extensibility mechanisms for this purpose
in the form of UML proﬁles.
Domain-speciﬁc modelling languages, on the other hand, are custom built languages that
purposely target a speciﬁc domain. An advantage of DSMLs is that they allow the end-users to
deﬁne the system according to the needs and perspective of the user domain whilst shielding
them from any implementation details. Model transformations are then used to translate the
domain-speciﬁc models into either further reﬁned models, or as is most often the case, into
automatically generated source code.
A DSML requires a meta-modelling infrastructure to be in place that will aid in the creation
of the abstract and concrete syntaxes as well as the semantics. A common infrastructure for
creating the abstract syntax is the Eclipse Modelling Framework [10] which employs the
Ecore metamodel for deﬁning the abstract syntax of a DSML. Further tools exist to create the
concrete syntax in either a graphical format or a textual one. The semantics of the language
also have to be agreed upon and appropriately deﬁned using a suitable notation. Note that
this as important challenge in the adoption of DSMLs - often it is the syntax that is formally
deﬁned and not the semantics [5, 6, 18]. DSMLs are meant to be easier to learn by the domain
experts, however their creation requires expert knowledge not only in the domain of use, but
also in the design of languages and well as expertise in the existing tools available for their
creation. This is a challenge as the infrastructure available for their creation is not yet mature
[5].
2.4.2 Modelling Language Selection
Using a DSML for creating models is useful when we have a speciﬁcally deﬁned domain.
The work in this thesis involves modelling safety standards as well as systems. Regarding the
standard, the information in the standard is being modelled to create an explicit interpretation.
The contents of the standard are being modelled not its structure - thus we are not dealing
with sections, paragraphs, numbered requirements and so forth but with the actual concepts
expressed in the standard. These vary greatly from expressing hazards and risk, to development
artifacts and system components. The standard itself is applicable to multiple domains from
safe load indicators on a crane to railway signalling systems and ﬂy-by-wire operations of
aircraft ﬂight controls. Hence, there are no speciﬁcs, not in the case of the standard nor in the
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type of system to be modelled. The types of models to be created are quite diverse and are
best expressed using a general-purpose modelling language.
The models are being created to show how the system satisﬁes the requirements of the
standard. Thus there is a need to link the two models together and yet maintain a clean
separation between the two so that the concepts of one do not confuse those of the other.
This is better achieved by using UML and its extension mechanism of proﬁles as opposed
to deﬁning two DSMLs - one for the standard and one for the system. Which still leaves the
problem of how to link the two types of models together whilst providing guidance in doing
so.
An advantage of using DSMLs is that source code can be automatically generated from the
models, this too is not applicable in the context of this work, where the models are created for
certiﬁcation and not code generation.
After deliberating on the types of constructs that will be needed for creating the models,
it was agreed that constructs to captures concepts, attributes, relationships, packages, enu-
merations, and inheritance would be sufﬁcient for modelling the standard and the domain
models of the system. These concepts are present in both DSMLs as well as UML. It seemed
a sensible choice to use a language that already has those constructs, instead of spending time
re-inventing them again.
UML, as a general-purpose language ﬁts all the identiﬁed needs:
• It is a standardized language that is used within industry and is well accepted as a
general purpose modelling language.
• The model of the certiﬁcation standard and the domain model of the system can be
created using the same language. It is also more likely that a UML model of a system
(perhaps partial) will exist that may be used as a basis for the certiﬁcation model.
• The UML proﬁle provides a clear and clean link between a model of a system and the
model of a standard and OCL constraints can be used to provide guidance in linking the
two models together.
Furthermore, the use of UML has been speciﬁcally limited to class diagrams to ensure
that too much complexity is not introduced. UML class diagrams are easy to understand and
hence their choice. The other constructs of UML have not been used in the interest of keeping
things simple and thus easy to adopt in industry, whilst still leaving the option of being able to
extend this work to include other constructs in the future. The constructs not being used do
not pose an issue, the users are informed that the proﬁle works only with the constructs used
in class diagrams and not other UML constructs. Should they want to use other constructs,
the proﬁle needs to be extended. However, they are free to use other models for any other
analyses that they want, the use of the proﬁle will not hinder them either. The only constraint
is that the certiﬁcation constraints are checked on class diagrams only.
Although, UML is criticised for not having formal semantics and allowing variation points,
this is only an issue if there is a need to mathematically analyse the information in the models.
In our case we use OCL to add the semantic information that is required and then validate
the OCL constraints, hence for the purpose of this work, the lack of formal semantics or the
presence of semantic variation points is not really an issue.
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The focus of the thesis is to use models, and visualize the models as and when necessary.
UML provides this capability: the models can be created textually or using the graphical
notation provided. To aid with the exempliﬁcation of the work, the thesis focuses on the
graphical notation but this is by no means a necessity when using UML. The tool infrastructure
used for creating the UML models is Rational Software Architect [13] which speciﬁcally
provides a mechanism for automatically generating the graphical representation of the models
when required - these are called browse diagrams. This is a useful facility when creating
very large models, it is not possible nor useful to visualize the entire model, but it is useful at
times to visualise parts of it. Thus the ability of UML to provide both a textual and graphical
notation is helpful indeed. In this thesis class diagrams are used for visualizing the static
structure of either systems (domain models of systems are created) or concepts retrieved
from standards (conceptual models of standards are created). Object diagrams are used for
visualizing instantiations of the class diagrams.
UML allows the creation of the conceptual model of the standard which along with a
glossary provides a means for creating an explicit interpretation of the modelled concepts.
The conceptual model is then converted into a UML proﬁle that is applied to domain models
of the system. This extension mechanism is one means of adapting UML to a speciﬁc domain,
however in this work it is used to provide a clean and clear connection between the certiﬁcation
standard and the domain models of the system to be certiﬁed. The UML proﬁle is used adapt
UML to the terminology used in a speciﬁc certiﬁcation standard. The next section discusses
how proﬁles are created and used.
2.4.3 UML Proﬁles: Extension Mechanism of UML
The UML standard provide a mechanism for extending the deﬁnition of its concepts so that
they can be customized for use in diverse domains or platforms. This mechanism is the
creation of a UML proﬁle. A UML proﬁle deﬁnes stereotypes which are extensions of the
elements of the UML metamodel. Stereotype are used to introduce new domain-speciﬁc
terminology and attributes to model elements. A simple example is shown in Figure 5.
Figure 5: Stereotype Example
The UML metaclass Class is being extended (indicated by the ﬁlled in arrow from Block
to Class). The stereotypes deﬁned are Block and its specializations SoftwareBlock and
HardwareBlock. The stereotype SoftwareBlock has an attribute named ’Level’ that is used
to state whether the software is at the system level or the module level as shown by the
enumeration type SoftwareLevel. As this stereotype extends the metaclass Class, it can
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be applied to instances of this metaclass - the Class construct in UML class diagrams, an
example is shown in Figure 6.
Figure 6: Stereotype Applied to ’Class’ Elements in a Class Diagram
A very simpliﬁed view of the braking system for a car is shown, consisting of a brake
controller and a traction detector. The brake controller is software that is made up of two
modules - one for detecting loss of traction and one for applying the brakes. In this example,
we can use the stereotypes to show which part of the system is hardware and which is
software and for the software we can also use the stereotype attribute to show the level of the
software - the system software is the BrakeController and the two modules it consists of
are DetectTractionLoss and ModulateBrakeForce.
Sometimes it may be necessary to ensure that elements with certain stereotypes also have
certain other properties. This can be done by deﬁning OCL [1] constraints on the stereotypes.
OCL is a standardized language for writing constraints based on ﬁrst order logic. The
constraints can be added to various types of model element. In this thesis, constraints are
added to stereotypes and then checked on the elements to which the stereotypes are applied.
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3 Research Goals
Safety-critical systems are certiﬁed based on industry relevant standards which set out the
requirements that must be fulﬁlled to gain certiﬁcation. Without standards upon which to
base the certiﬁcation requirements, the process would become ad hoc. Standards provide a
means of accumulating and sharing best practices and providing a structure to the certiﬁcation
process. However, the use of standards does pose some challenges to system suppliers and
certiﬁers alike. This section details these challenges and the related research goals for this
thesis.
3.1 Goal 1: Creating common interpretations of certiﬁcation standards.
Suppliers of safety-critical systems are well aware of the safety standards to which their
systems will be certiﬁed. In preparation for certiﬁcation, they need to have the requisite
evidence ready. To create this evidence, they need to read and understand the relevant standard
and the requirements therein. In order to use the standard effectively, there needs to be a
consistent understanding and agreed-upon interpretation of the standard being used, and all
parties involved should know what evidence is to be collected and maintained in readiness
for certiﬁcation. This common understanding also needs to extend to the certiﬁcation body
– it is hardly useful for the supplier and the certiﬁer to have different interpretations of the
standard being used. The different interpretations occur due to the standards being rather
large documents expressed textually in a language not easily understood by everyone in the
organization. Thus, they are amenable to subjective interpretation. This is an issue well
recognized in the literature, Redmill [24] addresses these issues in the context of IEC61508
standard, where readers have difﬁculty understanding the standard and engineers are unable
to interpret the standard consistently throughout an organization. Feldt et. al [11] discuss
it regarding standards used in the space industry, where there have been problems between
customers and suppliers due to the differences that exists in the interpretation of the applicable
standards. Most recently, Sannier et. al [26] have found the same problem in the nuclear
energy industry where there are gaps between the possible interpretations of the same standard.
Thus, there is a need to have a common and formal interpretation of the requirements of a
standard on which certiﬁcation can be based.
3.2 Goal 2: Specializing standards to industrial contexts.
As stated in Section 1, standards may be adapted to the context of their use such that there is a
generic standard and its sector-speciﬁc derivations. This practice is identiﬁed as specialization
in this thesis. IEC61508 is one such standard that has been adapted to a number of different
sectors. In the process industry, this standard is adapted as IEC61511 [15], in railways as
EN50128 [14], in the petroleum industry as OLF070 [27], and in the automotive industry as
the forthcoming ISO 26262 [17].
To effectively use derived standards, it is important to know which requirements of the
generic standard map on to the sector-speciﬁc standard. This speciﬁcation of the relationship
between two standards can also be necessary between two standards within the same industry
sector. Sometimes standards within a sector evolve, leading to different systems being
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speciﬁed to different versions of the same standard. In this case we again have a parent
standard and another that is derived from it, and we still have the issue of systematically
specifying the relationship between the two. Feldt et. al. [11] cite the lack of agreed-upon
relationships between generic and derived standards as one of the main reasons behind
certiﬁcation delays within the space industry. Whatever the case, there has been little work
to date on systematizing the speciﬁcation of the relationship between generic and derived
standards. Furthermore, Nordland [20] notes the lack of a well-formulated process for showing
that a derived standard is consistent with a generic one. This too is directly attributable to the
lack of precise and explicitly-deﬁned relationships between the standards.
3.3 Goal 3: Aligning Standards to organizational practices.
When a standard is being used within an organization it will need to be aligned to the practices
of the organization. In this manner, the organization can check which of its existing practices
comply with the standard and which new practices need to be introduced and tailored. Thus,
there is a need to assist system suppliers in relating the concepts of their application domain
to the evidence requirements of the applicable standards. This observation is based on the
fact that the majority of the evidence artifacts that the suppliers create and manage are based
on the concepts for the application domain, as opposed to the concepts of the certiﬁcation
standards. The certiﬁcation body also needs to interpret the standard in the context of the
application domain in order to understand how the evidence relates to the standard before it
can check whether sufﬁcient evidence exists to satisfy all the requirements of the standard.
This highlights the need for a systematic procedure for creating the necessary evidence and
presenting it in a form that will allow the certiﬁcation body to assess it in terms of both the
application domain and the relevant standard.
3.4 Goal 4: Planning for certiﬁcation.
Inherent in the three challenges above is the need to ensure that the supplier and the certiﬁer
are both using the same interpretation of the standard and that both have an upfront agreement
concerning the evidence artifacts that will be created during system development. If no such
agreement exists, then it is possible that the supplier may create evidence artifacts that do
not match the certiﬁers’ interpretation of the standard, or the supplier may be missing certain
artifacts that the certiﬁer deems necessary. This mismatch can be a costly affair for the supplier
who will need to remedy the situation after the system has already been developed. Thus,
there needs to be a systematic procedure for ensuring an upfront agreement regarding the
speciﬁcs of the evidence artifacts.
3.5 Goal 5: Managing safety evidence electronically.
The ﬁnal form in which the evidence is presented for certiﬁcation needs to be highly structured
in order to ensure that it is readable and assessable. In general, there is a large amount of
evidence that is gathered and all of it needs to be structured such that each piece of evidence
and how it relates to other artifacts is clear to the certiﬁer. Traditionally, this has been very
difﬁcult to achieve via the paper-based documents that form the basis of the certiﬁcation
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evidence. Thus, there is a case for managing this evidence electronically [8] in order to ease
navigation of the information and to allow for diversity of presentation, delivery and re-use.
3.6 Goal 6: Promoting re-use of safety evidence.
The type of systems that are usually certiﬁed are characterized as belonging to product
families that have many variants of a base system. Thus any proposed solution for managing
certiﬁcation evidence should take advantage of the re-use that is possible in these types of
systems to create a systematic and cost-effective solution.
Given these goals, a means to deals with different levels of abstraction in the information
that needs to be represented is needed: going from generic standards to specialized standards,
from product family to a speciﬁc variant of a system and a way to explicitly deﬁne the
relationships between the two. This, combined with the need to structure the information
systematically and electronically, led to the conclusion that the use of models would be an
ideal way to cover all the goals.
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4 Research Method
The research method employed for this thesis is referred to as ’Design and Creation’ [21].
This is a common method of conducting research whereby the focus is on developing new
information technology (IT) products to solve a problem. The end product is often an
instantiation of a computer-based system but it may also be a new construct, model or method.
A new construct could be the introduction of new concepts or vocabulary for the domain,
models are a combination of constructs that are used to help in the understanding of a problem
and the development of a potential solution whereas a method would be some guidance
on such models and the process employed to solve a problem using them. Of course, an
instantiation is a working system that demonstrates how the constructs, models and methods
are implemented in a computer-based system. The steps in this research method are awareness,
suggestion, development, evaluation and conclusion.
4.1 Awareness:
This is the recognition of a problem, it is akin to ﬁnding which research problem to solve.
The research problems to tackle within this thesis were based on the personal experience of
the author, the needs of the industry partners, a survey of the literature and ﬁeld research.
The author spent three months at a partner company to learn about their systems and identify
the issues that required solutions and would warrant research at the doctoral level. The ﬁeld
work entailed observing the work of the engineers involved in developing a safety-critical
application and participating in the creation of a domain model of the system to help them
achieve an overall picture of their system. Based on the discussion with practitioners, the six
goals discussed in Section 3 were developed as the research goals for this thesis.
4.2 Suggestion:
This is the proposal of a solution that will solve the goals identiﬁed. For this thesis, a model-
driven approach for certiﬁcation is proposed. Models are used (1) to clarify the expectations
of safety standards and recommended practices, and develop concrete guidelines for system
suppliers; (2) to alleviate the ambiguity and redundancy problems associated with text-based
documentation by using standard notations; (3) to provide a means for preserving traceability
and the chain of evidence between hazards, requirements, design elements, implementation,
and test cases; (4) to represent different levels of abstraction and an explicit mapping between
the different levels; (5) to partially or fully automate some of the laborious safety analysis
tasks (e.g., completeness and consistency checking). A number of solutions are put forth
for solving the different problems identiﬁed in the goals of the thesis. In some cases new
software was created (for goals 4 and 5) but in other cases (goals 1, 2, 3 and 6) new approaches
are proposed that use models to guide suppliers in preparing for certiﬁcation. Guidance is
provided on which models to create how to create them as well as how to use them within the
overall approaches that are proposed.
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4.3 Development:
This is the step in which the proposed solutions are implemented. Within this thesis the
main contribution was the creation of an approach to aid system suppliers in preparing
for certiﬁcation - a solution was implemented for sub-sea production systems [4] and the
IEC61508 standard [16]. All the steps of the proposed approach were carried out by creating a
conceptual model of the IEC61508 standard, followed by constructing a UML [22] proﬁle of
the same standard. The domain models for a part of a sub-sea production control system were
created and used to demonstrate how the system development artifacts achieved compliance
to the standard. For the other goals, two additional solutions were implemented one to aid
planning for certiﬁcation and the other to automatically construct evidence repositories.
4.4 Evaluation:
This is the process of analysing the developed IT products to assess their usefulness. In this
thesis industry relevant research is presented and the proof of the usefulness of an approach in
industry is its adoption for use by practitioners in the ﬁeld. Thus for the main contribution of
the thesis, which is the model-driven approach for preparing for certiﬁcation, a pilot study
was carried out to show the application of the approach in the maritime and energy domain,
followed by a survey of domain experts to determine their perceptions regarding the approach.
4.5 Conclusion:
This is the ﬁnal step where the results of the whole process are written up. This is the aim of
this thesis. The research carried out in this thesis has resulted in two tools that help with the
fulﬁlment of goals 4 and 5 of the thesis, an approach for maintaining consistency amongst
generic and derived standards and a novel approach for using UML proﬁles and model-driven
engineering to enable the automated veriﬁcation of the compliance of safety-critical systems
to industry relevant certiﬁcation standards. For this approach, guidance is provided on the
models to be produced and how these models are used within a process to aid certiﬁcation.
Existing tool support that is normally used within the context of system development is used in
a novel way to aid in the preparation for the certiﬁcation process. Furthermore, the approach
has been applied in the maritime and energy domain showing its feasibility in an industrial
context with acceptable effort involved. The majority of surveyed practitioners found the
approach easy to understand and were in favour of adopting the approach in their work.
4.6 Data Generation Methods
Within the research strategy of design and creation, different types of data generation methods
can be employed. The two main techniques used in this thesis are case study and survey. A
case study focuses on investigating phenomena in their context [25]. A case study is suited
when it is difﬁcult to separate the phenomena under study from its context. In this thesis a case
study was carried out to investigate the feasibility of the proposed model-driven approach for
certiﬁcation. In this case study, document analysis and a questionnaire were used to generate
the data. Certiﬁcation standards were analysed to create the conceptual model, books and
other domains standards were used to create the domain models of the system and documents
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detailing internal procedures of the supplier company were used to create the development
process models. Subsequently a survey was carried out to gain insight into the perceptions
of practitioners at the supplier company. A workshop was carried out during which all the
steps of the approach were explained in detail to a group of industry participants; the results
of the case study were presented and tool support was demonstrated. A question and answer
session was carried out to clarify any concerns. This was followed by a questionnaire that
participants answered to provide their perceptions. In this manner we were able to collate
their perceptions about the presented approach.
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Figure 7: Relationship between Research Goals and Research Papers.
5 Summary of Results
Seven research papers represent the main research results of this thesis. The relationship
between the papers and the research goals is shown in Fig. 7. Paper I addresses research
goal 1; paper 2 addresses research goal 2; paper III addresses research goals 3,4,5 and 6;
paper IV addresses research goal 4; paper 5 addresses research goal 5 as well but looks into
automatically creating repositories for evidence information. Paper VI is a vision paper that
explains our overall strategy for managing certiﬁcation evidence and paper VII is a journal
extension of paper III and presents an empirical evaluation of the approach for specifying and
analysing safety evidence in order to show conformance to a safety standard.
Paper I: Characterizing the Chain of Evidence for Software Safety Cases: A Concep-
tual Model Based on the IEC 61508 Standard.
Rajwinder Kaur Panesar-Walawege, Mehrdad Sabetzadeh, Lionel Briand, Thierry Coq.
Third IEEE International Conference on Software Testing, Veriﬁcation and Validation (ICST),
2010.
This paper addresses the goal of creating an explicit interpretation of the requirements of
a safety standard. This work was motivated by the fact that little has been done to precisely
characterize what evidence should be collected to comply with a safety standard, leaving
suppliers with little guidance on what evidence to collate during the development process.
This has left the suppliers having to recover the relevant evidence after the fact – an extremely
costly and sometimes impractical task. Although standards such as the IEC61508 – which is
widely viewed as the best available generic standard for managing functional safety in software
– provide some guidance for the collection of relevant safety and certiﬁcation information,
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this guidance is mostly textual, not expressed in a precise and structured form, and is not
easy to specialize to context-speciﬁc needs. To address these issues, a conceptual model is
presented to characterize the evidence for arguing about software safety. The model captures
both the information requirements for demonstrating compliance with IEC61508 and the
traceability links necessary to create a seamless chain of evidence. Furthermore, the paper
explores initial ideas on how a conceptual model can be specialized according to the needs
of a particular context, and discusses some important ways in which the model can facilitate
software certiﬁcation. Examples are presented to show how the conceptual model can be
specialized according to the needs of a particular context and describes some important ways
in which the model can facilitate software certiﬁcation. An analysis of a random sample
of issues raised in certiﬁcation meetings shows that a majority of them would have been
prevented or addressed by information collected according to the model. Applications of
the model include: the precise speciﬁcation of safety-relevant information requirements for
system suppliers; deﬁnition of a data model for developing a certiﬁcation repository; the
implementation of automatic, safety-relevant constraint veriﬁcation (e.g., compliance with
standard, recommended practice); and the automated generation of certiﬁcation reports on
demand.
Paper II: Using UML Proﬁles for Sector-Speciﬁc Tailoring of Safety Evidence Informa-
tion.
Rajwinder Kaur Panesar-Walawege, Mehrdad Sabetzadeh, Lionel Briand.
30th ACM International Conference on Conceptual Modeling (ER), 2011.
This paper addresses the goal of specializing standards to industrial contexts. A key
requirement of certiﬁcation is the provision of evidence that a system complies with the
applicable standards. The way this is typically organized is to have a generic standard that
sets forth the general evidence requirements across different industry sectors, and then to have
a derived standard that specializes the generic standard according to the needs of a speciﬁc
industry sector. To demonstrate standards compliance, one therefore needs to precisely
specify how the evidence requirements of a sector-speciﬁc standard map onto those of the
generic parent standard. Unfortunately, little research has been done to date on capturing the
relationship between generic and sector-speciﬁc standards and a large fraction of the issues
arising during certiﬁcation can be traced to poorly-stated or implicit relationships between a
generic standard and its sector-speciﬁc interpretation. This paper presents a methodology for
ensuring that a generic standard can be specialized in a systematic manner for a particular
domain. This is done by capturing the generic standard as a conceptual model using a UML
class diagram and using this as a basis for creating a UML proﬁle. The proﬁle is then applied
to the conceptual model of a sector-speciﬁc standard and used as an explicit means of keeping
track of the relationships between the two. The methodology is exempliﬁed by showing
excerpts of the IEC61508 conceptual model that was created earlier, the UML proﬁle based
on this model and how this proﬁle is applied to a conceptual model of the OLF070 standard
which is a sector-speciﬁc derivation of IEC61508 for the petroleum industry.
The approach offers two key beneﬁts: (1) It incorporates the speciﬁc concepts used by a
generic standard into the sector-speciﬁc standard whilst making a clear distinction between the
two; and (2) It explicitly captures the mapping between two standards and deﬁnes consistency
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rules between them, which can be automatically veriﬁed and used for providing guidance to
the users about how to resolve any inconsistencies.
Paper III: A Model-Driven Engineering Approach to Support the Veriﬁcation of Com-
pliance to Safety Standards.
Rajwinder Kaur Panesar-Walawege, Mehrdad Sabetzadeh, Lionel Briand.
22th IEEE International Symposium on Software Reliability Engineering (ISSRE), 2011.
This paper addresses the goal of aligning standards to organizational practices and managing
safety evidence electronically whilst promoting re-use. Certiﬁcation of safety-critical systems
according to well-recognised standards is the norm in many industries where the failure of
such systems can harm people or the environment. Certiﬁcation bodies examine such systems,
based on evidence that the system suppliers provide, to ensure that the relevant safety risks
have been sufﬁciently mitigated. The evidence is aimed at satisfying the requirements of the
standards used for certiﬁcation, and naturally a key prerequisite for effective collection of
evidence, is that the supplier be aware of these requirements and the evidence they require.
This often proves to be a very challenging task because of the sheer size of the standards and
the fact that the textual standards are amenable to subjective interpretation.
This paper shows how to use model-driven engineering principles and technology to specify
and analyze safety evidence in order to show conformance to a safety standard. This is done by
establishing a sound relationship between a domain model of a safety-critical application and
the evidence model of a certiﬁcation standard. The requirements of the relevant standard are
captured as a conceptual model using a UML class diagram which is then used as a basis for
creating a UML proﬁle. The proﬁle is augmented with constraints to aid system suppliers in
systematically relating the concepts in the standard to the concepts in the application domain.
The proﬁle is then applied to a domain model of a safety-critical application aiding system
suppliers in clearly demonstrating how the development artifacts of their system fulﬁll the
compliance requirements of a standard. Constraints can be automatically checked to ensure
full compliance. The approach is illustrated by presenting an excerpt of a case study to show
how the concepts in the domain of sub-sea production control systems can be related to
the evidence requirements in the IEC61508 standard. The IEC61508 standard was chosen
for illustration as it is a generic standard that applies to multiple domains and a successful
application of the approach to it is a good indication of the usefulness of the work.
Paper IV: Planning for Safety Evidence Collection: A Tool-Supported Approach Based
on Modeling of Standards Compliance Information.
Davide Falessi ,Mehrdad Sabetzadeh, Lionel Briand, Emanuele Turella, Thierry Coq, Ra-
jwinder Panesar-Walawege.
IEEE Software, 2012.
This paper addresses the goal of planning for certiﬁcation. Safety-critical software-
dependent systems such as those found in the avionics, automotive, maritime, and energy
domains often need to be certiﬁed based on one or more safety standards. An important pre-
requisite for demonstrating compliance to software safety standards such as IEC61508 is the
collection of safety evidence. Without an upfront agreement between the system supplier and
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the certiﬁer about the evidence that needs to be collected, there will invariably be important
omissions, which will need to be remedied after the fact and at signiﬁcant costs. In this paper,
a ﬂexible approach and a supporting tool are presented for assisting suppliers and certiﬁers
in developing an agreement about the evidence necessary to demonstrate compliance to a
safety standard. The approach is model-based; speciﬁcally, the safety standard of interest is
expressed via an information model. The supporting tool, which is available online, takes
this information model as input and helps system suppliers and the certiﬁers in reaching a
documented and consistent agreement about the safety evidence that needs to be collected.
Though the tool has not been formally evaluated, it is not a major (and disruptive) break from
current practice, and provides a more effective way to do what is being done already through
the manual completion of a plethora of different checklists and spreadsheets.
Paper V: CRESCO: Construction of Evidence Repositories for Managing Standards
Compliance.
Rajwinder Kaur Panesar-Walawege, Torbjørn Skyberg Knutsen, Mehrdad Sabetzadeh, Lionel
Briand.
Tool Demonstration paper at the 30th ACM International Conference on Conceptual Modeling
(ER), 2011.
This paper addresses the goal of managing safety evidence electronically in an alternative
method to that presented in paper III. A tool, CRESCO, is described for the Construction of
Evidence REpositories for Managing Standards COmpliance. CRESCO draws on Model
Driven Engineering (MDE) technologies to generate a database repository schema from the
evidence requirements of a given standard, expressed as a UML class diagram. CRESCO
in addition generates a web-based user interface for building and manipulating evidence
repositories based on the schema. CRESCO is targeted primarily at addressing the tool
infrastructure needs for supporting the collection and management of safety evidence data.
A systematic treatment of evidence information is a key prerequisite for demonstration of
compliance to safety standards, such as IEC61508, during the safety certiﬁcation process. The
goal was to show feasibility via a coherent combination of existing open-source technologies.
While the current tool provides a ﬂexible infrastructure for managing compliance evidence,
further work is required to turn it into a tool that can be deployed in a production environment.
In particular, consideration is being given to adding more sophisticated query facilities such
that complex queries can be posed as well as professional reporting facilities in order to extract
data from the database to create reports that can be directly given to the certiﬁcation body.
Paper VI: Using Model-Driven Engineering for Managing Safety Evidence: Challenges,
Vision and Experience.
Rajwinder Kaur Panesar-Walawege, Mehrdad Sabetzadeh, Lionel Briand.
1st International Workshop on Software Certiﬁcation at the 22th IEEE International Sympo-
sium on Software Reliability Engineering (ISSRE), 2011.
This paper is a vision paper that presents the overall vision for addressing the research
goals. Before a safety-critical system can be put into operation it must under go the process
of certiﬁcation. This paper discusses the challenges that are faced by system suppliers and
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certiﬁer when having to certify systems to safety standards. These challenges are based on
our experience in working in and with industry. System supplier are required to prepare for
certiﬁcation based on the relevant industry standards that are textually expressed and are
subjectively interpreted. The suppliers run the risk of not collecting the requisite information
during the development of the system and having to do so after the fact, leading to large cost
overruns and delays in deployment of systems. On the other hand, certiﬁers may receive a
large collection of documents from the supplier with the hope that the certiﬁer will ﬁnd the
required safety information (based on their interpretation of the standard). This results in the
certiﬁer having to invest a signiﬁcant amount of time and effort sifting through the provided
documents, and in many cases not ﬁnding what they were looking for. What is required is
a structured and systematic procedure for certiﬁcation where both parties can proceed in a
timely manner, being aware of what information to collect and how to navigate easily through
it.
This paper states the position taken in this thesis on how safety evidence should be charac-
terized and managed. Speciﬁcally, the application of Model-Driven Engineering as an enabler
for performing the various tasks related to safety evidence management is proposed. The work
carried out on the speciﬁcation of safety evidence requirements, upfront planning of evidence
collection activities, tailoring of evidence information to domain-speciﬁc needs, and storage
of evidence information is outlined. Models are proposed as the means to tackle the identiﬁed
issues: they can be used to clarify the expectations of standards and present opportunities for
automation of the certiﬁcation process. To this end, an overview of the work carried out to
show the potential of using model-driven engineering techniques for safety certiﬁcation is
presented.
Paper VII: Supporting the Veriﬁcation of Compliance to Safety Standards via Model-
Driven Engineering: Approach, Tool-Support and Empirical Validation.
Rajwinder Kaur Panesar-Walawege, Mehrdad Sabetzadeh, Lionel Briand.
Submitted to the Journal of Information and Software Technology (IST),2012
This paper is an extension of paper III, it provides a description of the approach for aligning
standards to organization practices, the required tool support and substantial new empirical
results demonstrating the feasibility and usefulness of our approach. A novel technique that
guides system designers in establishing a sound relationship between the domain model for a
safety-critical application and the evidence model for a certiﬁcation standard is proposed. The
approach makes use of UML proﬁles and builds upon mature MDE technologies and tailors
them for specifying and automatically checking the constraints that must hold for compliance
with safety standards. More precisely, a proﬁle is developed based on the conceptual model
of a given standard. The proﬁle is then augmented with veriﬁable constraints that help system
suppliers to systematically relate the concepts in the standard to the concepts in the application
domain. The resulting relationship provides a clear route for the supplier to demonstrate
how their development artifacts can be used for showing compliance to the standard. The
contributions in this paper are: (1) A general approach that uses MDE techniques to aid
preparation for certiﬁcation; (2) the adaptation of general modelling tools to manage evidence
for certiﬁcation; and (3) the application of the approach in the context of sub-sea production
control systems. The approach uses general MDE techniques in a novel way and can be
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adapted to other standards.
The results of the case study presented show that the approach provided systematic guidance
in relating the concepts in the domain of sub-sea production control systems to those of the
IEC61508 standard. It allows the suppliers to work in a modular fashion on the different
parts of the system whilst still having an overall picture of the entire system. The domain
experts that were surveyed indicated ﬁnding beneﬁt in adopting the approach in their work.
The IEC61508 standard was chosen as the standard for the pilot case study as it is a generic
standard that applies to multiple domains and a successful application of the approach to it is
a good indication of the usefulness of the work.
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6 Future Directions
The work in this thesis explored several directions for helping both suppliers and certiﬁcation
bodies with the process of certiﬁcation.
For the main contribution in this thesis - a model-driven approach for preparing for certiﬁ-
cation, there are a number of issues that can be further explored in the future.
The ﬁrst step is the creation of the conceptual model of a certiﬁcation standard. The model
of the IEC61508 standard that was created for the case study was validated by experts in a
certiﬁcation body that uses that speciﬁc standard. The experts provided feedback which led to
the revision of the model. The revised model was then presented to a group of twenty-eight
certiﬁcation experts in an industry workshop. During this workshop, the modelling notation
was explained and the model itself fully presented. A question and answer session was held.
This session resulted in no further changes to the model. Additionally, the author went through
an exercise of checking all the requirements in the standard and checking that each concept
in the model originated in a requirement from the standard. This ensures that there were no
extraneous concepts or relationships in the conceptual model that did not originate in the
standard. The focus of all this work was to create a speciﬁc and explicit interpretation of
the standard that can be used to aid certiﬁcation. We did not focus on investigating ways of
modelling the alternative interpretations that can results from the subjective interpretation of
the standard. This is work that needs to be further examined along with a study into whether
conceptual models can be used as a sole means for presenting standards. Would this type
of representation make it easy to identify changes in standards when they are updated, thus
providing a means of easily disseminating the changes.
When a product is certiﬁed, the version of the standard being used should be agreed upon
upfront and stated. This helps in ensuring that should a new version of the standard be released
in the middle of the product development, then the product is not impacted. Having said that,
when the standard does evolve, the conceptual model and hence the proﬁle of the standard is
impacted - the proﬁle will need to be updated to be in alignment with the new requirements
of the standard. This impacts any previously elaborated domain model since the domain
model will need to be elaborated again using the new proﬁle. It is possible to use a previously
elaborated domain model and remove the old proﬁle from the model. This will leave all the
elements but no stereotypes. Then the elaboration part can be repeated, but new elements are
only added as necessary - mostly it will be re-stereotyping of existing elements. This could
lead to ﬁnding elements that are no longer necessary and be a little more time conserving.
However, it would be interesting to devise a means of detecting the changes and automatically
analysing a previously elaborated model to detect the differences that have resulted due the the
changes in the proﬁle. I suppose this is a question of comparing two proﬁles and detecting the
differences and highlighting these differences on the elaborated domain model - this would
improve the re-usability aspect of elaborated domain models.
The domain model of the system can be quite large. UML provides the facility to create
hierarchical models and break down even their visual representations into manageable sizes, it
is necessary to decompose the models into usable chunks. In future work it would be useful to
check whether some of the models could be elaborated automatically e.g., where an element
is stereotyped as a software block and all the required relationships to certiﬁcation elements
are automatically generated and added to the model. The models could also be analysed to
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show all certiﬁcation elements that are still missing.
The model-driven approach presented in this thesis focusses on which certiﬁcation artifacts
are to be created and not on the contents of the artifacts themselves - even the certiﬁcation
standards do not go into detail about the contents of the artifacts. It is the work of the
certiﬁcation body to check that the contents of the artifacts generated are sufﬁcient. This thesis
focuses on the ﬁrst step in the process of getting a system certiﬁed - on which artifacts are
required. The next step is to ensure the appropriate contents of those artifacts. One direction
to pursue is to highlight for each artifact, which speciﬁc techniques need to be employed
in the creation of the content of that artifact. Usually the techniques are dependent on the
safety integrity level of the component to which the artifact refers to. Thus based on the SIL
level, the techniques could be recommended. This would be a ﬁrst step in helping with the
appropriate content of the certiﬁcation artifacts, further work also needs to be done to help the
certiﬁcation body in the evaluation of collated evidence.
Safety critical-systems are sometimes certiﬁed to multiple standards and it should be
explored whether the approach itself can be extended for the certiﬁcation of a system to
multiple inter-related standards.
Finally, as a minor technological addition, a report generator needs to be added to the
current tool infrastructure in order to present the models in the form of reports for upper
management. This would allow the provision of relevant information for a number of different
actors in an organization.
In terms of the work carried out on systematizing the speciﬁcation of the relationship
between generic and derived standards, the work needs to be validated with a comprehensive
case study. The work has been done for one speciﬁc derived standard but sometimes a derived
standard draws from multiple standards and this aspect needs to be explored further.
The creation of the automated repository for certiﬁcation data was a preliminary investi-
gation into this direction. The generated repository was checked with a small data set but it
also needs a comprehensive case study. In this work the constructed repository was developed
based on the conceptual model of a certiﬁcation standard, further work can be done to explore
whether such a repository can also be populated with data from models that have been created
based on the conceptual model. The repository can then be a means of linking this data to
other tools that cannot access the data in the models directly.
The work on using conceptual models for creating a tool for planning for evidence collection
can be further extended by combining it with the work done on automatically generating
evidence repositories for compliance evidence from conceptual models. The direction to
explore is whether the data in a generated repository can be automatically checked for
compliance with the agreement created from the planning tool.
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7 Conclusion
This thesis has presented solutions to a number of goals that were set forth in the domain of
certiﬁcation of safety-critical systems based on industry standards. The work is grounded on
creating conceptual models of certiﬁcation standards and using these models in a number of
different ways to aid certiﬁcation.
The ﬁrst application is for explicitly showing the relationship between a generic standard
and a domain speciﬁc one. A complete approach is presented on how this can be accomplished.
The case shown is the relationship between the generic IEC61508 standard and the OLF070
standard for the petroleum industry.
Further two tools are presented - one that automatically generates an evidence repository
from a conceptual model of a standard and another that uses this model to created a question-
naire that the supplier and certiﬁer can use to come to an agreement about which artifacts will
be created in readiness for certiﬁcation.
Finally, an approach for showing compliance to a safety standard is presented. This ap-
proach establishes a sound relationship between a domain model of a safety-critical application
and the evidence model of a certiﬁcation standard. The relevant standard is captured as a
conceptual model using a UML class diagram which is then used to create a UML proﬁle.
The proﬁle is augmented with constraints to aid system suppliers in systematically relating the
concepts in the standard to the concepts in the application domain. The proﬁle is then applied
to a domain model of a safety-critical application, aiding system suppliers in clearly demon-
strating how the development artifacts of their system fulﬁl the compliance requirements of a
standard. Constraints are automatically checked to ensure full compliance. A complete case
study for the feasibility of this work is given showing that the approach provided systematic
guidance in relating the concepts in the domain of sub-sea production control systems to
those of the IEC61508 standard. It allowed the suppliers to work in a modular fashion on the
different parts of the system whilst still having an overall picture of the entire system. The
domain experts surveyed indicated ﬁnding beneﬁt in adopting the approach in their work.
The successful use of IEC61508 as the standard for the case study is a good indication of the
usefulness of the work as it is a generic standard that applies to multiple domains.
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Abstract:
Increasingly, licensing and safety regulatory bodies require the suppliers of software-
intensive, safety-critical systems to provide an explicit software safety case – a
structured set of arguments based on objective evidence to demonstrate that the
software elements of a system are acceptably safe. Existing research on safety cases
has mainly focused on how to build the arguments in a safety case based on available
evidence; but little has been done to precisely characterize what this evidence should
be. As a result, system suppliers are left with practically no guidance on what
evidence to collect during software development. This has led to the suppliers
having to recover the relevant evidence after the fact – an extremely costly and
sometimes impractical task. Although standards such as the IEC 61508 – which
is widely viewed as the best available generic standard for managing functional
safety in software – provide some guidance for the collection of relevant safety and
certiﬁcation information, this guidance is mostly textual, not expressed in a precise
and structured form, and is not easy to specialize to context-speciﬁc needs. To
address these issues, we present a conceptual model to characterize the evidence for
arguing about software safety. Our model captures both the information requirements
for demonstrating compliance with IEC 61508 and the traceability links necessary
to create a seamless chain of evidence. We further describe how our generic model
can be specialized according to the needs of a particular context, and discuss some
important ways in which our model can facilitate software certiﬁcation.
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1 Introduction
Safety-critical systems such as those found in the avionics, automotive, maritime, and energy
domains are often required to undergo a safety certiﬁcation process. The goal of certiﬁcation
is to provide an assurance recognized by society (and in some cases by law) that a system is
deemed safe by the certiﬁcation body.
The justiﬁcation for safe operation of a system is usually presented in what is known as a
safety case [3, 13, 14, 16, 21]. Kelly [14] describes a safety case as being composed of three
principal parts: safety objectives, arguments, and evidence. Demonstrating the satisfaction of
the objectives involves gathering systematic evidence during development and constructing
well-reasoned arguments that relate the evidence to the objectives.
With the growing use and complexity of software in safety-critical systems, licensing and
safety regulatory bodies increasingly require system suppliers to provide an explicit software
safety case. A software safety case is a part of an overall safety case, which provides assurance
that the software elements of a system are sound, and that these elements are used correctly
within the overall system.
While the argumentation aspects of software safety cases (and generally, safety cases) have
been studied for a long time [18]; little has been done to precisely characterize the evidence
that underlies software safety arguments. As a result, suppliers of safety-critical software
have been left without proper guidance on what evidence to collect during development. This
has led to the suppliers having to recover the relevant evidence after the fact, which can be
extremely costly or even impractical. In addition, the quality of the overall safety case is
bound by the quality of the weakest link. Hence, current practices for managing software
safety evidence can severely limit the effectiveness of safety cases.
Although standards such as IEC 61508 [12] – which is widely viewed as the best available
generic standard for management of functional safety in software – provide some guidance for
collecting safety and certiﬁcation information, this guidance is mostly textual, not expressed
in a precise and structured form, and is not easy to specialize to context-speciﬁc needs.
The goal of this paper is to address the above issues by providing a conceptual model that
characterizes the evidence necessary for arguing about software safety. Our model captures
both the information requirements for demonstrating compliance with IEC 61508, and the
traceability links necessary to create a seamless continuum of evidence information, called
the chain of evidence [13].
In real-life projects, multiple rules, regulations and standards apply; therefore, our concep-
tual model needs to be further specialized according to the safety needs of the application
domain (e.g., national and international laws, and class society regulations in the maritime
domain [8]), the development process, and the technologies used to express requirements and
design decisions (e.g., SysML [10]). A specialized version of the conceptual model can in
turn be used for constructing an evidence repository. Such a repository can be utilized for
automating various development and analysis tasks associated with safety-critical software,
including safety report generation, checking of various compliance rules, and impact analysis.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: In Section 2, we give a brief introduc-
tion to the IEC 61508 standard. We provide a detailed exposition of our conceptual model
in Section 3; and in Section 4, we exemplify some key aspects of the model. In Section 5,
we explain how the model can be specialized according to the needs of a particular context.
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In Section 6, we describe some important applications of the model in software certiﬁcation.
Section 7 provides initial validation of the usefulness of our model. Section 8 compares our
work to related research; and Section 9 concludes the paper with a summary and directions
for future work.
2 Background
This section provides background information on the IEC 61508 standard (version published
in 1998). The standard is concerned with improving the development of safety-related
electrical/electronic/programmable electronic systems (E/E/PES) whose failure could result
in harm to people, equipment, and/or the environment. IEC 61508 is a generic standard and
can either be used directly or for the creation of domain-speciﬁc standards in industries that
require an equivalent level of safety.
The standard applies to both low-demand and continuous mode systems. In a low-demand
system, the frequency of demands for operation is low (the standard speciﬁes a precise range).
An example of a low-demand system is a ﬁre & gas protection system, which alerts personnel
if a ﬁre or gas leakage is detected and initiates protective actions either automatically or
through manual intervention. A continuous (or high-demand) mode system is one with a high
frequency of demands for operation. An example would be the dynamic positioning system
that continuously controls a vessel’s movement when the vessel is near a port or rig.
The goal of the standard is to ensure that safety-related E/E/PES systems operate correctly
in response to their inputs. This is referred to as functional safety. Functional safety is not all
there is to safety. For example, the activation of an alarm in response to a ﬁre breakout is a
functional safety measure, whereas the use of ﬁre resistant walls to control the spread of ﬁre
is not, although the latter measure protects against the same hazard. IEC 61508 deals only
with functional safety. A function that a control system performs to ensure that the system
remains in a safe state is referred to as a safety function. Each safety function speciﬁes what
safety objective is to be achieved (safety function requirement) and the level of integrity with
which the safety function is implemented (safety integrity level).
To systematically deal with the activities necessary to achieve the required level of safety, the
standard adopts an overall safety lifecycle. The lifecycle starts with establishing the concept
and overall scope of a system, and then conducting a hazard and risk analysis to determine
the hazards that can occur and the risks that they pose. Together, these activities determine
what has to be done to avoid the hazardous situations (derivation of safety requirements) and
the level to which safety has to be provided (derivation of safety integrity levels).
In the next step, the safety requirements are allocated to the various designated E/E/PE
safety-related systems, other technology safety-related systems, and external risk reduction
facilities (only the E/E/PE allocations are within the scope of the standard). Once the alloca-
tions are made, the realization phase begins for both the hardware and software aspects of
the E/E/PE safety-related systems. In tandem, planning begins for the installation and com-
missioning, operation and maintenance, and the ﬁnal overall safety validation of the system.
During the realization phases, the standard calls for a number of overarching veriﬁcation,
management, and assessment activities. The life cycle further takes into account the eventual,
safe, decommissioning or retroﬁt of the system.
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In this paper, we deal with the activities that take place during the realization of the software
part of a programmable electronic safety-related system. The standard requires an explicit
software safety lifecycle, shown in Figure 1, for the development of a PES.
Figure 1: IEC 61508 Software Safety Lifecycle
The lifecycle for the realization of the hardware in the E/E/PES is similar except that it
applies to the hardware. It is important to realize that the hardware and software development
lifecycles are happening in parallel and certain hardware architectural assumptions will have
to be in place before the relevant software lifecycle can be started.
The software has to be implemented such that it fulﬁlls the safety requirements allocated
to it. In order to be able to show this during software safety validation and assessment, it is
crucial to maintain traceability between the software safety requirements, and the decisions
taken during design, and the actual implementation in code. This is a complex task and needs
to be performed whilst the system is being developed, not once the development has ﬁnished.
Providing an accurate description of the safety information that needs to be preserved during
software development is the main motivation behind our work in this paper.
The software safety lifecycle in Figure 1, together with the overall lifecycle activities
(veriﬁcation, management and assessment of safety) specialized to software, form the basis of
the conceptual model in Section 3.
3 Conceptual Model
Figure 2 formalizes our conceptual model as a UML class diagram. The concepts in the
model are only succinctly and intuitively deﬁned here and precise deﬁnitions are provided in
a technical report [4]. To manage the apparent complexity of the model, the concepts have
been divided into ten packages. We describe these packages next. Note that this conceptual
model is meant to deﬁne, in a precise way, information requirements to demonstrate both
compliance with the standard and, perhaps more importantly, ensure the safety chain of
evidence is collected.
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Figure 2: Core Concepts and Relationships
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3.1 System Concepts
The System Concepts package describes the basic elements needed to conceptualize safety-
related control systems that involve both hardware and software. A Programmable Electronic
System (PES) is a block made up of one or more hardware blocks and controlled by a number
of software blocks. A hardware block may represent a mechanical, electrical or electronic
entity, both programmable and non-programmable. Both hardware and software blocks can be
hierarchically decomposed into lower-level blocks. For software, the typical decomposition
levels are: module, component, subsystem, and system. The links between blocks and the
corresponding development artifacts (see Section 3.5) are captured through the association
between the Block and Artifact concepts.
Interactions between the blocks are expressed as interfaces. Making the interfaces explicit
is necessary to minimize mismatches and deadlocks during integration. For arguing software
safety at the level of an individual PES, the interfaces of interest are those that have a
software block at least at one end (i.e., no hardware-to-hardware interfaces). For integration
of system-of-systems, interfaces between PESs are crucial as well.
Interactions between a PES and the human elements are modeled through user roles. Safety
issues can arise due to misuse or unauthorized access to a system. Mitigating these issues
requires an accurate description of how different groups of users can interact with the PES.
Each block is traceable to the requirements allocated to it. At the PES level, the allocations
are made during the safety requirements allocation step of the IEC 61508 overall safety
lifecycle. The PES-level (safety) requirements are used to derive requirements for the software
and hardware blocks. We discuss requirements in Section 3.3. Blocks can evolve over time and
are thus versioned and placed under conﬁguration management. Conﬁguration management
is addressed in Section 3.7.
3.2 Hazard Concepts
The Hazard Concepts package captures the hazards and the risks they pose, which then
constitute grounds for safety requirements and safety integrity levels. A hazard is any real or
potential condition that can cause injury, illness, or death to personnel; damage to or loss of a
system, equipment or property; or damage to the environment.
The potential for a hazard to occur exists whenever the system has some hazardous element
in it – this is the basic hazardous resource creating the impetus for the hazard. An example
could be a hazardous energy source such as explosives. The hazardous element in itself is
not sufﬁcient to trigger a hazard. The trigger is captured using the concept of an initiating
mechanism. An initiating mechanism is a sequence of events that leads to the actualization of
a hazard. Hazards are the basis for deriving safety requirements.
Each hazard is analyzed to assess the risks it poses, using risk assessment techniques. In
essence, a risk is the combination of the probability of occurrence of a particular harm and the
severity of that harm to a person or object, usually referred to as the target.
The probability of occurrence is referred to as the likelihood and is sometimes qualitatively
divided into: frequent, probable, occasional, remote, improbable and incredible. The level of
harm caused is referred to as the consequence and can be qualitatively rated as catastrophic,
critical, marginal or negligible. Together, these are used to give a tolerance level to a risk.
The level of tolerance of a risk is then used to derive a safety integrity level. The results of
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hazard and risk analysis are presented as a Description. Hazards and risks can be referred to
in various other development artifacts such as requirements speciﬁcations.
3.3 Requirements Concepts
The concepts necessary to describe the requirements for creating, operating, maintaining and
decommissioning a system are included in the Requirements Concepts package. Traceability
from requirements to the corresponding PES, system blocks, hazards and artifacts forms an
important part of the chain of evidence.
A requirement is a statement identifying a capability, characteristic, or quality factor of a
system in order for it to have value and utility to a user. Requirements are one of the central
concepts of system development and are thus naturally connected to concepts in many other
packages. A requirement is typically concerned with some particular aspect of the system
(functionality, usability, performance etc.). This information is captured in the "type" of the
requirements. Each requirement is linked to the block(s) that must realize it. A rationale item
might be afﬁxed to a requirement to justify why that requirement exists. If an issue is raised
about a requirement at some stage of development, the issue is recorded and linked to the
requirement as well. The source of a requirement may be a person, organization, standard or
recommended practice. A requirement may apply to certain operating modes of the system
such as normal operation, maintenance, shut down, and emergency. Each operating mode may
have a set of designated states, which would render the system safe or unsafe. For example, it
might be unsafe to run a boiler engine during maintenance.
A particular class of requirements is that which concerns safety. Safety requirements are
used to ensure that the system carries out its functions in an acceptably safe manner. These
requirements are derived from hazards, and are intended to mitigate the risks posed by these
hazards. Each safety requirement is assigned a safety integrity level based on the likelihood
and consequences of the risks it mitigates.
Safety integrity is deﬁned as the probability of the system to successfully perform a required
safety function. Usually, the dual notion of probability of failure (instead of probability of
success) is used. The failure rate unit can be "failure per hour" for high demand or continuous
operation and "failure on demand" for low demand operation. When a safety requirement only
partially addresses a risk, the residual risk (i.e., the risk fraction remaining after the protective
measures have been taken) is recorded.
A requirement may relate to other requirements in a number of ways. Example relation-
ships include: when a lower-level requirement (e.g., module requirement) is derived from
a higher-level requirements (e.g., system or component requirement), when a requirement
contributes positively or negatively to the satisfaction of another requirement, and when a
requirement conﬂicts with or overrides another requirement. In these cases, we need to main-
tain traceability between the involved requirements. This is done using a reﬂexive association
for the Requirement concept.
A requirement can have various development artifacts associated with it. Particularly, a
requirement is speciﬁed in some requirements speciﬁcation, and referenced in many other
artifacts such as design and architecture speciﬁcations, test plans, source code, and also other
requirements speciﬁcations where related requirements are captured.
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3.4 Process Concepts
Development of software for a PES follows a certain process. This is expressed using the
Process Concepts package. Further reﬁnements of the process concepts would have to be
performed in speciﬁc contexts of applications, accounting for the speciﬁcs of the process in
place.
The notion of activity is the central concept in this package, representing a unit of behavior
with speciﬁc input and output. An activity can be further decomposed into sub-activities. A
(lifecycle) phase is made up of a set of activities that are carried out during the lifetime of
a system, starting from system inception to decommissioning. To be able to accommodate
iterative development processes, we do not restrict activity types to particular development
phases. Restrictions will be expressed externally where necessary, for example using OCL
constraints [1].
Each activity utilizes certain techniques to arrive at its desired output, given its input. The
selection of techniques is intimately related to the safety integrity level that needs to be
achieved. For example, if the activity in question concerns software veriﬁcation, constructing
formal proofs of correctness is usually unnecessary for low integrity levels, whereas, formal
proofs are highly recommended (and often necessary) for the highest integrity levels. Speciﬁc
technique recommendations (e.g., recommended, not recommended, highly recommended,
mandatory) are made based on the overall standard guidelines, and the requirements of the
certiﬁcation bodies in charge of assessing functional safety.
Each activity requires certain kind of competence by the agents performing it. The agent
itself can be either an individual person or an organization. In either case, the agent is
identiﬁed by the type of role it plays, for example the agent may be the supplier of a system
or the operator. Agents can be made responsible for certain development artifacts.
3.5 Artifact Concepts
The Artifact Concepts package characterizes the inputs and outputs of the development
activities. The main concept here is Artifact, which describes the tangible by-products
produced during development. IEC 61508 provides a high-level classiﬁcation of the different
types of development artifacts: a speciﬁcation (e.g. requirements speciﬁcation); a description
(e.g. description of planned activities); a diagram (e.g. architecture diagram); an instruction
(e.g., operator instructions); a list (e.g., code list, signal list); a log (e.g., maintenance log); a
plan (e.g., maintenance plan); a report (e.g., a test or inspection report); and a request (e.g., a
change request).
An artifact might be built based on a standard, e.g., source code may follow a certain coding
standard. Each artifact can pertain to requirements, blocks, hazards, and risks, as discussed
in earlier sections. An artifact can be linked to other artifacts as well. For example, a design
document may realize the requirements in the requirements speciﬁcation, or a report could
be the result of carrying out a plan. Issues that are identiﬁed during lifecycle activities are
documented in reports. Like system blocks, artifacts can evolve over time and are therefore
versioned and under conﬁguration management.
IEC 61508 prescribes speciﬁc input and output artifacts for all the activities in the overall
lifecycle. As an example, we have shown in Figure 3 the input and output artifacts for the
Software Module Testing activity, whose goal is to verify that each software module performs
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its intended function and does not perform unintended functions. In the technical report
version of this paper [4], we provide conceptualizations similar to that in Figure 3 for all the
software lifecycle activities.
Activity
SoftwareModuleTesting
SoftwareModuleTestSpecification SourceCode
CodeReviewReport
SoftwareModuleTestResultsReport Report
ListSpecification
TestingActivity
1 output
1 produces
1 requires
1 input
1 requires
1 input
1requires1 input
Figure 3: Software Module Testing Activity
Note that the links between the more speciﬁc subclasses of Artifact and these lifecycle
activities (e.g., the link between Source Code and Software Module Testing in Figure 3) reﬁne
the high-level input and output links between Artifact and Activity in the conceptual model.
Therefore, in Figure 2, the links between Activity and Artifact can be seen as derived (hence
the ’/’ before the link names). Further, note that the various artifacts in the standard need to
be specialized in any given context. For example, the Software Module Test Speciﬁcation
in Figure 3 could be deﬁned as being composed of test cases that exercise certain blocks
or requirements. Similarly, the notions of test stub, and test driver could be made explicit
for testing. Deciding about how much structure to enforce on each artifact is one of the key
aspects of specialization (see Section 5).
3.6 Issue Concepts
The concepts enabling the description of issues are modeled in the Issue Concepts package.
Issue is the broad term we use to denote a point in question or a situation that needs to be
settled in regards to a controlled item or a requirement (controlled items are discussed in
3.7). Issues may represent defects, human mistakes, or enhancements and can be a result of
activities concerned with Veriﬁcation & Validation (e.g. testing and inspection) and safety
assessment. In addition, enhancement may be proposed at different stages of development as a
result of activities such as requirements engineering and design, or in response to the ﬁndings
of V&V and safety assessment. Defects can be further reﬁned into errors, failures and faults.
An error is a discrepancy between the actual and the ideal output. IEC 61508 distinguishes
system errors from human errors, referred to as mistakes. Mistakes denote unintended results
due to human action or inaction. A failure is deﬁned as the inability of a unit to perform
a required function, and a fault as the abnormal condition that causes a unit to fail (e.g., a
software bug).
To illustrate these concepts, consider a boiler system. An error could be when the observed
temperature is 80 degrees Celsius while the water is boiling, i.e., when the expected value is
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100. If there is a safety requirement stating that the boiler should activate the pressure-release
valve in case of over-heating (i.e., when the temperature has reached 100), then the error
would lead to a failure, because the safety function would not be delivered. An error does
not necessarily lead to a failure. In our example, if the actual temperature was 80 and the
observed one was 60, there would still be an error but no failure. Failures and errors might
imply faults. In our example, the fault could be a damaged sensor or the boiler’s control unit
incorrectly interpreting the temperature sensor output.
Mistakes made by an operator of the system can lead to failures. For example, if the safety
function requires manual intervention and the operator fails to notice the alarm indicating an
over-heating boiler, he would not engage the safety function. Mistakes may lead to changes to
the operating procedures, or even the system. For example, the operating procedure may be
changed to ensure that at least one operator is monitoring the control panel at all times; or the
system’s user interface may be revised to reduce the possibility of alarms going unnoticed.
The decision made about an issue (whether it is valid, and if so, how it has been resolved)
is documented in a report. The resolution of an issue may induce change to some controlled
items. Note that issues can be raised not only through the development stage, but also during
operation, maintenance, decommissioning, etc.
3.7 Conﬁguration Management Concepts
Valid issues need to be addressed through change. The concepts required for management of
change and for ensuring that the safety requirements continue to be satisﬁed as the system
evolves are captured in the Conﬁguration Management Concepts package. Demonstration
of accurate change management is necessary for compliance with IEC 61508. The central
concept here is a controlled item, which is any item for which meaningful increments of
change can be documented. In our model, blocks, artifacts and PESs are controlled items.
Each controlled item may have some rationale to justify its existence, and assumptions to
describe constraints or conditions about the item. Assumptions and rationale are further
explained in Section 3.8. Changes to controlled items are made in response to issues, as
discussed earlier, and can be justiﬁed by rationale.
3.8 Justiﬁcation Concepts
System development entails various decisions which need to be justiﬁed by reasoning and
based on assumptions about the domain and the artifacts. The basic concepts to enable
justiﬁcation are provided in the Justiﬁcation Concepts package. There are two concepts here,
assumption and rationale. An assumption is a premise that is not under the control of the
system of interest, and is accepted as true. A rationale is the reason that explains the existence
of a controlled item or a requirement in the system. The rationale may rely on some of the
assumptions that have been made about the concerned block or artifact. An assumption about
a PES as a whole will have overarching affects whereas assumptions regarding a particular
block may affect how it is designed and implemented. In safety-critical systems, assumptions
play a key role. In particular, most statements about the safety of a system are tied to the
assumptions made about the environment where the system will function [13].
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3.9 Guidance Concepts
Many aspects of development are inﬂuenced by guidance from external resources. For exam-
ple, a sector-speciﬁc standard or a recommended practice may mandate certain requirements
that must be fulﬁlled by the PES; or the implementation source code may be expected to be
based on a certain coding standard. Such external resources are captured using the Guidance
Concepts package. The guidance package describes the various sources of advice and recom-
mendations used throughout development. A standard provides formal recommendations on
engineering or technical criteria, methods, processes and practices and can be either general
such as IEC 61508 or sector-speciﬁc such as ISO 17894 [2] that provides principles for the
development and use of PESs in marine applications . The recommended practice on the other
hand may be much more prescriptive and speciﬁc, providing sound practices and guidance for
the achievement of a particular objective. Either may be used as a measure of compliance.
3.10 Domain-Speciﬁc Concepts
Finally, the Domain-Speciﬁc Concepts package contains enumeration types that can be
customized by deﬁning speciﬁc enumeration values for a given context. The concepts behind
the enumerations have already been described in the other package descriptions. In Figure 4,
we show examples of the kinds of values that can be used for each enumeration type.
4 Illustrating the Chain of Evidence
The conceptual model described in the previous section gives an overall view of the safety
evidence pieces and the interconnections that need to be established between these pieces
during the lifecycle of a safety-critical system.
Figure 5 shows a partial instantiation of the concepts in the model and their links. The
hazard shown is the breakout of ﬁre on an oil platform. The hazardous element involved is
the combustible gas on the platform. The initiating mechanism leading to a ﬁre breakout is
the presence of a gas
leak and a spark in the vicinity of the leak. The hazard is identiﬁed during a hazard analysis
activity and documented in a hazard log. For every hazard, a risk analysis activity is conducted
and a report indicating the risks to mitigate is created. Two of the potential risks that such a
ﬁre can pose are damage to the platform and loss of life.
Based upon the hazard, safety requirements are derived and allocated to the various risk
mitigation facilities. One such facility is the ﬁre & gas protection system. The safety
requirement allocated to this PES is that it must detect a ﬁre breakout within two seconds of
occurrence. A safety requirement for the software system is then derived for the software
system that controls the PES, stating that the time from the actual detection of ﬁre from the
sensor until an alarm (visual and/or aural) is presented on the operator control panel is less
than one second. This requirement is further partitioned between the control software and the
heat sensor driver. The requirement allocated to the sensor driver is that it must keep the delay
between two consecutive polls of the sensor to less than 200 milliseconds.
In this example, we can see the relationships between the different blocks, the requirements
associated with each block, the derivation of lower-level requirements from higher-level
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Figure 4: Example Values for Domain-Speciﬁc Enumerations
Figure 5: Example Evidence Information
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requirements, the root hazard and associated risks, and the lifecycle activities. The example
could have been expanded to show a variety of other activities (e.g., design and testing) and
artifacts (e.g., design speciﬁcations, test speciﬁcations and test results). All this information
needs to be accounted for when a software safety case is being developed.
5 Specialization of the Conceptual Model
IEC 61508 is a generic standard and can be implemented and augmented in a variety of
ways depending on contextual factors, including the characteristics of a particular application
domain, and the development process and technologies to be used. Specialization is an
important prerequisite for developing a coherent, IEC 61508-compliant safety information
model, which can guide data collection and support analysis in a particular development
context. The generic conceptual model we developed in Section 3 provides an intuitive and
technically rigorous basis for describing specializations. As an example, we show how to
deﬁne a special type of the Diagram artifact (see Section 3.5), and use this specialized diagram
for expressing Assumptions (see Section 3.8).
In a safety-critical system, it is important to state the assumptions (e.g., about the operating
environment) in a way that permits systematic analysis. This helps ensure that we can assess
the validity of requirements, speciﬁcations, and design decisions and to verify that there are
no conﬂicts between the required system properties [13]. A powerful and ﬂexible notation for
formalizing assumptions is the Parametric Diagram in the SysML modeling language [10].
This type of diagram is used for representing constraints on a system’s property values. In
Figure 6, we have shown an example parametric diagram.
HydraulicPressDomain
feedbelt:Feedbelt
length width
constraint:DimensionsConstraint
 value=(plate_height<1/4*feedbelt_length)AND(plate_width<3/4*feedbelt_width)
plate_height plate_width feedbelt_length feedbelt_width
value
plate:Plate
height width
is_acceptable
Figure 6: Parametric Diagram for an Assumption
The diagram describes a domain assumption about the physical dimensions of the plates
that are fed to a hydraulic forging press. The assumption states that the height of a plate is
no larger than ¼of the length of the feed belt that conveys the plate to the press, and that the
width of a plate is not larger than ¾of the width of the feed belt. The former constraint is to
47
5. SPECIALIZATION OF THE CONCEPTUAL MODEL PAPER I
ensure that the plate is small enough to be picked up by the robot arm that places the plate on
the press table, and the latter – to ensure that plates would not fall off the edges of the feed
belt while in motion.
If we want to develop a specialized standard or recommended practice requiring that a
parametric diagram should be constructed for every assumption, our conceptual model will
be extended as follows: A Parametric Diagram is deﬁned as a subclass of Diagram and an
association is established between Assumption and Parametric Diagram. This is depicted in
Figure 7.
JustificationConcepts
Assumption
ArtifactConcepts
Diagram
SysML
Parametric
Diagram
expresses
11
Figure 7: A Specialization of the Generic Model
In general, specialization refers to the extensions one makes to the conceptual model of
Figure 2 in order to adapt it to a particular context. The extensions can be made by adding
new classes (or subclasses), associations, attributes, and constraints. The example in Figure 7
already shows the addition of new (sub)classes and associations to the model. Below, we
illustrate some simple extensions through new attributes and constraints. The model in
Figure 2 is intentionally abstract, thus only providing the attributes that are fundamental to
understanding the concepts. Any specialization of the model into an applicable, context-
speciﬁc information model necessarily requires many new attributes to be deﬁned. For
example, most concepts need a universal identiﬁer (uid), a name, and a description attribute.
Constraints will be used frequently in the specializations of the model as well. For example,
IEC 61508 highly recommends that module testing (see Figure 3) for safety integrity level
4 (SIL 4) should utilize probabilistic testing. If the certiﬁcation body applying the standard
wants to make this mandatory, it may choose to add the following OCL constraint to the
model in Figure 2:
context SafetyIntegrityLevel
inv:
self.forAll(sil.value = 4 implies
sil.SafetyRequirement.Block-> forAll(
b.SoftwareModuleTestResultReport.output.
Technique-> exists(t.name = "Probabilistic Testing"))
The above constraint states that a module testing activity associated with a block that has
SIL 4 requirements must utilize the probabilistic testing technique (we have assumed that
each technique is identiﬁed by a name attribute).
A full specialization of our conceptual model will involve numerous extensions like the
ones illustrated above. Once a full adaptation of our model to a particular context is arrived at,
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the resulting model can be used to drive data collection during the development process and
to automate some of the most important and yet laborious tasks in the software certiﬁcation
process, as we discuss in the next section.
6 Applications
Having described our conceptual model and how it can be specialized, we now discuss some
important ways in which our conceptual model or its specializations can facilitate software
certiﬁcation.
6.1 Aid to Understanding and Communicating IEC 61508
At the most basic level, the conceptual model we have developed helps improve understanding
and communication of the IEC 61508 standard. Interpreting a standard like IEC 61508 is a
daunting task for a software supplier. Even when attempted, the interpretation of a supplier is
likely to be signiﬁcantly different from that of the certiﬁer. An issue we have noticed through
our interactions with safety-critical software suppliers is that it is not always clear to them
what documents and information, and at which level of detail, they are expected to provide
in support of safety. Furthermore, it is frequently unclear what the scope of each document
should be, and how these documents should be linked to hazards, requirements, activities, and
so on. These issues typically lead to several unnecessary iterations to reﬁne and complete
certiﬁcation documents as well as many misunderstandings that could have been avoided.
A concise but precise graphical representation of the core concepts in the standard such as
the one we have developed here is a valuable and appealing aid for understanding and using
the standard. In particular, the representation can be used by the certiﬁers to convey their
expectations and to clarify the information requirements for demonstrating compliance.
6.2 A Contract between Suppliers and Certiﬁers
After our conceptual model has been specialized to a particular context, it can be viewed as
a formal contract between the supplier and the certiﬁer. Speciﬁcally, from the specialized
conceptual model, the supplier can determine what evidence the certiﬁer expects, and can
accordingly plan its data collection strategy. In the absence of such a contract, the supplier will
not know a priori what evidence needs to be collected. This often leads to the supplier failing to
record important information during the development process, and having to incur signiﬁcant
costs to recover the information later on. Having such a contract is also advantageous to the
certiﬁer, because it permits them to assume that the safety evidence provided to them has
certain content and structure.
Hence, the certiﬁer can optimize its safety assessment procedures according to the content
and structure mandated by the contract. For instance, the specialization example we gave in
Section 5 would bind the supplier to use a SysML parametric diagram for expressing assump-
tions. Hence, the supplier would know exactly how to express and record assumptions during
development and the certiﬁer would know exactly what they can expect during assessment
and possibly build supporting analysis tools to analyze the consistency and completeness of
assumptions.
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Finally, the existence of a formal contract for safety evidence means that certiﬁers and
suppliers may deﬁne a common language for the electronic interchange of data, for example
based on XML. This offers an opportunity for automation of some laborious certiﬁcation
tasks, as we are going to describe below in Sections 6.3 and 6.4.
6.3 Automatic Safety Report Generation
Our conceptual model provides an abstract structure for the organization of software safety
information. Once tailored to a particular context through specialization, the resulting concrete
structure can be used as the basis for a repository for storing development artifacts, process
knowledge, hazard analysis data, safety audits, etc. This repository can be queried automati-
cally for safety-relevant information, and the results then assembled into safety reports. For
example, the links in Figure 5 can be traversed from the hazard to all the related elements, and
a structured document can be generated to facilitate the veriﬁcation of all the safety evidence
related to the hazard. Modern model-driven technologies already enable the development of
such infrastructure.
The main traceability requirement for generation of safety reports has to do with how
software development artifacts (e.g., software requirements, architecture, design, and tests)
are linked to the higher-level safety concepts such as hazards, environmental and domain
assumptions, and overall safety requirements. Establishing this traceability is a key issue that
one must consider when the conceptual model is being specialized to a given context and the
speciﬁc artifacts to be used in that context are being deﬁned.
We believe that using Model Driven Engineering (MDE) will facilitate the deﬁnition and
exploitation of the traceability information that can be used for automatic software safety
report generation. To illustrate this point, let us revisit the example we gave in Section 5.
The parametric diagram in Figure 6 not only alleviates any potential ambiguities about the
textual description of the assumption, but also yields precise traceability links between the
assumption and the involved system blocks, namely Plate, Feedbelt, and Hydraulic Press
Domain (a super block). Hence, the chain of evidence is always maintained in a precise
manner and can thus be queried automatically.
In contrast, if text-based documents are used, traceability cannot be strictly enforced.
Further, the semantics of any traceability links established in text would not be machine-
interpretable. As a result, the information cannot be precisely queried, without the danger of
following false links or failing to follow the correct ones.
6.4 Automation for Rule Checking
An interesting use of our conceptual model is to deﬁne consistency and completeness rules
based on the concepts in the model (or a specialization thereof) and then check these rules
against the information in an evidence repository (see Section 6.3 where we discussed such a
repository). Here, we give two simple rules that can be articulated directly over the generic
conceptual model of Figure 2:
• From the model, we see that each activity requires certain competence, and that each
agent possesses certain competence. This coupled with the fact that competence itself
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can be deﬁned in terms of encompassing other competence, can be used to deﬁne a rule
for checking that an agent responsible for carrying out a given activity has the necessary
competence to do so.
• Another example would be checking that each safety requirement derived from a
hazard has indeed been allocated to a PES. This helps ensure that all derived safety
requirements have been dealt with appropriately by some system component.
To fully realize this notion of automated rule checking, we need to have in place a specialized
conceptual model based on which all the rules of interest can be articulated. We further need
some type of rule checking engine that allows both the deﬁnition of the rules in some language
and the veriﬁcation of the rules written in that language against the development information
of a system. For example, MDE technologies such as the Eclipse Modeling Framework [20]
and its associated OCL engine [1] readily provide such capabilities. This ability is useful to
both the suppliers and the certiﬁers of safety-critical systems. From the perspective of the
supplier, the rules can be used to ensure that the system has been built according to some
industry-speciﬁc standard or recommended practice, or even to perform impact analyses
whereby speciﬁc rules could be deﬁned to predict the impact of changes based on dependency
information. From the perspective of the certiﬁer, the rules could be deﬁned such that the
supplier provides the data from the model to the certiﬁers, according to some predeﬁned
interchange format, and the certiﬁers have some proprietary rules deﬁned in order to partially
check if the supplied information complies with its standard or recommended practice. The
checking of whether the supplier is using competent agents to perform certain activities could
be one such rule.
7 Model Validation
Our conceptual model is based on a systematic analysis of the IEC 61508 standard and on the
authors’ experience. To validate the usefulness of the model, we participated in a number of
safety-certiﬁcation meetings for a safety monitoring system in the maritime industry. From
the issues raised by the certiﬁcation body during these meetings, we randomly selected 30
and analyzed whether the information captured in our model could have either prevented or
helped to address the issues. These issues could be classiﬁed in seven categories as shown in
Table 1. Categories in the ﬁrst ﬁve rows could be addressed by information collected based
on the conceptual model. These categories represent 56% of the issues (17/30). The last two
categories correspond to completeness issues and argumentation ﬂaws and are not directly
addressed by our model.
8 Related Work
Systematic development of safety cases (and more generally, dependability cases) is an
important topic which is gaining increased attention in the dependability literature [3, 13, 21].
Kelly [14] provides an interesting and widely-accepted view on what a safety case is made
up of. It divides a safety case into three parts: the safety requirements (or objectives), the
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Table 1: Model Validation Findings
Type of Issue Count
Missing traceability links 2
Missing requirement type e.g. performance, availability 2
Missing mode of operation for requirement 3
Unaddressed certiﬁer expectations (e.g. use of particular notation or technique) 3
Unclear delineation of system blocks and interfaces 7
Unstated requirements, procedures , assumptions 6
Argumentation problems (redundancy, ambiguity, and reasoning issues) 7
argumentation, and the supporting evidence. The safety requirements are developed through
various kinds of safety analyses (e.g., Fault Tree Analysis, and Failure Modes and Effects
Analysis) and have been addressed extensively [9]. Building the argumentation in a safety
case has been the focus of a lot of research in the past 15 years, e.g. [3, 7, 11, 14, 15, 18], with
the Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) [14] as the basis for most of the work. However, there
has been little research on providing a detailed characterization of the evidence underlying a
safety case. What we presented in this paper is aimed to ﬁll this gap for the software aspects
of safety-critical systems.
The need for more effective collection and linking of safety evidence information has been
noted before. In particular, Lewis [17] mentions the existence of a web of safety-relevant
information covering not only the relationships between hazards and safety requirements but
also between the operator of the system and operating procedures, the system functions and
hardware elements, the system components and software tests, and so on. The conceptual
model we developed in this paper provides a precise characterization of this web of information
based on the IEC 61508 standard.
The sheer size and complexity of the documents comprising a safety case has been a
constant challenge for safety assessors. The authors in [6, 17] propose the notion of electronic
safety case, so that assessors can dynamically query a safety case for the information they
need, instead of having to go through hundreds of pages of physical documents to ﬁnd this
information. As we discussed in Section 6.3, our conceptual model, when specialized to a
particular context yields an information model for such electronic safety cases.
The authors in [5, 19] provide partial conceptualizations of IEC 61508, but they adopt a
process-oriented view of the standard and thus focus on the processes involved when using
the standard and assessing safety. The conceptual model we developed in this paper takes a
much more holistic approach and captures all the key information concepts necessary to show
compliance to the standard.
9 Conclusions
In this paper, we developed an extensible conceptual model, based on the IEC 61508 standard,
to characterize the chain of safety evidence that underlies safety arguments about software.
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We showed through some examples how our conceptual model can be specialized according
to the needs of a particular context and described some important ways in which our model
can facilitate software certiﬁcation. An analysis of a random sample of issues raised in
certiﬁcation meetings showed that a majority of them would have been prevented or addressed
by information collected according to our model. Applications of our model include: the
precise speciﬁcation of safety-relevant information requirements for system suppliers; deﬁning
a data model for developing a certiﬁcation repository; the implementation of automatic, safety-
relevant constraint veriﬁcation (e.g., compliance with standard, recommended practice); and
the automated generation of certiﬁcation reports on demand. A detailed investigation of these
activities and the development of appropriate tools to support them form facets of our future
work.
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Abstract:
Safety-critical systems are often subject to certiﬁcation as a way to ensure that the
safety risks associated with their use are sufﬁciently mitigated. A key requirement of
certiﬁcation is the provision of evidence that a system complies with the applicable
standards. The way this is typically organized is to have a generic standard that
sets forth the general evidence requirements across different industry sectors, and
then to have a derived standard that specializes the generic standard according to
the needs of a speciﬁc industry sector. To demonstrate standards compliance, one
therefore needs to precisely specify how the evidence requirements of a sector-
speciﬁc standard map onto those of the generic parent standard. Unfortunately, little
research has been done to date on capturing the relationship between generic and
sector-speciﬁc standards and a large fraction of the issues arising during certiﬁcation
can be traced to poorly-stated or implicit relationships between a generic standard
and its sector-speciﬁc interpretation. In this paper, we propose an approach based on
UML proﬁles to systematically capture how the evidence requirements of a generic
standard are specialized in a particular domain. To demonstrate our approach, we
apply it for tailoring IEC61508 – one of the most established standards for functional
safety – to the Petroleum industry.
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1 Introduction
Safety-critical systems are typically subject to safety certiﬁcation, whose aim is to ensure that
the safety risks associated with the use of such systems are sufﬁciently mitigated and that the
systems are deemed safe by a certiﬁcation body. A key requirement in safety certiﬁcation is
the provision of evidence that a system complies with one or more applicable safety standards.
A common practice in deﬁning standards for certiﬁcation is to have a generic standard and
then derive from it sector-speciﬁc standards for every industry sector that the generic standard
applies to. The idea behind such a tiered approach is to unify the commonalities across
different sectors into the generic standard, and then specialize the generic standard according
to contextual needs. The generic standard is sometimes referred to as a metastandard [19].
A notable example in safety certiﬁcation is the specialization of IEC61508 [7] – a generic
standard that deals with the functional safety of electrical / electronic / programmable elec-
tronic safety-critical systems. In the process industry, this standard is adapted as IEC61511 [6],
in railways as EN 50129 [5], in the petroleum industry as OLF070 [18], and in the automotive
industry as the forthcoming ISO 26262 [8].
For specialization to be effective, it is important to be able to precisely specify how the
evidence requirements stated in a generic standard map onto those stated in a derived standard.
Unfortunately, there has been little work to date on systematizing the speciﬁcation of the
relationship between generic and sector-speciﬁc standards. This has led to a number of
problems. In particular, Feldt et. al. [3] cite the lack of agreed-upon relationships between
generic and derived standards as one of the main reasons behind certiﬁcation delays, caused by
ambiguities in the relationships and the need for subjective interpretations by the certiﬁcation
body and system supplier. Furthermore, Nordland [9] notes the lack of a well-formulated
process for showing that a derived standard is consistent with a generic standard. This too
is directly attributable to the lack of precise and explicitly-deﬁned relationships between the
standards.
In this paper, we propose a novel approach based on UML proﬁles [11] to capture the
relationship between the evidence requirements of a generic standard and those of a sector-
speciﬁc derivation. Brieﬂy, our approach works by (1) building conceptual models for
the evidence requirements of both the generic and sector-speciﬁc standards, (2) turning
the conceptual model of the generic standard into a proﬁle, and (3) using the proﬁle for
stereotyping the elements in the conceptual model of the sector-speciﬁc standard. Our
approach offers two main advantages: First, it provides a systematic and explicit way to keep
track of the relationships between a generic and a derived standard in terms of their evidence
requirements. And second, it enables the deﬁnition of consistency constraints to ensure that
evidence requirements are being specialized properly in the derived standard.
While the overall ideas behind our approach are general, we ground our discussions on
a particular safety standard, IEC61508, and a particular derivation, OLF070 (used in the
petroleum industry). On the one hand, this addresses a speciﬁc observed need in safety
certiﬁcation of maritime and energy systems; and on the other hand, it provides us with a
concrete context for describing the different steps of our approach and how these steps ﬁt
together. The conceptual model characterizing the IEC61508 evidence requirements has
been described in our earlier work [16]. The one for OLF070 has been developed as part
this current work. Excerpts from both conceptual models will be used for exempliﬁcation
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throughout the paper.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: In Section 2, we review background
information for the paper. In Section 3, we describe our UML proﬁle for IEC61508 and in
Section 4 we discuss how the proﬁle can be used for specialization of safety evidence. Section
5 compares our work with related work. Section 6 concludes the paper with a summary and
suggestions for future work.
2 Background
In this section, we provide a brief introduction to safety certiﬁcation (based on IEC61508),
how safety evidence requirements can be structured through conceptual modeling, and UML
proﬁles.
2.1 IEC61508-Based Certiﬁcation
Safety-critical systems in many domains, e.g., the avionics, railways, and maritime and
energy, are subject to certiﬁcation. One of the most prominent standards used for this purpose
is IEC61508. The standard sets forth the requirements for the development of electrical,
electronic or programmable electronic systems containing safety critical components. This
standard is concerned with a particular aspect of overall system safety, called functional
safety, aimed at ensuring that a system or piece of equipment functions correctly in response
to its inputs [7]. The standard deﬁnes requirements for hardware development, software
development, and the development process that needs to be followed. The standard applies to
systems with different required safety margins. This is encoded in the standard in the form of
Safety Integrity Levels (SILs). The levels range from SIL 1 to SIL 4 and indicate the level of
risk reduction measures that need to be in place based on the failure rate of the implementation
and the acceptability of the risks involved. A number of sector-speciﬁc standards specialize
IEC61508. These include IEC61511 in the process industry [6], EN 50129 [5] for railways,
OLF070 [18] for the petroleum industry, and the upcoming ISO26262 [8] for the automotive
industry.
2.2 Conceptual Modeling Of Compliance Evidence Information
In general, standards, irrespective of the domains they are targeted at, tend to be expressed
as textual requirements. Since the requirements are expressed in natural language, they are
subject to interpretation by the users of the standards. To make the interpretation explicit
and develop a common understanding, we develop a conceptual model that formalizes the
evidence requirements of a given standard. Such a model can be conveniently expressed in
the UML class diagram notation [11].
For illustration, we show in Fig. 1 a small fragment of the conceptual model that we have
built in our previous work on IEC61508 [16]. Concepts are represented as classes and concept
attributes – as class attributes. Relationships are represented by associations. Generalization
associations are used to derive more speciﬁc concepts from abstract ones. When an attribute
assumes a value from a predeﬁned set of possible values, we use enumerations. Finally, we use
the package notation to make groupings of concepts and thus better manage the complexity.
61
2. BACKGROUND PAPER II
Figure 1: IEC61508 Process Concepts and Their Links
The diagram in Fig. 1 presents the concepts for describing the development process,
packaged as Process Concepts, and how these relate to concepts in the Issue Concepts,
Artifact Concepts and Requirements Concepts packages. From these other packages,
we show only the concepts that related to those in Process Concepts. The central concept in
the diagram of Fig. 1 is the notion of Activity, representing a unit of behavior with speciﬁc
input and output. An activity can be further decomposed into sub-activities. A (life-cycle)
phase is made up of a set of activities that are carried out during the lifetime of a system.
Each activity utilizes certain techniques to arrive at its desired output, given its input. The
selection of techniques is related to the safety integrity level that needs to be achieved. For
example, if the activity in question concerns software veriﬁcation, constructing formal proofs
of correctness is usually unnecessary for low integrity levels, whereas, formal proofs are
highly recommended for the highest integrity level. Each activity requires certain kind of
competence by the agents performing it. The agent itself can be either an individual person or
an organization. In either case, the agent is identiﬁed by the type of role it plays, for example
the agent may be the supplier of a system or the operator. Agents can be made responsible for
certain development artifacts. Further detail about the other packages shown can be found in
[16].
2.3 UML Proﬁles
UML proﬁles [11] aim at providing a lightweight solution for tailoring the UML metamodel
for a speciﬁc domain. The same mechanisms used by UML proﬁles for tailoring the UML
metamodel can also be effectively used for tailoring standards compliance evidence according
to domain-speciﬁc needs.
Brieﬂy, UML proﬁles enable the expression of new terminology, notation and constraints
by the introduction of context-speciﬁc stereotypes, attributes and constraints. Stereotypes are
a means of extending a base metaclass. We extend the Class, Property and Association
metaclasses, creating stereotypes for the concepts, their attributes and their relationships
respectively. Moreover, constraints can be deﬁned in a proﬁle by using the Object Constraint
Language (OCL) [1] to ensure that certain semantics are maintained in the new models to
which the proﬁle is applied. By using proﬁles the new models that employ the proﬁle are still
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Figure 2: The Methodology for Specialization of a Generic Standard.
consistent with the UML metamodel.
As we describe in the subsequent sections, we use this mechanism to create a proﬁle of the
IEC61508 conceptual model (Section 3) and then use it to specialize the IEC61508 standard
for the petroleum industry (Section 4).
3 UML Proﬁle of the IEC61508 Standard
Our approach for specializing a generic standard is through the use of a UML proﬁle. In
Fig. 2, we show the methodology we propose for this purpose. The methodology consists of
four main steps: (1) creating a conceptual model of the generic standard, we do this using
a UML class diagram; (2) creating a UML proﬁle based on the generic conceptual model;
(3) creating a conceptual model of the sector-speciﬁc standard and applying the stereotypes
from the UML proﬁle of the generic standard; and (4) validating the OCL constraints of the
proﬁle over the sector-speciﬁc conceptual model to ensure that it is consistent with the generic
standard. We apply this methodology for specializing the generic IEC61508 standard to the
OLF070 standard for the petroleum industry.
Using proﬁles for specialization offers the following key advantages:
• We can incorporate the speciﬁc terminology used by a generic standard and still allow
the use of context-speciﬁc terminology. For example, in IEC61508, we have the
general concept of ProgrammableElectronicSystem (PES). OLF070 instead refers
to very speciﬁc types of PESs in the petroleum industry, e.g., Fire and Gas system
(F&G), Process Shut-Down system (PSD), Emergency Shut-Down system (ESD). These
sector-speciﬁc concepts can all be stereotyped as ProgrammableElectronicSystem to
capture the correspondence. It is of course possible to directly extend the conceptual
model of a generic standard for a speciﬁc domain by adding new elements to it. However,
this makes it hard to keep track of which concepts are from the generic standard and
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which are from the sector-speciﬁc one. When a proﬁle is used, all the stereotypes are
known to be from the generic standard, hence a clear distinction is made between the
terminologies.
• Stereotypes establish an explicit and rigorous mapping between the generic and sector-
speciﬁc standards. This mapping can be used to ensure that, for a speciﬁc project, all
the necessary evidence for demonstrating compliance has been collected. Further, the
existence of such an explicit mapping makes it possible to deﬁne pairwise consistency
rules between the generic and derived standards (using UML’s rich constraint language,
OCL), and to provide guidance to the users about how to resolve any inconsistencies
detected.
As shown in Fig. 2, the basis of our proﬁle of IEC61508 is the conceptual model of the
IEC61508 standard. The process of creating a conceptual model of the evidence requirements
of a given standard involves a careful analysis of the text of the standard. It requires skills in
modelling, systems development and knowledge of the process of certiﬁcation beyond merely
reading the standard. To some extent, this can be viewed as a process of qualitative data
analysis, where the data is the text of the standard and it is being analysed to identify from
it, all the salient concepts and their relationships. This retrieved information from the text is
used create a common understanding of the standard and as a means of explicitly showing the
relationships that exist between the salient concepts.
We exemplify the process of creating the conceptual model of IEC61508 by showing an
excerpt of the standard, and the concepts and relationships that have been gleaned from the
excerpt. Fig. 3 shows a section of the IEC61508 standard that is dedicated to requirements
applicable to the software of a safety-related system. In Fig. 3, we can see the salient concepts
and relationships identiﬁed in the text - these have been highlighted by enclosing the relevant
text in a box and numbering the identiﬁed section. Box 1 shows that the concepts Phase and
Activity are of importance during the software development lifecycle (in Fig. 3 we have
used the concept names shown earlier in Fig. 1). Box 2 identiﬁes some key relationships
between phases and activities. An activity is performed during a phase and has speciﬁed inputs
and outputs. Box 3 indicates that a generic life cycle is prescribed by the standard while not
precluding deviations in terms of phases and activities. Box 4 presents the concepts: technique,
safety integrity level and techniques recommendation - indicating that activities utilize certain
techniques based on the safety integrity level. The same concepts and relationships may be
found in several places in the standard. Once the text has been marked up in this manner, a
glossary is created to ensure that consistent terms are used to refer to the same concepts and
relationships. A part of this glossary, describing the most important concepts is shown in
Table 1. The conceptual model is created from this set of concepts and their relationship and
serves as the metamodel of the proﬁle.
Fig. 4 shows a bird-eye’s view of the different packages that make up the metamodel for
our IEC61508 UML proﬁle. The packages contain abstractions for modelling of the main
concepts of IEC61508. We brieﬂy explain each package. For more details, see [16]. The
System Concepts package describes the breakdown of the system at a high level; the Hazard
Concepts package contains the abstraction for describing the hazards and risks for the system;
the Requirements Concepts package for the different types of requirements, including
safety requirements; the Process Concepts package for describing the development process
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Concepts: Phase, Activity.
Concept: Artifact.
Relationship: PerformedIn, 
InputTo and OuputFrom
Concepts: Technique, 
SafetyIntegrityLevel, 
TechniqueRecommendation. 
Relationship: Utilizes
Concepts: Artifact.
Relationship: OutputFrom
Use of general concepts for 
organizing the life cycle.
1
2
3
4
5
Figure 3: An Excerpt of IEC61508 showing the textual source of some of the Process elements
(details given in Section 2.2); the Artifact Concepts package for describing the different
types of artifacts created as supporting evidence; the Guidance package for describing
the other standards and recommended practices that will be used to develop the system,
the Issue Concepts package for describing the defects or enhancements that may have
given rise to changes; the Configuration Management Concepts package for describing
the unique versions for all the components that make up the system, the Justification
Concepts package to capture the assumptions and rationale behind the various decisions that
are made during development; and the Domain-Specific Concepts package for capturing
the enumerations for concept attributes in other packages (e.g., requirement type, system
operating mode). The elements of the conceptual model are mapped almost directly into the
proﬁle. The concepts become stereotypes that extend the metaclass Class, the relationships
become stereotypes that extend the metaclass Association and the attributes of these two
extend the metaclass Property.
Table 1: Description of Main Concepts from the IEC61508 Metamodel
Stereotype Description
Activity A unit of behaviour in a process.
Agent A person or organization that has the capability and responsibility for carrying out an activity.
Artifact One of the many kinds of tangible by-products produced during the development of a system.
Assumption A premise that is not under the control of the system of interest, and is accepted as true without
a thorough examination. Assumptions can, among other things, be related to the environment of
the system, the users, and external regulations.
Continued on next page ...
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Figure 4: Packages of the IEC61508 Metamodel
Continued from previous page ...
Stereotype Description
Block Entity of hardware or software, or both, capable of accomplishing a speciﬁed purpose.
Change A modiﬁcation made to the PES, Block or Artifact.
Competence The ability to perform a speciﬁc task, action or function successfully.
ControlledItem A PES, Block or Artifact for which meaningful increments of change are documented and
recorded.
Defect An error, failure, or fault in a system that produces an incorrect or unexpected result, or causes it
to behave in unintended ways.
Description A planned or actual function, design, performance or activity (e.g., function description).
DesignatedState The state of the EUC related to safety, the EUC is either in a safe state or an unsafe state.
Diagram Speciﬁcation of a function by means of a diagram (symbols and lines).
Enhancement Provision of improved, advanced, or sophisticated features.
Error Discrepancy between a computed, observed or measured value or condition and the true, speciﬁed
or theoretically correct value or condition.
Event A single occurence in a series of occurences that cause a hazard to occur.
Failure Termination of the ability of a functional unit to perform a required function.
Fault Abnormal condition that may cause a reduction in, or loss of, the capability of a functional unit
to perform a required function.
GeneralStandard A standard that provides generic recommendations on a speciﬁc subject to a number of related
domains.
HardwareBlock Any entity of hardware – this may be mechanical, electrical or electronic that is used in the
composition of the system.
HazardousElement The basic hazardous resource creating the impetus for the hazard, such as a hazardous energy
source such as explosives being used in the system.
Hazard Any real or potential condition that can cause injury, illness, or death to personnel damage to or
loss of a system, equipment or property or damage to the environment.
Individual Refers to a person.
InitiatingMechanism The trigger or initiator event(s) causing the hazard to occur. The IM causes actualization or
transformation of the hazard from a dormant state to an active mishap state.
Instruction Speciﬁes in detail the instructions as to when and how to perform certain jobs (for example
operator instruction).
Interface An abstraction that a block provides of itself to the outside. This separates the methods of external
communication from internal operation.
Issue A unit of work to accomplish an improvement in a system.
List Information in a list form (e.g., code list, signal list).
Log Information on events in a chronological log form.
Mistake Human action or inaction that can produce an unintended result.
NonProgrammable-
HardwareBlock
Electro-mechanical devices (electrical) solid-state non-programmable electronic devices (elec-
tronic).
Continued on next page ...
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Stereotype Description
OperatingMode The different modes that a system can be operating in, e.g. normal, maintenance, test, emergency.
Organization A social arrangement which pursues collective goals, which controls its own performance, and
which has a boundary separating it from its environment.
Phase A set of activities with determined inputs and output that are carried out at a speciﬁc time during
the life of a system.
Plan Explanation of when, how and by whom speciﬁc activities shall be performed (e.g., maintenance
plan).
Programmable-
ElectronicSystem
System for control, protection or monitoring based on one or more programmable electronic
devices, including all elements of the system such as power supplies, sensors and other input
devices, data highways and other communication paths, and actuators and other output devices.
Programmable-
HardwareBlock
Any physical entity based on computer technology which may be comprised of hardware, soft-
ware, and of input and/or output units.
Rationale The fundamental reason or reasons serving to account for something.
RecommendedPractice Sound practices and guidance for the achievement of a particular objective.
Report The results of activities such as investigations, assessments, tests etc. (e.g., test report).
Request A description of requested actions that have to be approved and further speciﬁed (e.g., mainte-
nance request).
Requirement A necessary attribute in a system; a statement that identiﬁes a capability, characteristic, or quality
factor of a system in order for it to have value and utility to a user.
ResidualRisk Risk remaining after protective measures have been taken.
Risk Combination of the probability of occurrence of harm and the severity of that harm.
SafeState The state of the EUC when safety is achieved.
SafetyIntegrity-
Level
The probability of a safety-related system satisfactorily performing the required safety functions
under all the stated conditions within a stated period of time.
SafetyRequirement A prescriptive statement that ensures that the system carries out its functions in an acceptably safe
manner.
SectorSpecific-
Standard
A standard that provides recommendations for a speciﬁc industrial sector (e.g., the energy sector).
SoftwareBlock Any entity of software that may be used for controlling the system – this may be embedded or
application software or even different levels of software such as module, component, subsystem,
system.
SoftwareLevel The different levels into which a software system can be decomposed, e.g. System, subsystem,
component and module.
Source An abstract concept that can represent a person, organization or standard that can be a source of
requirements to a system.
Specification Description of a required function, performance or activity (e.g., requirements speciﬁcation).
Standard An established norm or requirement, typically provided as a formal document that establishes
uniform engineering or technical criteria, methods, processes and practices.
Technique-
Recommendation
A particular technique recommended based on the safety integrity level of the requirements that
have been allocated to the block in question.
Technique A procedure used to accomplish a speciﬁc activity or task.
UnsafeState The state of the EUC when safety is compromised.
UserRole An aspect of the interaction between a PES and the human elements.
Our IEC61508 proﬁle consists of:
• 57 stereotypes that extend the metaclass Class, used to characterize the evidence
elements
• 53 stereotypes that extend the metaclass Association, used to characterize the trace-
ability links amongst the various evidence elements.
• 6 stereotypes extend the metaclass Property, used on the role names of the correspond-
ing associations.
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Figure 5: IEC61508 Proﬁle Fragment for the System Development Process
Besides these stereotypes, stereotypes extending the Class and Association metaclasses
have OCL constraints to ensure they are used consistently. We will discuss these constraints
and provide examples later in this section.
Since the proﬁle is quite large and cannot be fully explained in this paper, as an example,
in Fig. 5, we show the stereotypes created to manage the development process. These are
the stereotypes derived from the partial conceptual model shown in Fig. 1. The IEC61508
standard does not mandate a speciﬁc development life-cycle such as the waterfall or iterative
lifecycle; it does however state that a number of speciﬁc activities should be carried out.
We have the stereotype Activity to model this. An Activity can itself include other sub
activities and this is modelled by the association stereotype ActivityIncludes. Certain
activities may precede or succeed others and this is modelled via the association stereotype
ActivityLink along with its properties Precedes and Succeeds.
In safety-critical systems, it is very important to ensure that all work is carried out by
personnel with the required knowledge and skills. IEC61508 mandates that this information
be part of the compliance evidence. Hence, for each activity, we model both the required
competence and that of the agent performing the activity via the stereotypes Agent and
Competence along with CarriesOut, Requires and Possesses. An activity may have
certain artifacts that are needed in order to carry it out and it will produce certain artifacts
upon its completion. These concepts are modelled using the stereotypes Artifact, InputTo,
OutputFrom, Requires, Produces, Input and Output. Finally, each activity will use certain
techniques to create its output. These techniques are chosen based on the level of safety
required and hence we have the stereotypes Technique and TechniqueRecommendation.
As stated earlier, there are OCL constraints for the class and association stereotypes. These
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Table 2: OCL Constraints on Stereotypes
Stereotype Constraint
CarriesOut self.base_Association.memberEnd->
select(p:Property | not (p.class.getAppliedStereotype(
’IEC61508Profile::Activity’).oclIsUndefined()))->size()=1
and
self.base_Association.memberEnd->
select(p:Property | not (p.class.getAppliedStereotype(
’IEC61508Profile::Agent’).oclIsUndefined()))->size()=1
OutputFrom self.base_Association.memberEnd->
select(p:Property| not (p.class.getAppliedStereotype(
’IEC61508Profile::Activity’).oclIsUndefined() ))->size()=1
and
self.base_Association.memberEnd->
select(p:Property| not (p.class.getAppliedStereotype(
’IEC61508Profile::Artifact’).oclIsUndefined() ))->size()=1
Activity 1: self.base_Class.ownedAttribute->collect(
c:Property | c.association)->select(
a:Association | not a.getAppliedStereotype(
’IEC61508Profile::OutputFrom’).oclIsUndefined())->size()>0
2: self.base_Class.ownedAttribute->collect(
c:Property|c.association)->select(
a:Association | not a.getAppliedStereotype(
’IEC61508Profile::CarriesOut’).oclIsUndefined())->size()>0
constraint enforce the structural consistency of the evidence information in the sector-speciﬁc
derivations. Speciﬁcally, for any association stereotyped with X , we must check that the
endpoints of the association are stereotyped correctly according to the endpoints of X in the
proﬁle metamodel. For example, consider the CarriesOut stereotype. We need a constraint
to ensure that any association with this stereotype connects two elements stereotyped Agent
and Activity, respectively. This constraint is shown in Table 2. A similar constraint is shown
for OutputFrom, to ensure that any association having this stereotype has endpoints that are
stereotyped Artifact and Activity.
For stereotypes extending the Class metaclass, we need to verify that any stereotyped
element respects the multiplicity constraints of the proﬁle metamodel. We show an example
in Table 2: we have constraints to ensure that an element with the Activity stereotype is
linked to at least one element with the Artifact stereotype and at least one element with the
Agent stereotype.
The proﬁle only needs to be created once per standard, and then can be reused for spe-
cializing the generic standard to any number of domains. Once the proﬁle is created, the
stereotypes of the proﬁle are applied to the conceptual model of the domain-speciﬁc standard,
also expressed as a UML class diagram. For the derived standard there are three things to bear
in mind to ensure its consistency with the generic standard: (1) which concepts will be used
directly from the generic standard (possibly with different terminology), (2) which concepts
are speciﬁc to the domain and thus new, and (3) which concepts, from the generic standard,
have been deliberately left out as they may not be applicable to the domain, in which case
this omission is clearly noted and explained. The conceptual model of the derived standard is
created in a manner similar to the generic standard, except that, the proﬁle stereotypes are
applied and the OCL constraints are checked to enforce the semantics of the specialization
and guide the user in creating a structurally sound information model for a derived standard.
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4 Specializing IEC61508 for the Petroleum Industry
OLF070 is a derivation of IEC61508, elaborating the safety concerns that are speciﬁc to
control systems in the petroleum industry. We discuss at a high level how OLF070 re-
ﬁnes IEC61508. Recall the packages shown in Fig. 4: the Artifact Concepts, the
Configuration Management Concepts, the Issue Concepts, the Guidance Concepts,
and the Justification Concepts are the same in OLF070 as in IEC61508. The Hazard
Concepts are the same, apart from the fact that in OLF070, the most common hazards have
been deﬁned in the standard already. The change in the System Concepts is that in addition
to specifying the breakdown of the system, a particular component can be speciﬁed as either
being part of a local safety function (e.g., process shutdown) or a global safety function
(e.g., emergency shutdown). The Requirements Concepts specify that the SIL level of most
common components can be obtained from a table provided in the standard unless there is a
deviation in the component from what is described in the standard, in which case the SIL level
is calculated using the procedures speciﬁed by IEC61508. The Process Concepts and the
Domain-Specific Concepts are different in that there are speciﬁc processes and speciﬁc
terminology used in the petroleum industry for developing the systems. In this section, we
illustrate the specialization process by showing how the proﬁle described in the previous
section can be used for tailoring the evidence required by the OLF070 standard [18].
To preserve the continuity of our examples from the previous section, we focus on the
development process aspects of OLF070, and more precisely on one of the phases envisaged
in the standard, called the Pre-Execution Phase. This phase is concerned with developing a
Plan for Development and Operation (PDO) of an oilﬁeld. The PDO contains the details of
all the systems that need to be created to make the oilﬁeld functional. The phase ends with
the creation of the PDO document that is then sent to the authorities to get permission for the
project and used to select the main engineering contractor. In this phase, a number of activities
are carried out: (1) all the equipment to be installed at the ﬁeld and all the safety instruments
systems (SIS) are deﬁned; (2) hazards are identiﬁed; (3) a risk analysis is performed to gauge
the extent of the risks that need to be mitigated; (4) safety functions (such as ﬁre detection,
gas detection, process shut-down) and the safety integrity levels are speciﬁed based on the
results of the risk analysis.
In Fig. 6, we present a small excerpt of the OLF070 conceptual model and show the
concepts we have just described as the different activities that take place during the Pre-
Execution Phase. The stereotypes from our IEC61508 proﬁle have already been applied. The
phase is documented in the artifact called PlanForDevelopmentAndOperation. This is in
compliance with IEC61508, whereby each phase should have a plan documenting it. For some
of the activities, we show the relevant inputs and outputs and the agents that need to perform
them. We use the stereotypes from our IEC61508 proﬁle to show how this OLF070 model
excerpt relates to IEC61508. Some of the stereotype we have already explained in Section 3.
The four new ones here are DocumentedIn for the result of a phase, BasedOn to show whether
an artifact is based on a standard, Standard to indicate a type of material used to create an
artifact and PerformedIn for indicating which phase an activity is performed in. Note that
stereotypes can have attributes, e.g the attribute type for the stereotype Agent, shown in Fig.
6, has the value Owner to indicate that the Safety Engineer is employed or commissioned by
the owner of the system to be developed. For linking to artifacts and facilitating navigation to
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Figure 6: An example phase from OLF070
them, we can include URLs and ﬁle references in the conceptual model. An example is shown
in the ﬁgure, where we link the OLF070 element to the actual document for the standard.
As discussed in Section 3, we use OCL constraints for enforcing consistent use of the
proﬁle. Once the stereotypes have been applied to the modelled elements, we can val-
idate the model using an OCL checker, e.g. the Rational Software Architect OCL tool
[4] that we use here. In Fig. 6, we can see that ﬁve of the elements have a red cross
in their upper right-hand corner. These element have failed the OCL validation. The
errors generated are shown in Fig. 7. The ﬁrst ﬁve errors concern the constraint that
an activity should have an agent performing it. The model elements EquipmentUnder-
ControlDefinition, SafetyInstrumentedSystemDefinition, RiskAnalysis, Safety-
FunctionsDefinition, and SILRequirementsDevelopment do not have a corresponding
agent element. For EquipmentUnderControlDefinition, a further constraint has been vio-
lated: there is no output speciﬁed from that activity, indicated by the last error in the snapshot
of Fig. 7. Thus, in addition to providing a means to explicitly show the relationships be-
tween the generic and sector-speciﬁc standard, the proﬁle enables users to check whether the
requirements of the generic standard are maintained in the sector-speciﬁc one.
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Figure 7: Error Report showing violated OCL Constraints
5 Related Work
Using UML proﬁles to adapt UML to a speciﬁc context is very common. The Object
Management Group have so far standardized three proﬁles: the UML Proﬁle for Modeling and
Analysis of Real-time and Embedded Systems (MARTE) [13], the UML Proﬁle for Modeling
QoS and Fault Tolerance Characteristics and Mechanisms (QFTP) [12], and the UML Proﬁle
for Schedulability, Performance and Time (SPT) [15]. All three include safety-relevant
concepts. However, in contrast to our work, none of these were designed for characterizing
the evidence required for compliance to safety standards.
Zoughbi et. al. [20] propose a UML proﬁle for the RTCA DO-178B standard[17] used
in commercial and military aerospace software. This proﬁle enables software engineers to
directly add certiﬁcation information to software models. The concepts modeled are targeted
at addressing a major requirement of RTCA DO-178B having to do with traceability between
requirements and design and eventually code. This information together with evidence of
other quality assurance activities would form the basis of full compliance to the standard. The
approach we propose in this paper differs from [20] in the following ways: Firstly, we focus
on a different and broader standard; secondly, our proﬁle includes a wide range of concepts
related to the management of the development process in safety-critical systems, whereas
[20] deals primarily with requirements and design; and thirdly and most importantly, we use
proﬁles as a basis for sector-speciﬁc specialization – specialization is not tackled in [20].
The Software Assurance Evidence Metamodel (SAEM) [14] is a proposal from the OMG,
concerned with managing assurance evidence information. A main distinction between our
work and SAEM is that we aim at characterizing the evidence that needs to be collected for
certiﬁcation based on a standard. Instead, SAEM is standard-independent and mainly directed
towards linking the evidence to claims and the evaluation of the claims in light of the evidence.
An abstract speciﬁcation of evidence such as the one given by SAEM will therefore need
to be complemented with an evidence conceptual model for a speciﬁc standard, e.g., our
IEC61508 conceptual model. Indeed, just as we use proﬁles for specializing IEC61508 for a
speciﬁc sector, one can use proﬁles to incorporate SAEM into the conceptual model of a given
standard and create a metamodel that captures both the evidence requirements for compliance,
and also the evaluation of whether the evidence is sufﬁcient to substantiate the claims.
Chung et. al. [2] study the problem of compliance of a user-deﬁned workﬂow with
the activities envisaged in IEC61508. Their approach is to check (process) compliance by
comparing user-deﬁned activities in an organization against models of the activities in the
standard. Our work is close to [2] in its goal to model compliance information; however, we
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go beyond the process aspects of IEC61508 and provide an evidence information model for
the entire IEC61508, which can in turn be specialized to sector-speciﬁc needs through the use
of proﬁles.
6 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper we presented a methodology for ensuring that a generic standard can be spe-
cialized in a systematic manner for a particular domain. We do this by capturing the generic
standard as a conceptual model using a UML class diagram and use this as a basis for creating
a UML proﬁle. The proﬁle is then applied to the conceptual model of a sector-speciﬁc standard
and used as an explicit means of keeping track of the relationships between the two. We
exemplify our methodology by showing excerpts of the IEC61508 conceptual model that
we have created, the UML proﬁle based on this model and how we apply this proﬁle to a
conceptual model of the OLF070 standard which is a sector-speciﬁc derivation of IEC61508
for the petroleum industry.
Our approach offers two key beneﬁts: (1) It incorporates the speciﬁc concepts used by a
generic standard into the sector-speciﬁc standard whilst making a clear distinction between the
two; and (2) It explicitly captures the mapping between two standards and deﬁnes consistency
rules between them, which can be automatically veriﬁed and used for providing guidance to
the users about how to resolve any inconsistencies.
Having established a means to capture the evidence required for a speciﬁc standard, we
are now working on a means to create instantiations of these conceptual models such that we
can create repositories of evidence for safety certiﬁcation. Subsequently, we plan to carry out
case studies to assess the cost-effectiveness of our methodology in the context of certiﬁcation.
Another prime concern is the ability to certify a system to multiple and often overlapping
standards. For example, in the petroleum industry, it is quite common to certify a system to
both OLF070 and to one of the NORSOK standards such as the NORSOK I-002 for Safety
Automation Systems [10]. In future work, we plan to extend our methodology so that we
can express how a repository of evidence information addresses each standard in a collection
of inter-related standards. Finally, to aid the certiﬁcation process from the perspective of a
certiﬁcation body, we would like to extend our work to the evaluation of evidence as proposed
by the SAEM. This would lay the groundwork for a complete certiﬁcation infrastructure based
on industry standards.
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Abstract:
Certiﬁcation of safety-critical systems according to well-recognised standards is
the norm in many industries where the failure of such systems can harm people or
the environment. Certiﬁcation bodies examine such systems, based on evidence
that the system suppliers provide, to ensure that the relevant safety risks have been
sufﬁciently mitigated. The evidence is aimed at satisfying the requirements of
the standards used for certiﬁcation, and naturally a key prerequisite for effective
collection of evidence, is that the supplier be aware of these requirements and the
evidence they require. This often proves to be a very challenging task because of
the sheer size of the standards and the fact that the textual standards are amenable
to subjective interpretation. In this paper, we propose an approach based on UML
proﬁles and model-driven engineering. It addresses not only the above challenge but
also enables the automated veriﬁcation of compliance to standards based on evidence.
Speciﬁcally, a proﬁle is created, based on a conceptual model of a given standard,
which provides a succinct and explicit interpretation of the underlying standard. The
proﬁle is augmented with constraints that help system suppliers with establishing a
relationship between the concepts in the safety standard of interest and the concepts
in the application domain. This in turn enables suppliers to demonstrate how their
system development artifacts achieve compliance to the standard. We illustrate our
approach by showing how the concepts in the domain of sub-sea control systems
can be aligned with the evidence requirements in the IEC61508 standard, which is
one of the most commonly used certiﬁcation standard for control systems.
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1 Introduction
Safety-critical systems are often subject to a stringent safety certiﬁcation process, aimed at
providing assurance that a system is deemed safe by a certiﬁcation body. Increasingly, system
suppliers are asked by such bodies to provide their justiﬁcation for the safe operation of a
system in the form of a safety case, which provides well-reasoned arguments based on the
collected safety evidence that the overall safety objectives of a system are being met [14].
One approach to certiﬁcation is to demonstrate, based on evidence, compliance to a safety
standard, such as IEC61508 for Programmable Electronic Systems (PES) [11].
Verifying compliance to safety standards proves to be a very challenging task because of
their sheer size and the fact that they are mostly textual and subject to subjective interpretation.
On the supplier side, they run the risk of missing critical details that need to be recorded during
system development. This means that they will have to reconstruct the missing evidence after
the fact. Doing so is often very expensive, and the outcomes might be far from satisfactory.
On the certiﬁer side, poorly structured and incomplete evidence often leads to signiﬁcant
delays and loss of productivity, and further may not allow the certiﬁer to develop enough trust
in the system that needs to be certiﬁed. It is therefore very important to devise a systematic
approach, which is amenable to effective automated support, to specify, manage, and analyze
the safety evidence used to demonstrate compliance to standards.
Motivated by the above challenges, we have studied in our previous work different facets
of the problem of safety evidence speciﬁcation and management. Speciﬁcally, we proposed
an approach to specify safety evidence using conceptual modeling [24] and a technique
for tailoring generic evidence requirements according to sector-speciﬁc needs (e.g., in the
railways, avionics, and maritime and energy sectors) [23]. A recurring theme in this earlier
work is the use of standard Model-Driven Engineering (MDE) technologies, such as UML
[19] and OCL [1] for speciﬁcation, storage, and analysis of safety evidence information.
In this paper, drawing on the same MDE principles underlying our previous work, we
develop a novel approach for assisting system designers in relating the concepts of their
application domain to the evidence requirements of the standards that apply to the domain.
The research is motivated by a natural and real need that we have observed in software safety
certiﬁcation. Speciﬁcally, the majority of the evidence artifacts that the suppliers record are
based on the supplier’s concepts for the application domain, as opposed to the concepts of the
certiﬁcation standards. The absence of an explicit and precise link between the two conceptual
frameworks can pose two main challenges. First, the certiﬁer may not be able to comprehend
the evidence, and second, it becomes very difﬁcult to verify whether the evidence collected
using the domain concepts is covering all the evidence aspects mandated by the standard.
To give a concrete example, in the IEC61508 standard, a Programmable Electronic System
(PES) is the system for controlling or monitoring one or more programmable electronic
devices, including all elements of the system such as sensors, communication paths, and
actuators. It has software that is used to send commands for controlling the various different
types of equipment. A sub-sea control system on the other hand, is made up of a Sub-
sea Control Module (SCM) that incorporates a Sub-sea Electronics Module(SEM). The
SCM executes the commands for opening or closing valves that control the oil well. These
commands are sent from the Sub-sea Control Unit (SCU) which is software that run on the oil
rig in what is called the Topside Processing Unit(TPU).[2, 12]. In this scenario, the certiﬁer
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needs to know which is the PES, and which is the software system. The PES in this case is
the SCM and the software controlling and monitoring it, is the SCU. The correlation of these
simple pieces of information provides clariﬁcation to the certiﬁer who needs to understand
the system being certiﬁed.
To address the above problem, we propose a novel technique that guides system designers
in establishing a sound relationship between the domain model for a safety-critical application
and the evidence model for a certiﬁcation standard. Our approach makes use of UML proﬁles.
This enables us to build upon mature MDE technologies and tailor them for our speciﬁc
needs, particularly for specifying and automatically checking the constraints that must hold
for compliance with safety standards.
More precisely, we begin with developing a proﬁle based on the conceptual model of a
given standard. The proﬁle is then augmented with veriﬁable constraints that help system
suppliers to systematically relate the concepts in the standard to the concepts in the application
domain. The resulting relationship provides a clear route for the supplier to demonstrate how
their development artifacts can be used for showing compliance to the standard. We illustrate
our approach by showing how the concepts in the domain of sub-sea control systems can
be related to the evidence requirements in the IEC61508 standard, which is one of the most
commonly used certiﬁcation standards for control systems.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: In Section 2, we review background
information for the paper and in Section 3 we outline our overall approach for creating
certiﬁcation evidence for compliance. In Section 4, we present our UML proﬁle for IEC61508
and in Section 5 we discuss how the proﬁle can be used for the creation of certiﬁcation
evidence. Section 6 compares our work with related work. Section 7 concludes the paper with
a summary and suggestions for future work.
2 Background
In this section, we brieﬂy introduce safety certiﬁcation and how the evidence for standards
compliance can be structured through conceptual modeling, and UML proﬁles.
2.1 Safety Certiﬁcation
Safety-critical systems are typically subject to a safety certiﬁcation process. The aim of
certiﬁcation is to provide assurance that the system has been deemed safe for use in a speciﬁc
environment. This is usually carried out by a third-party certiﬁcation body. The certiﬁcation is
usually based on a speciﬁc standard applicable to the domain in which the system is operated,
e.g., there is the general standard IEC61508 for the certiﬁcation of electrical, electronic or
programmable electronic systems that are used in safety-critical environments, the IEC61511
standard for the process industry [10], EN50129 [9] for railways, and NORSOK I-002 [18] for
safety automation systems in the petroleum industry. All these standards present requirements
for how the system should be created to ensure the quality of the end product and more
speciﬁcally to ensure that the system is safe for operation. The justiﬁcation for safe operation
of a system is usually presented as a safety case [14].
A safety case is made up of three principal parts [14]: safety objectives, arguments, and
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evidence. Demonstrating the satisfaction of the objectives involves gathering evidence during
the lifecycle of a system and constructing well-reasoned arguments that relate the evidence to
the objectives. With the growing use and complexity of software in safety-critical systems,
licensing and safety regulatory bodies increasingly require system suppliers to provide an
explicit software safety case. A software safety case is a part of an overall system safety case,
which provides assurance that the software elements of a system satisfy the safety aspects
stated in the technical and software requirements speciﬁcation of the system [17]. While the
argumentation aspects of software safety cases have been studied before [14], little has been
done to precisely specify the evidence that underlies software safety arguments [13]. As a
result, suppliers of safety-critical software have been left without proper guidance on what
evidence to collect during development. This has led to the suppliers having to recover the
relevant evidence after the fact, which can be extremely costly or even infeasible. In addition,
the quality of the overall safety case is bound by the quality of the weakest link. Hence, current
practices for managing software safety evidence can severely limit the effectiveness of safety
cases in general. In this paper, we provide a ﬂexible approach for systematically specifying
safety evidence and establishing a precise link between the evidence and the requirements of
relevant standards. This will in turn help with the construction of more deﬁnitive software
safety cases.
2.2 Conceptual Models
In general, standards, irrespective of the domains they are targeted at, tend to be expressed
as textual requirements. Since the requirements are expressed in natural language, they are
subject to interpretation by the users of the standards. To make the interpretation explicit and
develop a common understanding, we propose the development of a conceptual model that
formalizes the evidence requirements of a given standard. Lewis [16] expresses the need for
presenting a safety case as an information model. He highlights the need for creating a formal
structure for a safety case and the need to present the relationships that exist between atomic
items of information resulting in a web of information that supports the safety case argument.
In order to represent these relationships as required by a particular standard, we create a
conceptual model that allows us to represent the main factors that need to be considered for
certiﬁcation and the relationships amongst them. The fundamental elements that we need
to represent are 1) concepts, 2) attributes, 3) inter-concept relationships and 4) constraints.
Additionally, as standards can be quite large, it is useful to have a means to divide the concepts
into useful groupings. The UML [19] class diagram notation can be used to conveniently
express the conceptual model. Concepts are represented as classes and concept attributes – as
class attributes. Relationships are represented by associations. Generalization associations are
used to derive more speciﬁc concepts from abstract ones. When an attribute assumes a value
from a predeﬁned set of possible values, we use enumerations. Finally, we use the package
notation to make groupings of concepts and thus better manage the complexity [24].
2.3 UML Proﬁles
UML proﬁles [19] are a lightweight solution for extending the UML metamodel for a speciﬁc
domain. They enable the expression of new concepts, notation and constraints by the intro-
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Figure 1: Methodology for the Creation of Evidence of a Safety Standard.
duction of context-speciﬁc stereotypes, attributes and constraints. Stereotypes are a means of
extending a base metaclass of the UML metamodel. We extend different metaclasses to create
stereotypes for the concepts, their attributes and their relationships respectively. Moreover,
constraints can be deﬁned in a proﬁle by using the Object Constraint Language (OCL) [1] to
ensure that certain semantics are maintained in the models to which the proﬁle is applied. By
using proﬁles the models that employ the proﬁle are still consistent with the UML metamodel.
The proﬁle stereotypes along with constraints written in OCL provide us with the mechanism
to guide the creation of the evidence requirements for a speciﬁc standard.
As we describe in the subsequent sections, we use this mechanism to create a proﬁle of the
IEC61508 conceptual model (Section 4) and then use it to create the evidence required for the
certiﬁcation of a sub-sea control system in the petroleum industry.
3 Approach Overview
We propose a approach for assisting system suppliers in preparing for certiﬁcation of their
systems according to industry-relevant standards. Our approach guides system developers
in establishing a relationship between a domain model of a safety-critical application and
the evidence model of a certiﬁcation standard. We make use of UML proﬁles which allows
us to build upon mature MDE technologies for specifying and automatically checking the
constraints that must hold for compliance with safety standards. The approach consists of
four main steps as shown in Figure 1, which will be illustrated by our case study.
The ﬁrst step is the creation of a conceptual model of the standard according to which a
system needs to be certiﬁed. This process involves interpreting the text of the standard and
picking the main concepts presented in it, any attributes the concepts may have, and any
inter-concept relationships. Note that making these concepts and their relationships explicit is
an important aspect of compliance [5, 13, 16].
The second step is the creation of a UML proﬁle based on the conceptual model. The
proﬁle is in turn used for stereotyping the elements of a domain model of the system to be
certiﬁed. Broadly, a domain model is a representation of the core concepts in an area of
83
3. APPROACH OVERVIEW PAPER III
interest. In this paper, we use the term domain model to refer to concepts that represent the
physical and abstract components of a family (class) of systems in a particular application area
(e.g., sub-sea control systems), the environment in which this family of systems function, and
the key artifacts built throughout development. An example of product family [25] is a Fire
and Gas Protection system that will consist of sensors being used to detect ﬁre or combustible
gas, a controller that does processing based upon the input from the sensors and then deploys
certain actuators such as sprinklers or dampers. This is a generic description of a class of
systems – each variant of the system will have very speciﬁc types of sensors and actuators
with speciﬁc actions that should take place upon the detection of ﬁre or gas. Following the
norm in MDE, we assume domain models are represented as UML class diagrams[15]. Using
a proﬁle makes it possible to establish a concrete link between the evidence requirements of
a given standard and a domain model. In this paper, we do not concern ourselves with the
construction of domain models. Good references and guidelines already exist [15].
When a stereotype from the proﬁle of a given standard is applied to a domain model element,
it shows how that element fulﬁlls the requirements from the standard. The proﬁle is created
by mapping the concepts in the conceptual model as extensions of the metaclass ’Class’ in the
UML metamodel, the attributes of the concepts are made into attributes of the class to which
the stereotypes are applied to, the relationships between the concepts are mapped as extensions
of the metaclass ’Association’. Enumerations are used for describing either standard-speciﬁc
or user-speciﬁc data types. OCL constraints are added to the stereotypes to ensure certain
properties of the stereotypes as well as to guide system developers in elaborating the domain
model for the system being developed.
The third step requires the elaboration of the domain model. Speciﬁcally, elaboration
means the application of the proﬁle stereotypes to the appropriate domain model elements,
and reﬁning the domain model so that it satisﬁes the OCL constraints of the stereotypes. These
reﬁnements could include the addition of new domain model elements or making changes to
the existing ones (e.g., adding new attributes, revising multiplicities).
The process starts by applying a stereotype to the domain model itself, stating which
standard the domain model needs to comply with. If the standard of interest is IEC61508, the
stereotype could be IEC61508Model. The OCL constraints associated with this stereotype
will start the guidance process for augmenting the domain model with other stereotypes.
This in turn may require the domain model to be updated so that the stereotype constraints
are satisﬁed. Each new stereotype applied will have further constraints that will need to be
satisﬁed for the model to be valid. This chain of constraints will guide the elaboration of the
domain model, so that it will cover all aspects that are necessary for certiﬁcation. Ultimately,
that elaborated domain model will represent a precise speciﬁcation for the safety evidence
and explicit links to the standard’s requirements.
Finally, for certifying a speciﬁc system (variant) from a product family, step four in Figure
1 is performed. This step creates an instantiation of the UML class diagram representing the
elaborated domain model. In other words, an object diagram of the domain model is built to
represent the speciﬁc properties of a system variant.
Steps one, two and three need input from an expert who understands the certiﬁcation
process and the standard to which the system will be certiﬁed; whereas, in steps three and four
the knowledge of an application domain expert is required. Finally, we note that steps one
and two are carried out once per standard; step three and the creation of the domain model is
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done once per product family; and step four is performed once for each variant that is subject
to certiﬁcation.
We exemplify this whole process by creating a conceptual model and then proﬁle of the
IEC61508 standard. We present the proﬁle in Section 4 and show how the domain model of a
sub-sea control system is elaborated with the application of stereotypes from the IEC61508
proﬁle in Section 5.
4 The IEC61508 Proﬁle
4.1 IEC61508 Standard
The IEC61508 standard presents requirements to facilitate the development of safety-related
electrical/electronic/programmable electronic systems (E/E/PES). The goal of the standard
is to ensure the functional safety of safety-related E/E/PES systems. Functional safety is
a component of overall safety, for example, the activation of an alarm in response to a ﬁre
detection by a control system is a functional safety measure, whereas the use of ﬁre resistant
walls to control the spread of ﬁre is not, whilst it is still a part of overall safety measures.
A function that a control system performs to ensure that the system remains in a safe state
is referred to as a safety function. Each safety function speciﬁes which safety objective is
to be achieved (safety function requirement) and the level of integrity with which the safety
function is implemented (safety integrity level).
To achieve the required level of safety, the standard recommends the use of a safety lifecycle.
The lifecycle should contain certain activities such as a hazard analysis and risk assessment to
determine the hazards that can occur and the risks that they pose. Together, these activities
determine what has to be done to avoid hazardous situations (derivation of safety requirements)
and the level to which safety has to be provided (derivation of safety integrity levels). The
derived safety requirement are allocated to either certain functions of a designated E/E/PE
safety-related system, other technology safety-related systems, or to external risk reduction
facilities. The IEC61508 standard is only concerned with the allocations made to the E/E/PE
system. Once the requirements have been allocated, the realization of the system begins for
both the hardware and software aspects of the E/E/PE system. The activities concerned with
the installation and commissioning, operation and maintenance, and the ﬁnal overall safety
validation of the system begin alongside the realization of the system.
4.2 IEC61508 Conceptual Model
The conceptual model for the IEC61508 standard was built in our previous work on IEC61508
[24]. As mentioned in Section 2, we use UML class diagrams to create the conceptual
model where concepts are represented as classes and concept attributes as class attributes;
relationships are represented by associations. When an attribute assumes a value from a
predeﬁned set of possible values, we use enumerations. Finally, we use the package notation
to make groupings of concepts and thus better manage the complexity.
The conceptual model has a total of 10 packages, containing abstractions for modelling the
main concepts of IEC61508. We brieﬂy explain each package. For more details, see [24]. The
System Concepts package describes the breakdown of the system and reﬂects both hardware
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Figure 2: Process Concepts Package of the IEC61508 Conceptual Model
and software concepts; the Hazard Concepts package captures the abstraction for describing
the hazards and risks for the system and leads to the speciﬁcation of safety requirements;
the Requirements Concepts package captures the requirements for creating, operating,
maintaining and decommissioning control systems; the Process Concepts package is for
describing the development process for creating the system; the Artifact Concepts package
is for describing the different types of artifacts created as supporting evidence during the
development of the system; the Guidance package is for describing the other standards
and recommended practices that will be used to develop the system, the Issue Concepts
package is for describing the defects or enhancements that may give rise to changes; the
Configuration Management Concepts package is for describing the unique versions for all
the components that make up the system, the Justification Concepts package to capture
the assumptions and rationale behind the various decisions that are made during development;
and the Domain-Specific Concepts package for capturing the enumerations for concept
attributes in other packages (e.g., requirement type, artifact state).
As a small example, we show in Figure 2 part of the conceptual model for specifying the
process of development. The main concept in this package is the concept of activity, this
is a unit of work which has speciﬁc artifacts as deﬁned inputs and outputs. An activity can
be decomposed into further activities and is performed within a larger unit of work called a
phase. A phase deﬁnes a means to manage a related set of activities together and a number of
phases are used to manage the development of the entire system. An activity may have one of
more agents that perform it and there are certain techniques that are utilized to carry it out.
The techniques selected for an activity are based on the safety integrity level that needs to
be achieved. Thus, module testing alone may be sufﬁcient for a low level of safety integrity
but at higher levels, testing along with formal proofs may be required. The agents that carry
out the activity need to possess the competence that the activity requires and may be either
individuals or organizations. The concepts related to the process are together used to show
that competent agents have created the system in an organized manner. Details for the other
packages can be found in [24].
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4.3 IEC61508 Proﬁle
The IEC61508 proﬁle is a means of showing how a system fulﬁlls the requirements of the
IEC61508 standard. The proﬁle is based on a conceptual model of the standard that was
created in our earlier work [24]. From the conceptual model we capture all the concepts and
their relationships in terms of stereotypes and use OCL constraints for capturing some of
the more complex requirements of the standard. The stereotypes are used to highlight how a
particular aspect of the system fulﬁls the IEC615508 standard.
The IEC61508 proﬁle consists of the following:
• 1 stereotype that extends the metaclass Model, that characterizes the base domain model
as being certiﬁed to the IEC61508 Standard..
• 4 stereotypes that extend the metaclass Package, that is used to organize the evidence
at a high level.
• 54 stereotypes that extend the metaclass Class, that are used to characterize the evidence
elements.
• 53 stereotypes that extend the metaclass Association, that are used to characterize the
relationships between the evidence elements.
• 6 stereotypes extend the metaclass Property, that are used on role names of certain
associations.
All stereotypes have documentation attached to them that explains what the stereotype
is meant for and OCL constraints that perform two main functions: they ensure that the
stereotypes are used in the way intended, and provide guidance to the user as to which
stereotypes need to be used in the ﬁrst place, e.g., the stereotype Activity has constraints that
ensure that elements with the stereotype Agent also exist in order to show who is performing
the activity. In this way we create the web of evidence information mentioned in Section 2.
We use OCL constraints for a number of purposes:
(i) To ensure that mandatory aspects of the standard are accounted for.
(ii) To ensure the correct type of stereotypes at the two ends of associations.
(iii) To ensure that elements with certain stereotypes are connected to other speciﬁc elements.
(iv) To ensure that elements with certain stereotype have speciﬁc properties - this helps
when creating instances of the model.
(v) To help with the creation of user-deﬁned enumerations deﬁned in the conceptual model.
As it would be difﬁcult to show all stereotype of the proﬁle within the size constraints of
this paper, in Figure 3 we show a fragment of the proﬁle corresponding to the process concepts
package discussed earlier along with the stereotypes applied at the model and package level.
We also use this fragment to show examples of the ﬁve types of constraints mentioned above.
As we stated earlier, the IEC61508 proﬁle is meant to be applied to a domain model
of the system to be certiﬁed. The ﬁrst stereotype to be applied is at the model level: the
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Figure 3: IEC61508 Proﬁle Fragment for the System Development Process
IEC61508Model stereotype, which starts the incremental guidance process about which types
of evidence to create. This stereotype has attached to it the OCL constraints that ensure that at
a minimum four speciﬁc packages exist in the model with the stereotypes Process, System,
SafetyManagementSystem and HazardsAndRisks (constraints of type 1). As an example,
we show the constraint on this stereotype for ensuring that the HazardsAndRisks stereotype
exists on a UML package in the model (for the sake of brevity we have omitted the name and
context of the constraints shown):
self.base_Model.allOwnedElements()->
exists(e | e.oclIsTypeOf(uml::Package) and
not e.getAppliedStereotype(
’IEC61508Profile::HazardsAndRisks’).oclIsUndefined())
The keyword self refers to the element being constrained, in this case the IEC61508Model
stereotype. Properties and attributes of an element are referenced using the dot notation. The
base_Model reference is used to access the model to which the stereotype has been applied,
in this case the domain model. The allOwnedElements is an operation that returns all the
elements in the model. Exists is an OCL operation that will check that least one element in
a collection of elements satisﬁes the given constraint. The constraint in the exists clause
speciﬁes that at least one element is of type Package using the operation oclIsTypeOf and
that this element also has the stereotype HazardsAndRisks applied to it (using the operation
getAppliedStereotype).
The rationale behind requiring these packages comes from the IEC61508 standard. The
IEC61508 standard advocates a risk-based approach for determining the required level of
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safety measures for safety-relevant systems. Hence the need for the HazardsAndRisks
package. Risks can only be determined based upon the hazards that will exist when the
system is used, thus it is important to have a breakdown of the system, bearing in mind
both the hardware and software aspects of the system as well as the role of human users.
This breakdown will be kept in the System package. The standard also put emphasis on
having clearly speciﬁed technical and management activities and a clear identiﬁcation of all
responsible persons within the organization that perform these activities. The management
information is kept in the SafetyManagementSystem package whereas the technical activities
are speciﬁed within a safety life-cycle and kept in the Process package.
The standard does not require a speciﬁc kind of life-cycle but does state which activities
should be carried out and which artifacts should be produced. Thus, we have the stereotype
Phase to model the life-cycle and the stereotype Activity to model the activities. The
Process package has a constraint (type 1) on it that speciﬁes that it should contain in it
elements with the stereotype of Phase:
self.base_Package.allOwnedElements()->
exists(el:Element | el.oclIsKindOf(uml::Class) and
not(el.getAppliedStereotype(’IEC61508Profile::Phase’).
oclIsUndefined()))
The Phase stereotype has a constraint attached to it that states that every phase must have
at least one Activity deﬁned for it (a type 3 constraint). This means that there must be
elements that have the stereotype Activity in the same package and be attached to the
element with the stereotype Phase. This is done through two different constraints, one on
the class stereotype Phase and the other on the association stereotype PerformedIn (see
Figure 2). On the stereotype Phase, we have a constraint that states that there should be
an association with a stereotype PerformedIn originating from the element that has this
stereotype:
self.base_Class.ownedAttribute->
collect(c:Property | c.association)->
select(a:Association | not a.getAppliedStereotype(
’IEC61508Profile::PerformedIn’).
oclIsUndefined())->size()>0
On the stereotype PerformedIn, there is the constraint that states that this stereotype can
only be applied to an association that is between a pair of elements that have the stereotypes
Activity and Phase, respectively (a type 2 constraint):
self.base_Association.memberEnd->
select(p:Property not (p.class.getAppliedStereotype(
’IEC61508Profile::Activity’).oclIsUndefined()))->
size()=1
and
self.base_Association.memberEnd->
select(p:Property| not (p.class.getAppliedStereotype(
’IEC61508Profile::Phase’).oclIsUndefined()))->
size()=1
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An activity can include sub activities or it can be linked to another activity by either
preceding or succeeding it, all these relationships are modelled by the stereotypes Activity-
Includes and ActivityLink, along with its properties Precedes and Succeeds. Activities
are to be performed by competent agents using recommended techniques, that are based
upon the safety integrity level allocated to a component. All these aspects are modelled
using the stereotypes Agent, Requires, Competence along with CarriesOut, Possesses,
Technique and TechniqueRecommendation. An activity may require certain artifacts as
input and upon completion produce certain artifacts as outputs. The stereotypes Artifact,
InputTo, OutputFrom, Requires, Produces, Input and Output are used to model these
concepts. Constraints on the stereotype Activity ensure that for every activity, the agent
that carried out the activity is deﬁned as well as the output from the activity. Constraints
are also used to create properties for the elements on which stereotypes have been applied
or for creating user-deﬁned types, e.g., An element with the Artifact stereotype applied to
it should have a property called ’State’ of type ’ArtifactStateType’ which is a user deﬁned
enumeration (this constraint combines both type 4 and 5 constraints):
self.base_Class.ownedAttribute->
one(p:Property | p.name=’State’ and
p.type.name=’ArtifactStateType’ and
p.type.oclIsTypeOf(uml::Enumeration))
These types of constraints allow the user to deﬁne domain-speciﬁc values for the enumera-
tion, the proﬁle only gives the name and type of the property. An advantage of using OCL
constraints is that they can be automatically checked using any OCL validation engine, thus
providing a means of efﬁciently checking large amounts of evidence in terms of completeness
and consistency. The stereotypes together with the constraints deﬁned on the stereotype guide
the user in creating an information model of the evidence necessary for certiﬁcation. This
in turn will enable the systematic collection and automated analysis of evidence. In the next
section, we show how the IEC61508 proﬁle can be used to manage the certiﬁcation evidence
for a sub-sea control system in the petroleum industry.
5 Case Study: Application of the IEC61508 Proﬁle to the
Sub-sea Control Domain
To validate our approach, we have applied it for guiding the construction of a domain model
for sub-sea control systems in compliance with IEC61508, and to partially create the evidence
for a speciﬁc variant of the system. Our sub-sea domain concepts were deﬁned in close
consultation with experts in a large maritime and energy company and based on a reading
of the relevant literature where the architecture and the components of sub-sea systems
(including the control software operating on them) are described [2, 12, 18, 27]. Due to space
constraints, we are unable to show the entire domain model or to go through all the guidance
steps provided by the proﬁle. Instead, we will focus in this section on a fragment of the
domain model, shown in Figure 4, and illustrate how our proposed approach is applied in a
concrete way over this fragment.
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Figure 4: A Domain Model Fragment of a Sub-Sea Control System
In a sub-sea system, the wellhead attaches to the sub-sea oil or gas well and interfaces to
the drilling and other production equipment housed in what is known as a Christmas Tree
(CT). A CT in this context is an assembly of control valves, pressure gauges, and chokes put
on the top of a well to control the ﬂow of oil and gas once the well drilling operation has
been completed. The CT controls the ﬂow of oil or gas to the manifold which provides the
connections to direct the oil or gas away from the production system. All this equipment
is anchored to the seabed via a structural frame called the template. Mounted on the CT is
the Sub-sea Control Module (SCM) that receives commands from the Sub-sea Control Unit
(SCU) that is executing in the Topside Processing Unit (TPU) located in the Sub-sea Power
and Communication Unit (SPCU). The SCM also sends signals from the sub-sea instruments
to the SCU. The signals are sent from the SCM via the Sub-sea Router Module (SRM) to a
router in the SPCU that passes the signal to the TPU. A more complete description of these
components can be found in [2, 12].
Once the initial domain model has been created, the IEC61508Model stereotype is ap-
plied to the domain model and the OCL constraints of this stereotype are validated. Fig-
ure 5 shows the beginning of the guidance process for creating the evidence. The ﬁrst
thing required is the creation of four packages that have the stereotypes: Process, System,
SafetyManagementSystem and HazardsAndRisks. The packages themselves can be named
using the supplier’s own terminology, but the speciﬁed stereotypes need to be applied. Once
these stereotypes have been applied, the next set of (failed) constraints will provide guidance
on what stereotypes to apply next.
Figure 6 shows that ﬁve constraints have failed once the package stereotypes have been
applied. Hazards have not yet been identiﬁed in the HazardsAndRisks package; phases have
not yet been identiﬁed in the Process package; agents and their competence have not been
identiﬁed in the SafetyManagementSystem package, and blocks have not been identiﬁed in
the System package. As an example, we will show the application of the stereotypes that
identify the system components.
The SCU controls and monitors the sub-sea wells through the operator station, so the stereo-
type SoftwareBlock is applied to this element. The system being controlled is the SCM that
contains the Sub-sea Electronic Module (SEM) that links to the different instruments. Thus,
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Figure 5: Error Report Showing the Violated OCL Constraints of the IEC61508Model Stereotype
the stereotype ProgrammableElectronicSystem is applied to the SCU and the stereotype
ProgrammableHardwareBlock to the rest of the elements. If we now validate the model then,
we get new constraints that are violated as the model is now missing further information.
In Figure 7, all the elements have a cross in their upper right-hand corner. These element
have failed the OCL constraint validation. For brevity, we show in Figure 8, the errors
generated for the SCU only; similar errors are also generated for the other elements.
All system blocks need to have requirements allocated to them. In this model, the allocated
requirements have not been added to the model, leading to the violation of constraint regarding
requirements. Blocks also need to have unique identiﬁers, which have not been yet added to
the elements – in the petroleum industry, every components of a system has a unique identiﬁer
called a tag. The standard also recommends version control of the system components - a
version attribute has not yet been added to the elements either, thus the violation of that
constraint. If we add the elements to satisfy these constraint violations, then we get the model
depicted in Figure 9. Two requirements at the system level have been added to the model
- SReq1 and SReq2. They model two different kinds of requirements that are common on
sub-sea control systems: the shutdown of parts of the system due to an emergency and the
monitoring of the status of certain instruments. All requirements are kept in an artifact called
the SystemSoftwareRequirements.
A user-deﬁned enumerated type has also been added. A constraint on the SoftwareBlock
stereotype requires the need to show the decomposition level of the software. The constraint
speciﬁes the name of the attribute (’Level’) and the type (’Enumeration’). The actual literal
values are set by the user as relevant to their industry. In this case the literals used are ’System’,
’FunctionModule’ , ’LogicModule’ and ’Driver’ - this is the breakdown that is most commonly
used in the sub-sea industry and hence the user is able to use appropriate domain terminology.
Attached to each stereotype is documentation that can help the user to understand how to
use a particular stereotype, as shown in Figure 10. Thus all stereotypes are documented in
this way to aid the user in elaborating the domain model with the necessary stereotypes. The
documentation is useful is giving general guidance as the constraints alone would not be
sufﬁcient. The creation of the proﬁle and the models and the validation of constraints can be
performed using a UML modelling tool, e.g., Rational Software Architect [8]. We used this
tool in our case study here.
As more stereotypes are added and the constraints are evaluated, the web of evidence is
created for a particular product family. Once the elaboration of the domain model is complete
with all the generic information, the instance for a particular system variant can be created. In
Figure 11, we show a small instance model conforming to the domain model that we present in
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Figure 7: Fragment of the Domain Model After Application of the System Stereotypes
Figure 8: Error Report Showing the Violated OCL Constraints for the Subsea Control Unit
Figure 9: Fragment of the Domain Model After Application of the System Stereotypes
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Figure 10: Documentation for a Stereotype
Figure 9. In this particular instance there is one template and one manifold. The manifold has
two CT structures on it, each connected to a wellhead. There are two SCMs, both controlled by
a single SCU. The unique Id given to the SCU is ’T1823a’, the version of the software for the
SCU is 1.2 and this is the system level software version. For hardware equipment, the version
would store the model number or serial number of the piece of equipment. Three requirements
are shown: RQ1.121 and RQ1.212 are instances of SReq1 which is the requirement in the
domain model concerning emergency shutdown of the system. There are two instances in the
actual system of this requirement to deal with the shutdown of the two wells independently. A
further requirement, RQ1.1 is shown that would be for monitoring the status of some piece of
equipment - there would be multiple instances of this requirement in the system to monitor
the various instruments. All requirements are kept in the speciﬁc requirements artifact called
theABC_OilField Requirements. The UID, Version, Level, ReqID and Detail attributes were
added to the elements due to constraints on the stereotypes, this allows speciﬁc values to be
set for these elements in the instance model. The stereotypes can have attributes as well, as in
the case of ’Description’ for the Requirement stereotype. The value for this stereotype is set
in the domain model and does not change in the instance model. The use of an elaborated
domain model for the certiﬁcation evidence of a product family and the instance model for the
evidence for a particular variant allows a high degree of reuse and helps to reduce the effort
needed in creating the evidence for each particular variant.
6 Related Work
There are two areas of related work that are important to mention regarding our work: the
creation of electronic safety cases and the use of UML for the development of safety-critical
systems.
The need for constructing electronic safety cases has been identiﬁed by [6] and [16] in order
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Figure 11: Instance Model Created from the Elaborated Domain Model
to manage the complexity and large amounts of information that needs to be kept for a safety
case. Lewis [16] calls for an underlying information model to manage the complex links that
exist between the various pieces of safety evidence. We propose an automated approach to do
so, in the context of the IEC61508 standard. Our conceptual model provides the underlying
information model for the standard and our proﬁle provides a practical mechanism for using
this information in order to create the relevant artifacts for a safety case. Cockram and
Lockwood [6] present a hypertext linked approach to linking all the pieces of information
for a safety case in the form of a proprietary tool. We on the other hand use model-driven
engineering technologies, and in particular UML proﬁles, to aid with the creation of the safety
case for a particular standard. The proﬁle can be exported and used in any UML modelling
tool. This allows one to keep a set of inter-related information items which can be viewed
directly from the tool, or can be transformed into different views by the use of reporting tools.
The use of model-based technologies is gaining pace in industry. Especially, UML is
increasingly used in the development of safety-critical software. The Object Management
Group (OMG) have standardized the UML Proﬁle for Modeling and Analysis of Real-time
and Embedded Systems (MARTE) [21] and the UML Proﬁle for Modeling QoS and Fault
Tolerance Characteristics and Mechanisms (QFTP) [20]. Both these proﬁles are used for
modelling the real-time and performance properties of safety-critical systems. Similary,
Berkenkotter [3] and Hannemann [4] have created a proﬁle for the railway domain that aids
the design and veriﬁcation of interlocking functionality. However, neither of these are meant
to characterise the evidence requirements of a standard to which safety-critical systems are
certiﬁed.
A proﬁle that deals with certain aspect of certiﬁcation is proposed by Zoughbi et. al.
[28]. Their proﬁle enables the direct addition of certiﬁcation information to software models,
for compliance with the RTCA DO-178B standard [26] used in commercial and military
aerospace software. However, this proﬁle is targeted at maintaining traceability between
requirements, design and code, which is a part of the requirements of the RTCA DO178B
standard. The proﬁle that we propose deals with a different standard, IEC61508, and takes
into account not only evidence regarding requirements and design but also with the wide
range of concepts related to the management of the development process in safety-critical
systems.
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Huhn and Hungar [7] discuss the proliferation of UML in the model-based development of
safety-critical software and mention the proﬁles discussed above. They propose a development
process where models form an integral part of the development of a safety-critical system.
However, they do concede that the use of models for the certiﬁcation aspect has not been
adequately addressed. Our proﬁle is a starting point for addressing this gap.
Recently, the OMG has put forward a new proposal, called the Software Assurance Evidence
Metamodel (SAEM) [22], for managing safety assurance evidence. The SAEM is a standard-
independent metamodel and directed towards linking the certiﬁcation evidence to safety
claims and the evaluation of these claims subject to the evidence. The approach that we
propose uses a UML proﬁle for characterizing the evidence of a speciﬁc standard. To perform
the same task, the SAEM model will still require a deﬁnition of the speciﬁc evidence needed
by a particular standard (perhaps based on a conceptual model was we have proposed). On the
other hand, a proﬁle of the SAEM could be incorporated into our approach and cover both the
evidence requirements for compliance to IEC61508, as well as the evaluation of the evidence
to ensure that it is sufﬁcient to substantiate the safety claims. Together this could be a means
to further the ﬁeld of model-based certiﬁcation.
Finally, we have used UML proﬁles of safety related standards in prior work [23], where
we ensure that a generic standard can be specialized for a particular domain in a systematic
manner. In contrast to this current paper, proﬁles were used in [23] as a way to keep track of
the relationships between a generic standard and a sector-speciﬁc one.
7 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper we showed how to use model-driven engineering principles and technology
to specify and analyze safety evidence in order to show conformance to a safety standard.
We start by establishing a sound relationship between a domain model of a safety-critical
application and the evidence model of a certiﬁcation standard. We do this by capturing the
relevant standard as a conceptual model using a UML class diagram and using this as a basis
for creating a UML proﬁle. The proﬁle is augmented with constraints to aid system suppliers
in systematically relating the concepts in the standard to the concepts in the application
domain. The proﬁle is then applied to a domain model of a safety-critical application aiding
system suppliers in clearly demonstrating how the development artifacts of their system fulﬁll
the compliance requirements of a standard. Constraints can be automatically checked to
ensure full compliance. We illustrate our approach by presenting an excerpt of a case study
that we are conducting to show how the concepts in the domain of sub-sea control systems can
be related to the evidence requirements in the IEC61508 standard. We have chosen IEC61508
as the standard for illustration as it is a generic standard that applies to multiple domains and a
successful application of our approach to it is a good indication of the usefulness of our work.
In future work we plan to complete the case study and assess the cost-effectiveness of our
approach in the context of certiﬁcation. This would mean, creating a full instantiation of a
system with all the certiﬁcation information included. This would allow us to compare our
approach with the current industry practice of preparing for certiﬁcation. We intend to check
how complete our set of certiﬁcation information is - how many details do we include when
using our approach that are missed with current practice and how efﬁcient is our approach
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in collating all the required information compared with current practice. We also plan to
extend our approach for certiﬁcation of a system to multiple inter-related standards. Finally,
we would like to extend our work to include the evaluation of evidence as proposed by the
SAEM.
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Abstract:
Safety-critical software-dependent systems such as those found in the avionics,
automotive, maritime, and energy domains often need to be certiﬁed based on one
or more safety standards. An important prerequisite for demonstrating compliance
to software safety standards such as IEC 61508 is the collection of safety evidence.
Without an upfront agreement between the system supplier and the certiﬁer about
the evidence that needs to be collected, there will invariably be important omissions,
which will need to be remedied after the fact and at signiﬁcant costs.
In this article, we present a ﬂexible approach and a supporting tool for assisting
suppliers and certiﬁers in developing an agreement about the evidence necessary
to demonstrate compliance to a safety standard. The approach is model-based;
speciﬁcally, the safety standard of interest is expressed via an information model.
The supporting tool, which is available online, takes this information model as input
and helps system suppliers and the certiﬁers in reaching a documented and consistent
agreement about the safety evidence that needs to be collected.
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1 Introduction
Safety-critical systems that depend on software – such as those found in the avionics, auto-
motive, maritime, and energy domains – usually undergo a stringent certiﬁcation process to
show compliance with one or more safety standards. Although the standards provide some
guidance for collecting relevant safety information for this process, the guidance is mostly
textual, imprecise, and hard to specialize for context-speciﬁc needs.
An agreement about the evidence necessary to demonstrate compliance with the applicable
standards is an important aspect of safety assessment practice [5]. Without such an agreement,
discrepancies between the ways suppliers and certiﬁers interpret the standards can give rise
to problems on both sides. On the supplier side, the development process might not record
the information speciﬁcally necessary for certiﬁcation. Recovering this information after the
fact can lead to signiﬁcant cost overruns and deployment delays. Indeed, given the time lapse
between development and certiﬁcation processes, the original developers might have moved
on to a different project, department, or company. Consequently, the supplier might need to
reproduce the necessary evidence from scratch, often at extremely high costs. A high-proﬁle
example of such problems occurred during the certiﬁcation of the Airbus A400M computer
system, when a misunderstanding in certiﬁcation requirements led to substantial rework [1].
On the certiﬁer side, problems show up when supplier documentation lacks structure and
direct mention of safety information. Indeed, from our experience, suppliers often provide
large fragments of their existing documents with the hope that the certiﬁer will ﬁnd the
required safety information in them. The certiﬁer must then spend the time and effort to sift
through the documents and, in many cases, still not ﬁnd the right information.
We developed an approach and supporting tool to systematically negotiate a consistent
agreement between suppliers and certiﬁers about the information to collect prior to safety
certiﬁcation. Our approach and tool are standard-independent. However, for clarity in this
article, we ground our discussions on IEC61508, a widely adopted generic standard for
managing the functional safety of software-dependent systems [4].
2 A Questionnaire-Based Agreement Process
Our solution for safety-evidence planning involves a questionnaire-based agreement process,
depicted in the center of Figure 1.
The process takes a safety standard’s conceptual model as its input and uses a questionnaire
to deﬁne details about what evidence to collect and the alternatives ways of recording and
structuring it (see the Related Work in Compliance Management sidebar for more information).
An administrator deﬁnes the questionnaire for a given safety standard. The supplier proposes
answers (such as possible specializations), and a certiﬁer accepts or rejects the answers,
providing the decision rationale via comments.
After the certiﬁer agrees on the supplier’s answers, the tool provides as output an agreement
document (in a PDF) to review, print, and sign.
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Figure 1: Overview of the solution for safety-evidence planning. An information model is encoded in an Eclipse-
compatible format (Ecore) and provides the input to a questionnaire-based agreement process. Administrators,
suppliers, and certiﬁers interact through the process to deliver a PDF document of the agreed-upon information
requirements.
2.1 Model-Based Agreement
Our approach to planning safety-evidence collection is model-based. Speciﬁcally, to manage
the apparent complexity of safety standards and provide an explicit and precise interpretation
of the content, we use an information model that captures a given safety standardâA˘Z´s core
concepts and their relations.
In earlier work [7], we developed an information model for the IEC61508 standard as
a UML class model encoded in an Eclipse-compatible format (Ecore). Figure 2 shows a
fragment of the Ecore information model. Brieﬂy, an agreement concerning this fragment
must specify which safety validation techniques are carried out in which phases and by which
agents in relation to the targeted safety integrity levels. We use this model fragment later to
illustrate how to build a questionnaire around the concepts and relations in an information
model.
2.2 The EvidenceAgreement Tool
We developed the EvidenceAgreement tool to support our approach. The tool is web-based
and lets certiﬁers and suppliers collaborate easily even when theyâA˘Z´re located at different
geographical sites. EvidenceAgreement, its documentation, and its commented demo are
publicly available at http://modelme.simula.no/evagr/index.html.
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Figure 2: A fragment of the IEC 61508 information model. The main concepts of the safety standard and their
relationships are formally described in a UML class diagram. The information model acts as the foundation
upon which the questionnaire is created.
3 The Questionnaire
An administrator is in charge of creating a questionnaire that captures the information required
to comply with a safety standard. In practice, the administrator role is typically played by one
or several experts – usually, certiﬁers – who can interpret the relevant standard’s details and
enumerate alternative ways of achieving compliance in different contexts.
The administrator assigns a speciﬁc questionnaire for suppliers and certiﬁers to use in reach-
ing an agreement. The supplier and certiﬁer must subsequently authenticate themselves and
then choose the questionnaire to work on among the assigned ones. The EvidenceAgreement
tool lets both the supplier and the certiﬁer monitor the questionnaire’s status. As Figure 3
shows, the status for each question in both text and color-coding. Pie charts show the status
for different question types in the information model and for their aggregated "Final status".
In general, each standard has one information model, but the model can include several
questionnaires. As a good practice, we recommend using a single questionnaire per in-
formation model, encompassing all the domains to which the underlying standard applies.
Our experience with IEC61508 supports this recommendation. However, we can’t be sure
that one questionnaire could support any given standard in all possible domains, so the Ev-
idenceAgreement tool allows the association of multiple questionnaires to an information
model.
An administrator can assign a pre-existing questionnaire to the supplier and certiﬁer or
create a new one. A new questionnaire should provide some basic information including the
questionnaire name, author, and brief description as well as an information model based on
the standard for which compliance is required. The EvidenceAgreement tool can accept any
information model that can be encoded in the Ecore format.
Finally, the questionnaire must deﬁne the questions, answers, and rules as we describe in
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Figure 3: The EvidenceAgreement tool interface for monitoring agreement-completion status. On the one side,
the supplier can easily identify which questions need an answer – namely, those that haven’t yet been answered
or those to which the supplier rejects the answer). On the other side, the certiﬁer can easily identify which of the
supplier’s answers still require a revision.
the remainder of this article.
3.1 Question Types
The questionnaire includes ﬁve types of questions.
Context Contextual questions help suppliers better plan for evidence collection in a given
context. For example, "In which domain will the product be deployed?" is a common
question, and its answer would affect the safety level required. Consider a ﬁre monitoring and
control system deployed in an offshore oil platform as opposed to an on-land reﬁnery. Each
deployment would have different safety concerns and might need to comply with different
safety levels.
Contextual questions are associated with the whole questionnaire, with no constraints on the
number of questions or answers to each question. The supplier answers contextual questions
at the beginning of the process, because the context has an overarching effect on all aspects
of evidence planning. These questions are the only ones that don’t require an agreement on
the certiﬁer side; the context is ﬁxed by the supplier’s obligations to its customers. For the
remaining types of questions, the certiﬁer must review and agree (or disagree) with each of
the supplier’s answers.
Evidence concepts Questions about evidence concepts concern the information model’s
classes, and the answers are textual descriptions of the types of evidence required. The
administrator creates at least one question of this type for all the information model classes.
For example, "Which are the adopted techniques for software safety validation?" is a question
that could be associated with the "software safety validation technique" class.
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Answers to these questions describe the possible specializations of the evidence. For
instance, the alternative answers to the safety validation technique question in Figure 2 include
"probabilistic testing", "simulation and modeling", and "functional and black-box testing".
The supplier can answer these questions by selecting from predeﬁned answers or proposing
new ones. A given questionnaire’s information model stores the predeﬁned answers. The
certiﬁer must agree on all answers to questions about evidence concepts and, if necessary, can
suggest additional answers.
Relations between evidence concepts After the supplier answers the questions about the
model classes, it must elaborate on the relations between the classes. The questions for a
given relation are automatically derived from the answers provided for the related class pairs.
Answers are of the open text type. For example, once a supplier answers the questions for
"agent" and "software safety validation technique" types of evidence in Figure 2, it can specify
which agent will be in charge of applying which safety validation technique.
Deliverables The certiﬁer and supplier must agree on how to deliver the evidence. For each
proposed evidence concept, the supplier must therefore answer the question, "Which deliv-
erable(s) will provide this type of evidence?" Deliverables include artifacts (such as a given
type of documentation) and actions (such as a review meeting). In the EvidenceAgreement
tool, we use the Det Norske Veritas (DNV) plan-approval documentation types to populate
the list of possible deliverables [2].
The supplier can choose from predeﬁned answers or propose new ones. An agreement must
have at least one agreed deliverable per evidence concept.
3.2 Rules and Inconsistent States
We use rules to enforce consistency, completeness, and traceability in the questionnaire
answers. The administrator deﬁnes the rules, and the EvidenceAgreement tool checks them at
runtime. There are two types of rule, which specify the constraints a questionnaire must meet:
• A multiplicity rule prescribes the minimum number of answers that the supplier must
propose for a given question. For example, the standard may require that at least two
different techniques (answers) are adopted for software safety validation.
• An exclusion rule excludes the coexistence of two speciﬁc answers to the same or
different questions. For example, the rule excludes the answer "simulation and model-
ing" for software safety validation when the answer "COTS (commercial-off-the-shelf)
technology" has been selected.
The interactions between exclusion and multiplicity rules can lead to inconsistent states.
For example, the supplier might not be able to meet the multiplicity constraint of one question
because the answers available for it are excluded by answers to other questions. To illustrate,
consider the example of IEC61508, which speciﬁes four safety integrity levels (SILs), with
SIL 1 being the lowest level and SIL 4 the highest. At SIL 4, the supplier must often choose
at least two testing techniques (answers) for software safety validation. If two of the three
possible answers – for example, "probabilistic testing" and "simulation and modeling" –
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are excluded by answers to other questions, then an inconsistency occurs because only one
technique is available for software safety validation.
Inconsistent states require the user to backtrack and change the answers to one or more
of the previously answered questions so that a feasible answer to the current question is no
longer excluded. The EvidenceAgreement tool helps manage inconsistent states in two ways.
First, it prioritizes the questions at runtime according to the likelihood that each question
will become infeasible to answer while respecting the multiplicity rules (see the ﬁrst column
in Figure 3). It estimates the likelihood as proportional to the number of required answers and
the number of exclusion rules per answer. By following the priority order suggested by the
tool, the user answers the most constrained questions ﬁrst.
Second, for each alternative answer, the tool shows both all the alternatives that the answer
excludes and all the alternatives that exclude the answer. The example in Figure 4(A) lists a
question and three possible answers (excluded answers are hidden). The "Y/N" check-mark
indicates the selected answer – in this case, "Functional and black-box testing". The blue
highlight and the information in Figure 4(B) result from clicking the "Rules" button for that
selection – in this case, the highlighted answer "Simulation and modeling" is excluded by an
answer of the question "Do you use COTS?" In fact, the Direction column in Figure 4(B) is
"in" (incoming) if the exclusion is incoming from an answer of another question and "out"
(outgoing) if the selected answer excludes an answer of another question.
In Figure 4(C), the tool reports the agreement according to the date, user, role, and the
speciﬁc action performed regarding the question.
Figure 4: Example of exclusion rule type. For a given question ("How do you verify software safety?"), the
tool shows (A) the possible answers, (B) the rules related to a selected answer, and (C) a log report of the
agreement reached. The rules related to the answer selected in (A) are listed one per line, with the Direction
column indicating whether the exclusion is incoming from, or outgoing to, the answer of another question. In
this example, the highlighted answer "Simulation and modeling" in (A) has one incoming rule (from an answer
of the question "Do you use COTS?") that excludes it from being a possible answer of "How do you verify
software safety?"
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4 Output
The tool generates a PDF document as output. This customizable report is intended mainly
as an appendix to the certiﬁcation contract. Figure 5 shows example output including statis-
tical pie charts of the evidence and deliverable statuses, a matrix mapping the evidence to
deliverables, and a textual description of the questionnaire results.
Figure 5: An excerpt of a PDF document produced by EvidenceAgreement. Both supplier and certiﬁer can sign
a printed document describing which evidence to provide; this is the result of the agreement procedure.
5 Related work
Safety certiﬁcation is one facet of the more general problem of compliance management [8],
which encompasses topics such as process, medical, and environment regulations. A wide
array of techniques and commercial tools exist to enable the execution and monitoring of
compliance-related activities. Service-level management is a related notion [9], aimed at
developing a formal agreement for rendering services and ensuring their delivery accordingly.
Our work on safety certiﬁcation could serve as an input to the existing compliance
and service-level management tools, such as IBS’s CompliantPro2 (www.ibs-us.com/en/-
products/compliantpro) and MetricStream’s Compliance management software (www.metric-
stream.com), which focus on the concrete collection and validation of evidence. In this
context, our work’s main contribution is the use of information models for formalizing the
interpretation of safety standards and guiding decisions about what evidence to collect.
The research literature includes references to more systematic safety evidence collection as
an important problem. In particular, Robert Lewis highlights the need for having a structured
web of safety information covering not only hazards and safety requirements but also, among
others, the requirements of development processes, hardware elements, human agents, and
veriﬁcation and validation results [6]. Compliance assessment schemes such as CASS [10] for
IEC61508 partially address this problem by establishing guidelines for recording conformity.
However, these schemes exist at a high abstraction level and must be specialized for a given
domain or system. Our approach addresses this gap by helping with the specialization of
safety information according to the needs of a particular context.
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Our work relates most closely with questionnaire-based elicitation techniques [3]. What
differentiates our work is the use of model-driven engineering concepts to facilitate the
speciﬁcation of questions and possible answers and thereby ensure coverage of the underlying
safety standards and consistency between the provided answers.
6 Conclusion
Our approach to constructing and specializing information models for safety standards lets
certiﬁers and suppliers develop a negotiated and structured agreement about the evidence
necessary for compliance. Although we haven’t formally evaluated the tool, we note that it’s
not a major (and disruptive) break from current practice but, instead, a more effective way
to do what’s already being done by manually using a plethora of different check-lists and
spreadsheets.
In the future, we plan to derive data schemas from the agreements generated by our
approach and use them to construct and manage safety case databases that can be analysed
automatically.
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Abstract:
We describe CRESCO, a tool for Construction of Evidence REpositories for Man-
aging Standards COmpliance. CRESCO draws on Model Driven Engineering
(MDE) technologies to generate a database repository schema from the evidence
requirements of a given standard, expressed as a UML class diagram. CRESCO in
addition generates a web-based user interface for building and manipulating evidence
repositories based on the schema. CRESCO is targeted primarily at addressing the
tool infrastructure needs for supporting the collection and management of safety
evidence data. A systematic treatment of evidence information is a key prerequisite
for demonstration of compliance to safety standards, such as IEC 61508, during the
safety certiﬁcation process.
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1 Introduction
Safety critical systems are typically subject to safety certiﬁcation based on recognized safety
standards as a way to ensure that these systems do not pose undue risks to people, property,
or the environment. A key prerequisite for demonstrating compliance to safety standards
is collecting structured evidence in support of safety claims. Standards are often written in
natural language and are open to subjective interpretation. This makes it important to develop
a precise and explicit interpretation of the evidence requirements of a given standard. In
previous work [4, 5], we have proposed conceptual modeling for formalizing the evidence
requirements of safety standards. This approach on the one hand helps develop a shared
understanding of the standards and on the other hand, provides a basis for the automation of
various evidence collection and management tasks.
In this paper, we describe CRESCO, a ﬂexible tool infrastructure for creating repositories
to store, query, and manipulate standards compliance evidence. Additionally, CRESCO
generates a web-based user interface for interacting with these repositories. Our work was
prompted by an observed need during our collaboration with companies requiring IEC 61508
compliance. In particular, we observed that little infrastructure support has been developed
to date to support management of safety evidence based on a speciﬁc standard. This issue
has also been noted in the literature as an important gap in the safety certiﬁcation process
[2, 6]. While CRESCO is general and can be used in conjunction with different standards,
we ground our discussion in this paper on IEC 61508, which is a key standard for safety
certiﬁcation of programmable electronic systems.
In the rest of this paper, we will describe the key components of CRESCO. For the
actual demonstration, we will follow, and expand where necessary, our presentation in this
paper. Speciﬁcally, the demo will begin with motivational material – similar to this paper’s
introduction and augmented with snippets of the conceptual model in [5]. We then go on to
describe the overall architecture of the tool, as shown in Figure 1. In the next step, we will
use a combination of pre-recorded and live demonstrations to illustrate the main functions of
the tool, discussed in Sections 2. Finally, as we outline in Section 3, our demonstration will
provide information about the tool’s implementation based on our existing documentation [1],
and give details about availability.
2 Tool Overview
Users can interact with CRESCO in two roles: the administrator and general user. The
administrator is responsible for importing the conceptual model into CRESCO, running the
transformations and setting up and starting the web server. Once the server is started, the
general users – typically experts from the supplier company or certiﬁcation body – can add,
view and manipulate the data in the database. In this section we provide an overview of the
main components of CRESCO as shown in Figure 1(a).
2.1 Generation of database schema and UI
The generation of the database and the user interface code involves two steps: a model-
to-model (M2M) transformation and a model-to-text (M2T) transformation. The M2M
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Figure 1: Components of CRESCO and How the User Interacts With It
transformation takes as input a conceptual model of a standard in the form of a UML class
diagram [3]. This model can be created in any UML tool and then imported into CRESCO.
An in-depth description of the conceptual model is beyond the scope of this demonstration
paper – further details are available in [5]. The M2M transformation makes use of the UML
meta-model [3] and a meta-model for an object-relational mapping (ORM) that we have
created – see [1]. This ORM meta-model enables the storage (in a relational database) of
objects that have been created based on a UML class diagram. The ORM meta-model includes
a database schema (with tables, columns, foreign keys, etc) and object-oriented concepts,
mainly generalization. The M2M transformation iterates over the conceptual model and
transforms it into a model that corresponds to the ORM meta-model.
The user interface is generated from the ORM model created during the M2M transforma-
tion. The M2T transformation iterates over the elements of the ORM model and generates the
database implementation as well as all the code for accessing and updating the database via a
web interface. The generated code is a combination of server-side Java code and HTML (see
Section 3). Figure 1(b) shows how the user interaction is processed via the generated code.
Figure 2 shows the user interface generated. The left hand pane lists all the tables that have
been generated and the right hand pane is used to manipulate the rows in a selected table. The
’New’ button shown is used to add a new row into the selected table. Figure 2 shows the table
for the concept of Agent, who is an entity that carries out an activity required during system
development. An Activity is a unit of behavior with speciﬁc input and output Artifacts.
Each activity utilizes certain Techniques to arrive at its desired output and requires certain
kind of Competence by the agents performing it. The agent itself can be either an individual
or an organization and is identiﬁed by the type of role it plays. In CRESCO, one can: (1)
create instances of concepts such as Agent, Activity, Artifact, (2) ﬁll out their attributes,
(3) and establish the links between the concept instances. For illustration, we show in Figure
2, the addition of an agent record into the Agent table.
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Figure 2: CRESCO User Interface
2.2 Consistency Checking
The consistency check is a means of verifying that the state of the database is in accordance
with the multiplicity constraints deﬁned in the conceptual model. The consistency check is
derived from the multiplicities of UML associations. We have chosen not to preserve the
multiplicities in the database schema, where all associations are represented as many-to-many.
This ﬂexibility is required so that we can tolerate inconsistencies during the construction of
the database. Trying to maintain consistency at all time would be intrusive, as this would
enforce an unnecessary order on how the evidence items have to be entered. While our
choice allows more freedom for the user when adding entries in the database, it also calls
for the implementation of a consistency checker, to verify that the data in the database is in
accordance with the constraints deﬁned in the UML class diagram. For example, an Activity
must have at least one Agent who is responsible for carrying out this activity (deﬁned in
the Agentcarriesoutactivity table shown in Figure 2). Such constraints are checked by
CRESCO’s consistency checker and any violations are highlighted to the user for further
investigation.
3 Implementation and Availability
CRESCO is implemented in Eclipse for Java Enterprise Edition. We use two plugins, one for
Kermeta that is used for the M2M transformations and the other is MOFScript for the M2T
transformations. The M2M and M2T code are approx. 800 and 1500 lines, respectively. The
total number of lines of code generated depends on the size of the input conceptual model.
For the IEC 61508 model, the resulting code was in excess of 20,000 lines. Hence, signiﬁcant
manual effort can be saved by applying CRESCO. We use Apache Derby as the underlying
database which is accessed by the Java code via Hibernate. The user interface for populating
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the database is via the web and we use Apache Tomcat as the web server and JavaServer Pages,
Apache Struts and JavaScript to present and manipulate the objects residing in the database as
well as to provide the navigation of the user interface. For our demonstration, we will present
the import process of the conceptual model, the execution of the the two transformations and
the user-interaction with the web-based user-interface. Due to space restrictions, we do not
describe the technologies underlying CRESCO. See [1] for details and references. CRESCO
is freely available at http://home.simula.no/~rpanesar/cresco/.
4 Conclusion and Future Work
We presented CRESCO a tool for the generation and manipulation of evidence repositories
for demonstrating standards compliance during certiﬁcation. CRESCO provides a centralized
repository for keeping diverse data which, in the current state of practice, is often not collected
systematically and needs to be extracted and amalgamated during certiﬁcation. Our goal was
to show feasibility via a coherent combination of existing open-source technologies. While
our current tool provides a ﬂexible infrastructure for managing compliance evidence, further
work is required to turn it into a tool that can be deployed in a production environment. In
particular, we are considering adding more sophisticated query facilities such that complex
queries can be posed as well as professional reporting facilities in order to extract data from
the database to create reports that can be directly given to the certiﬁcation body.
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Abstract:
Certiﬁcation is a major prerequisite for most safety-critical systems before they can
be put into operation. During certiﬁcation, system suppliers often have to present
a coherent body of evidence demonstrating that the developed systems are safe for
operation. Regardless of the certiﬁcation approach taken (process-based or product-
based), collection of proper evidence at the proper stage of development is critical for
successful certiﬁcation. Currently, system suppliers and certiﬁcation bodies alike are
facing various challenges in relation to safety evidence collection. Notably, they ﬁnd
it hard to interpret the evidence requirements imposed by the safety standards within
the domain of application; little support exists for recording, querying, and reporting
evidence in a structured manner; and there is a general absence of guidelines on how
the collected evidence supports the safety objectives.
This paper states our position on how safety evidence should be characterized and
managed. Speciﬁcally, we propose the application of Model-Driven Engineering as
an enabler for performing the various tasks related to safety evidence management.
We outline our current work on the speciﬁcation of safety evidence requirements,
upfront planning of evidence collection activities, tailoring of evidence information
to domain-speciﬁc needs, and storage of evidence information. Based on this work,
we identify a number of challenges that need further investigation and provide a
future research agenda for managing safety evidence for software safety certiﬁcation.
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1 Introduction
As we create increasingly complex control systems incorporating both software and hardware,
it is becoming crucial for these systems to be certiﬁed as safe for operation. A system is
considered safe when it can perform its intended function without posing undue harm to the
environment within which it operates. It is becoming the norm for safety critical systems to
be certiﬁed by third-party certiﬁcation bodies.
A key requirement of safety certiﬁcation is the provision of evidence that a system complies
with the applicable safety standards. The two main aspects under consideration here are:
the standards involved, and the evidence that shows the compliance of the system with the
speciﬁed standards. The standards prescribe the procedures for compliance and the system
supplier creates, during the development of the system, the necessary evidence to meet the
compliance requirements.
The compliance procedures may be process-based or product-based. In a process-based
certiﬁcation procedure, the safety of the system is assured by following prescribed activities
that employ speciﬁc techniques to ensure a certain level of safety; whereas in product-based
certiﬁcation, a well reasoned argument that is supported by product-based evidence is required.
This argumentation and evidence is usually structured into what is called a safety case [22].
Whatever the advantages or drawbacks of the two approaches, the ideal case is to have strong
evidence created via a structured development process that backs the safety arguments of
the product being certiﬁed. Thus we maintain that both process-based and product-based
certiﬁcation procedures are important for assuring the safety of a system and the commonalty
between the two is the requisite compliance evidence.
In this paper, we present our experience with certiﬁcation in the Maritime and Energy
(M&E) industry. One of the main standards for certiﬁcation in M&E is the IEC61508
standard [7] for functional safety of electrical/electronic/programmable electronic systems.
Functional safety is paramount in M&E as their safety-critical systems are increasingly reliant
on software. M&E now utilize various Integrated Software-Dependent Systems1 (ISDSs)
in such areas as ﬁre and gas detection, drilling and production, vessel propulsion, steering
and navigation. Hence the suppliers of these systems are increasingly required to have them
certiﬁed by recognized certiﬁcation bodies. In M&E, certiﬁcation is important not only to
assure reduction in risks but also to assure continued business. The challenge is less about
whether to use process-based or product-based certiﬁcation, and more about how to provide a
consistent understanding of the information in the IEC61508 certiﬁcation standard and how
to manage the certiﬁcation in a systematic and timely manner.
In this paper, we discuss the challenges with using the current certiﬁcation standards in
Section 2. We then propose our vision on how to tackle these challenges in Section 3. Section
4 highlights the current work we have performed in taking this vision forward. Further work
that still needs to be addressed is covered in Section 5. We conclude our discussion in Section
6.
1Integrated systems for controlling, monitoring and maintaining safety that may be connected via communi-
cation networks.
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2 Challenges in Safety Evidence Management
The use of recognized standards for certifying complex control systems is the norm for
providing assurance to the public that the system will be safe during its operation. Without
standards upon which to base the certiﬁcation requirements, the process would become ad
hoc. Standards provide a means of accumulating and sharing best practices and providing a
structure to the certiﬁcation process. However, the use of standards does pose some challenges
to system suppliers and certiﬁers alike.
Creating common interpretations. Suppliers need to recognize that it is not sufﬁcient to
build safe systems, they will also need to demonstrate that a system is safe and in order to do
so they need to collect the requisite evidence whilst building the system and not after the fact.
Collating evidence once the system has been built can be a very expensive undertaking that
may still not yield the required results. This means there should be a consistent understanding
and an agreed-upon interpretation of the standard used, and all parties involved should know
what evidence is to be collected and maintained in readiness for certiﬁcation. This common
understanding also needs to extend to the certiﬁcation body – it would hardly be useful for the
supplier and the certiﬁer to have different interpretations of the standard being used. These
different interpretations occur due to the standards being rather large documents expressed
textually in a language not easily understood by everyone in the organization. Thus, they
are amenable to subjective interpretation. This is an issue well recognized in the literature,
Redmill [19] addresses it in the context of IEC61508 standard, Feldt et. al [4] discuss it
regarding standards used in the space industry and most recently Sannier et. al [20] ﬁnd the
same problem in the nuclear energy industry. There is a need to have a common and formal
interpretation of the requirements of a standard on which certiﬁcation can be based.
Specializing standards to industrial contexts. A standard may need to be adapted to its
context of use. It is common to have a generic standard that captures the common requirements
across different sectors of industry and then derive sector-speciﬁc standards to capture the
differences. We call this practice specialization. IEC61508 is one such standard that has been
adapted to number of different sectors. In the process industry, this standard is adapted as
IEC61511 [6], in railways as EN 50128 [5], in the petroleum industry as OLF070 [21], and in
the automotive industry as the forthcoming ISO 26262 [8].
To effectively use derived standards, it is important to know which requirements of the
generic standard map on to the sector-speciﬁc standard. This speciﬁcation of the relationship
between two standards can also be necessary between two standards within the same industry
sector. Sometimes standards within a sector evolve, leading to different systems being
speciﬁed to different versions of the same standard. In this case we again have a parent
standard and another that is derived from it, and we still have the issue of systematically
specifying the relationship between the two. Feldt et. al. [4] cite the lack of agreed-upon
relationships between generic and derived standards as one of the main reasons behind
certiﬁcation delays within the space industry. Whatever the case, there has been little work
to date on systematizing the speciﬁcation of the relationship between generic and derived
standards. Furthermore, Nordland [11] notes the lack of a well-formulated process for showing
that a derived standard is consistent with a generic one. This too is directly attributable to the
lack of precise and explicitly-deﬁned relationships between the standards.
Aligning Standards to organizational practices. When a standard is being used within an
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organization it will need to be aligned to the practices of the organization. In this manner, the
organization can check which of its existing practices comply with the standard and which
new practices need to be introduced and tailored. Thus, there is a need to assist system
suppliers in relating the concepts of their application domain to the evidence requirements
of the applicable standards. This observation is based on the fact that the majority of the
evidence artifacts that the suppliers create and manage are based on the concepts for the
application domain, as opposed to the concepts of the certiﬁcation standards. The certiﬁcation
body also needs to interpret the standard in the context of the application domain in order to
understand how the evidence relates to the standard before it can check whether sufﬁcient
evidence exists to satisfy all the requirements of the standard. This highlights the need for
a systematic procedure for creating the necessary evidence and presenting it in a form that
will allow the certiﬁcation body to assess it in terms of both the application domain and the
relevant standard.
Planning for certiﬁcation. Inherent in the three challenges above is the need to ensure that
the supplier and the certiﬁer are both using the same interpretation of the standard and that
both have an upfront agreement concerning the evidence artifacts that will be created during
the system development. If no such agreement exists, then it is possible that the supplier may
create evidence artifacts that do not match the certiﬁers’ interpretation of the standard, or the
supplier may be missing certain artifacts that the certiﬁer deems necessary. This mismatch
can be a costly affair for the supplier who will need to remedy the situation after the system
has already been developed. Thus, there needs to be a systematic procedure for ensuring an
upfront agreement regarding the speciﬁcs of the evidence artifacts.
Managing safety evidence electronically. The ﬁnal form in which the evidence is presented
for certiﬁcation needs to be highly structured in order to ensure that it is readable and
assessable. In general, there is a large amount of evidence that is gathered and all of it needs to
be structured such that each piece of evidence and how it relates to other artifacts is clear to the
certiﬁer. Traditionally, this has been very difﬁcult to achieve via the paper-based documents
that form the basis of the certiﬁcation evidence. Thus, there is a case for managing this
evidence electronically [2] in order to ease navigation of the information and to allow for
diversity of presentation, delivery and re-use.
Promoting re-use. The type of systems that are usually certiﬁed are characterized as
belonging to product families that have many variants of a base system. Thus any proposed
solution for managing certiﬁcation evidence should take advantage of the re-use that is
possible in these types of systems to create a systematic and cost-effective solution.
Certifying system to multiple safety standards. Control systems are often subject to
certiﬁcation based on multiple standards. This may occur due to the use of the system in
diverse geographical locations or merely due to the diversity of the components that make
up the system. The different standards that may be relevant can often have overlapping
requirements and thus there is a need to effectively manage both the distinctions and the
overlaps in a systematic manner.
In the remainder of the paper, we will discuss our vision for tackling the above challenges
and subsequently some concrete steps we have taken to realize the vision.
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3 Vision and Foundations
Having identiﬁed the challenges faced by our industry partners during certiﬁcation we found
there were a number of goals that any potential solution would need to fulﬁll:
(i) Provide ways of extracting a common understanding of the requirements presented in a
textual certiﬁcation standard.
(a) Extract the most important concepts.
(b) Extract any inherent relationships amongst these concepts.
(c) Capture this information in a structured and systematic way such that it is can be
amenable to specialization in different contexts.
(ii) Capture all requisite information electronically.
(iii) Provide some guidance for collecting safety certiﬁcation information in a precise and
structured manner.
Given these goals, we need a means to deals with different levels of abstraction in the
information that needs to be represented: going from generic standards to specialized stan-
dards, from product family to a speciﬁc variant of a system and a way to explicitly deﬁne the
relationships between the two. If we combine this with the need to structure the information
systematically and electronically, we can come to the conclusion that the use of models would
be an ideal way to cover all the goals.
Brieﬂy, our position is that models, and not documents, should serve as the main sources
of development information - documents, when needed, should be generated from models.
For the purpose of safety certiﬁcation, models are beneﬁcial in many important respects.
Most notably: (1) Models can be employed to clarify the expectations of safety standards and
recommended practices, and develop concrete guidelines for system suppliers; (2) Models
expressed in standard notations avoid the ambiguity and redundancy problems associated with
text-based documentation; (3) Models provide an ideal vehicle for preserving traceability and
the chain of evidence between hazards, requirements, design elements, implementation, and
test cases; (4) Models can represent different levels of abstraction and an explicit mapping
between the different levels; (5) Models present opportunities for partial or full automation
of many laborious safety analysis tasks (e.g., impact analysis, completeness and consistency
checking, etc).
We thus maintain that model-driven engineering techniques can be leveraged to create
formalized interpretations of standards, and can serve as a primary vehicle for tackling the
challenges presented in Section 2. Speciﬁcally, we have chosen UML [12] as the modelling
language of choice as it is standardized and has a well-deﬁned syntax and semantics that will
give a degree of formalization to the interpretation of the standard. We use UML proﬁles for
tailoring standards compliance evidence according to domain-speciﬁc needs. Additionally,
constraints can be deﬁned in a UML proﬁle by using the Object Constraint Language (OCL)
[1] to ensure the inclusion of compliance information in the models to which a proﬁle
is applied. We use this mechanism to provide guidance for collecting safety certiﬁcation
evidence. The models allow for creating electronically managed evidence that can be queried
and transformed to whatever form is required by the certiﬁcation body. Finally, the use of
models will allow for a higher degree of re-use as we will show in Section 4.
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Figure 1: Our current work using MDE techniques
4 Current Work
The basis of our work is an explicit interpretation of textual standards. We need to ground our
approach on a particular standard for illustration. We have chosen IEC61508 which is the most
comprehensive safety standard we know of. It is a de-jour standard for many systems. It is
generic and applies to multiple domains (e.g., railways, maritime, energy, process industries).
Given the signiﬁcance of IEC61508, we believe that the successful application of our approach
to it, is a good indication of the generalizability of our work. In Figure 1, we show the areas
of safety certiﬁcation that we have tackled.
4.1 Creating common interpretations.
In order to create an explicit interpretation of the IEC61508 standard that promotes a common
understanding of the standard, we have created a conceptual model that formalizes the
evidence requirements of the standard [17]. The process of creating a conceptual model of
the evidence requirements of a given standard involves a careful analysis of the text of the
standard. It requires skills in modelling, systems development and knowledge of the process
of certiﬁcation beyond merely reading the standard. To some extent, this can be viewed as a
process of qualitative data analysis, where the data is the text of the standard and it is being
analyzed to identify from it, all the salient concepts and their relationships.
This retrieved information from the text is used to identify all the important concepts in
the standard and as a means of explicitly showing the relationships that exist between the
salient concepts. Lewis [10] expresses the need for presenting certiﬁcation information as
an information model. He highlights the need for creating a formal structure and the need to
present the relationships that exist between atomic items of information, resulting in a web of
information that supports certiﬁcation.
In order to represent these relationships as required by a particular standard, we create
a conceptual model that allows us to represent the main factors that need to be considered
132
PAPER VI 4. CURRENT WORK
for certiﬁcation and the relationships amongst them [17]. The fundamental elements that
we need to represent are 1) concepts, 2) attributes, 3) inter-concept relationships and 4)
constraints. Additionally, as standards can be quite large, it is useful to have a means to
divide the concepts into useful groupings. The conceptual model has an analogous glossary to
provide descriptions of the identiﬁed concepts and their relationships. The UML [12] class
diagram notation can be used to conveniently express the conceptual model. Concepts are
represented as classes and concept attributes as class attributes. Relationships are represented
by associations. Generalization associations are used to derive more speciﬁc concepts from
abstract ones. When an attribute assumes a value from a predeﬁned set of possible values, we
use enumerations. Finally, we use the package notation to make groupings of concepts and
thus better manage the model complexity.
At the most basic level, the conceptual model we have developed helps improve understand-
ing and communication of the IEC61508 standard. Interpreting a standard like IEC61508 is a
difﬁcult task for system suppliers, and inevitably their interpretation may vary, sometimes
signiﬁcantly, from that of the certiﬁer. Suppliers are frequently not clear as to what docu-
ments and information, and at what level of detail, they are expected to provide in support
of safety. Furthermore, they are unsure of how these documents should be linked to hazards,
requirements, activities, and so on. A concise but precise graphical representation of the
core concepts in the standard such as the one we have developed is a valuable and appealing
aid for understanding and using the standard. In particular, the representation can be used
by the certiﬁers to convey their expectations and to clarify the information requirements for
demonstrating compliance. Towards this end, we have used the conceptual model as the basis
for creating a UML proﬁle of the IEC61508 standard. This proﬁle is used to specialize generic
evidence requirements according to sector-speciﬁc needs (e.g., in the railways, avionics, and
maritime and energy sectors) and to support compliance to safety standards.
4.2 Specializing standards to industrial contexts.
For sector-speciﬁc tailoring [16], we capture the relationship between the evidence require-
ments of a generic standard and those of a sector-speciﬁc derivation. Brieﬂy, our approach
works by building conceptual models for the evidence requirements of both the generic and
sector-speciﬁc standards. The conceptual model of the generic standard is turned into a UML
proﬁle, and this proﬁle is used for stereotyping the elements in the conceptual model of the
sector-speciﬁc standard. We use OCL constraints attached to the stereotypes of the proﬁle for
validating the sector-speciﬁc conceptual model to ensure that it is consistent with the generic
standard. Our approach offers two main advantages: First, it provides a systematic and explicit
way to keep track of the relationships between a generic and a derived standard in terms of
their evidence requirements. The concepts of the generic standard can be incorporated into
the sector-speciﬁc standard whilst making a clear distinction between the two. And second, it
enables the deﬁnition of consistency constraints to ensure that evidence requirements are being
specialized properly in the derived standard. The consistency constraints can be automatically
veriﬁed and used for providing guidance to the users about how to resolve any inconsistencies.
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4.3 Aligning Standards to organizational practices
In order to support compliance to safety standards we need to establish a relationship between
the concepts in the standard to the concepts in the application domain [15]. This is done
by creating a domain model containing concepts that represent the physical and abstract
components of a family (class) of systems in a particular application area (e.g., sub-sea control
systems), the environment in which this family of systems function, and the key artifacts built
throughout development. An example of a product family [18] is a Fire and Gas Protection
system that will consist of sensors being used to detect ﬁre or combustible gas, a controller
that does processing based upon the input from the sensors and then deploys certain actuators
such as sprinklers or dampers. This is a generic description of a class of systems – each variant
of the system will have very speciﬁc types of sensors and actuators with speciﬁc actions that
should take place upon the detection of ﬁre or gas.
Following the norm in MDE, we assume domain models are represented as UML class
diagrams [9]. This domain model is then elaborated using the UML proﬁle of the relevant
standard, which has been augmented with constraints to aid system suppliers in systematically
relating the concepts in the standard to the concepts in the application domain. During
elaboration the stereotypes of the proﬁle are applied to the appropriate domain model elements,
and the domain model is reﬁned so that it satisﬁes the OCL constraints of the stereotypes.
These reﬁnements could include the addition of new domain model elements or making
changes to the existing ones (e.g., adding new attributes, revising multiplicities). Elaboration
makes it possible to establish a concrete link between the evidence requirements of a given
standard and a domain model. Finally, for certifying a speciﬁc system (variant) of a product
family, an instantiation of the UML class diagram representing the elaborated domain model
is created. In other words, an object diagram of the domain model is built to represent the
speciﬁc properties of a system variant. This will represent the safety evidence to be collected
to demonstrate compliance of a speciﬁc variant of the system.
4.4 Planning for certiﬁcation.
The conceptual model is also used in planning for certiﬁcation. Once there is an agreed
upon interpretation of the standard, the certiﬁer and supplier can use this to create an upfront
plan as to what evidence the supplier will create and present for the certiﬁcation process.
We have created EvidenceAgreement [3], a web-based safety evidence planning tool for
assisting suppliers and certiﬁers in developing an agreement about the evidence necessary
to demonstrate compliance to a safety standard. The agreement process revolves around
the notion of a questionnaire: the questions are regarding what evidence to collect and the
answers are the agreed upon speciﬁcs of the evidence to collect. The tool takes the conceptual
model as input and assists system suppliers and the certiﬁers in reaching a documented and
consistent agreement about the safety evidence that needs to be collected.
4.5 Managing safety evidence electronically.
The conceptual model can be used directly to keep track of safety information by instantiating
the conceptual model in a UML modeling environment. However if the suppliers do not wish to
work directly with a modelling tool, e.g., due to scalability reasons, then the conceptual model
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can be the basis of an automatically constructed evidence repository. We have created such a
repository infrastructure, named CRESCO [14]. CRESCO is a ﬂexible tool infrastructure
for creating repositories to store, query, and manipulate standards compliance evidence.
Additionally, CRESCO generates a web-based user interface for interacting with these
repositories. Our work was prompted by an observed need that little infrastructure support
has been developed to date to support management of safety evidence based on a speciﬁc
standard. This issue has also been noted in the literature as an important gap in the safety
certiﬁcation process [10, 19]. CRESCO is a general tool and can be used in conjunction with
different standards.
4.6 Promoting re-use
Within all this work, we have always been conscious of creating solutions that can build upon
each other and incorporate a lot of re-use. In all this work, the creation of the conceptual model
and the corresponding UML proﬁle needs to be created once per standard, the domain model
needs to be created once per product family and the instantiation is performed for each variant
that is subject to certiﬁcation. We have also chosen to illustrate our approach by working
with IEC61508. Given the proliﬁc use of IEC61508 and that our proﬁle closely reﬂects its
concepts makes our work reusable - the proﬁle and its OCL constraints can be reused for all
the domains that use the standard directly as well as those using its specializations. These
collectively cover a signiﬁcant fraction of the safety certiﬁcation activities in the current
practice.
Regarding the challenges of using textual standards for expressing certiﬁcation require-
ments, we have created potential solutions and demonstrated their applicability for the ﬁrst
six challenges expressed in Section 2. We believe that the creation of UML proﬁles of the
certiﬁcation standards will also help in the ﬁnal challenge of certiﬁcation to multiple standards.
We are now in the process of working on this issue. We discuss this and other future work
directions in Section 5.
5 Future Research Agenda
At present, we are working on extending the process presented in [14] for the certiﬁcation of
a single system to multiple standards and how to deal with overlapping standard requirements.
Each standard will represent different concerns, however there is likely to be some overlap in
the concepts of standards that are for certifying systems in the same domain. If we choose to
express each standard as a UML proﬁle that is applied to a domain model of the system to be
certiﬁed then we need to ensure that a consistent vocabulary is used such that the same terms
are not used to express different concepts or the same concept is not expressed multiple times
with different vocabulary. Hence, to successfully employ multiple UML proﬁles we will need
to look for formal ways to represent the concepts in the standards such that their underlying
semantics can be captured and reconciled in some automatic way.
Our current work has focused on creating models, speciﬁcally from a certiﬁcation point of
view. This means that we do not expect that the supplier is using model-driven development
for the actual system development. The models we create are for certiﬁcation, irrespective of
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which development methodology is used. However, if a model-driven development approach
is used for system development as well, then it should be possible to leverage those models
for the purpose of certiﬁcation. We would like to investigate how the conceptual model and
proﬁle of a certiﬁcation standard can be used along with development models to improve
the process of certiﬁcation. This may have an impact on how the system is designed as the
developers need to be more aware of certiﬁcation requirements.
A common thread when presenting the evidence for certiﬁcation is to link it to corresponding
argumentation. The norm is to have safety claims and argumentation backed by evidence
of how these claims are fulﬁlled. Recently, the OMG has put forward a proposal, called
the Software Assurance Evidence Metamodel (SAEM) [13], for managing safety assurance
evidence. The SAEM is a standard-independent metamodel and directed towards linking
the certiﬁcation evidence to safety claims and the evaluation of these claims subject to the
evidence. The approach that we propose uses a UML proﬁle for characterizing the evidence of
a speciﬁc standard. To perform the same task, the SAEM model will still require a deﬁnition
of the speciﬁc evidence needed by a particular standard (perhaps based on a conceptual model
as we have proposed). On the other hand, a proﬁle of the SAEM could be incorporated into
our approach and cover both the evidence requirements for compliance to a particular standard,
as well as the evaluation of the evidence to ensure that it is sufﬁcient to substantiate the safety
claims. Together this could be a means to further the ﬁeld of model-based certiﬁcation.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have discussed the challenges that are faced by system suppliers and certiﬁer
when having to certify systems to safety standards. These challenges are based on our
experience in working in and with industry. System supplier are required to prepare for
certiﬁcation based on the relevant industry standards that are textually expressed and are
subjectively interpreted. The suppliers run the risk of not collecting the requisite information
during the development of the system and having to do so after the fact, leading to large cost
overruns and delays in deployment of systems. On the other hand, certiﬁers may receive a
large collection of documents from the supplier with the hope that the certiﬁer will ﬁnd the
required safety information (based on their interpretation of the standard). This results in the
certiﬁer having to invest a signiﬁcant amount of time and effort sifting through the provided
documents, and in many cases not ﬁnding what they were looking for. What is required is
a structured and systematic procedure for certiﬁcation where both parties can proceed in a
timely manner, being aware of what information to collect and how to navigate easily through
it.
We propose that models can be used to tackle the issues that we have identiﬁed. They
can be used to clarify the expectations of standards and present opportunities for automation
of the certiﬁcation process. To this end, we gave an overview of our current work to show
the potential of using model-driven engineering techniques for safety certiﬁcation. We have
illustrated our work using IEC61508, one of the most commonly used standards in industry in
order to show the applicability of our approach.
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Abstract:
Context. Many safety-critical systems are subject to safety certiﬁcation as a way of
providing assurance that these systems cannot unduly harm people, property or the
environment. Creating the requisite evidence for certiﬁcation can be a challenging
task due to the sheer size of the textual standards based on which certiﬁcation is
performed and the amenability of these standards to subjective interpretation.
Objective. This paper proposes a novel approach to aid suppliers in creating the
evidence necessary for certiﬁcation according to standards. The approach is based on
Model-Driven Engineering (MDE) and addresses the challenges of using certiﬁcation
standards while providing assistance with compliance.
Method. Given a safety standard, a conceptual model is built that provides a succinct
and explicit interpretation of the standard. This model is then used to create a UML
proﬁle that helps system suppliers in relating the concepts of the safety standard to
those of the application domain, in turn enabling the suppliers to demonstrate how
their system development artifacts comply with the standard.
Results. We provide a generalizable and tool-supported solution to support the
veriﬁcation of compliance to safety standards. Empirical validation of the work
is presented via an industrial case study that shows how the concepts of a sub-sea
production control system can be aligned with the evidence requirements of the
IEC61508 standard. A subsequent survey examines the perceptions of practitioners
about the solution.
Conclusion. The case study indicates that the supplier company where the study
was performed found the approach useful in helping them prepare for certiﬁcation
of their software. The survey indicates that practitioners found our approach easy to
understand and that they would be willing to adopt it in practice. Since the IEC61508
standard applies to multiple domains, these results suggest wider applicability and
usefulness of our work.
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1 Introduction
Safety-critical systems are often subject to a stringent safety certiﬁcation process, aimed
at providing an assurance that a system is deemed safe by a certiﬁcation body. In order to
structure this assurance process and the related assurance artifacts, there are certiﬁcation
standards that set out the requirements that system suppliers must meet. These standards
can be generic standards that apply to generic technologies used across many domains or
they can be very speciﬁc to a particular technology in a speciﬁc domain. There is generally
overall agreement within an industry as to which standards are applicable. The suppliers of
safety-critical systems are then required to present the necessary evidence to show compliance
to the relevant safety standards.
Showing compliance to safety standards proves to be a very challenging task due to the
fact that these standard are presented as very large textual documents that are amenable
to subjective interpretation. Without an explicit interpretation of the standards, the system
suppliers run the risk of missing crucial details that should have been recorded during system
development. This would result in them having to re-construct the missing evidence at the
time of certiﬁcation - an often expensive and time-consuming endeavour. On the certiﬁer’s
side, poorly-structured and incomplete evidence often leads to signiﬁcant delays and loss of
productivity, and furthermore, does not allow the certiﬁer to develop enough trust in the system
undergoing certiﬁcation. It is therefore very important to devise a systematic approach, which
is supported by effective automation, to specify, manage, and analyze the safety evidence
necessary to demonstrate compliance to standards.
In this article, we present an approach for assisting system designers in relating the concepts
of their application domain to the evidence requirements of the standards that apply to their
domain. This work is motivated by a real and observed need during our work with safety-
critical system suppliers. The majority of the evidence artifacts that suppliers create for
certiﬁcation are based on the concepts of the application domain, as opposed to the concepts
of the certiﬁcation standards. There is a need to link the concepts used in the application
domain to those used in the standard. The absence of such a link can pose two main challenges:
ﬁrst, the certiﬁer may not be able to comprehend the evidence, and second, it becomes very
difﬁcult to verify whether the evidence collected using the application domain concepts is
covering all the evidence aspects mandated by the standard.
To provide a concrete example, in the IEC61508 standard, a Programmable Electronic
System (PES) is the system for controlling or monitoring one or more programmable electronic
devices, including all elements of the system such as sensors, communication paths, and
actuators. It has software that is used to send commands for controlling the various types
of equipment. A sub-sea production control system on the other hand, is made up of a
Sub-sea Control Module (SCM) that incorporates a Sub-sea Electronics Module (SEM). The
SCM executes the commands for opening and closing valves that control the oil well. These
commands are sent from the Master Control Station (MCS) which is software that runs on
the oil rig in what is called the Topside Processing Unit (TPU) [3, 16]. In this scenario, the
certiﬁer needs to know which is the PES, and which is the software system. The PES in this
case is the SCM and the software controlling and monitoring it is the MCS. The correlation
of these simple pieces of information provides clariﬁcation to the certiﬁer who needs to
understand the system being certiﬁed.
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Solution Overview. To address the above problem, we propose a solution based on MDE for
systematically guiding system designers in establishing a sound relationship between a domain
model of a safety-critical application and the evidence model for a certiﬁcation standard. Our
proposed approach makes use of mature MDE technologies which we tailor for our speciﬁc
needs. We use UML [24] class diagrams for creating domain models of the application and
conceptual models of the safety standard. We then use the extension mechanisms of UML
and create a UML proﬁle of the safety standard based on its conceptual model. The proﬁle
is then augmented with veriﬁable constraints, written in the Object Constraint Language
(OCL) [2], that help system suppliers in systematically relating the concepts in the standard to
the concepts in the application domain. In this manner, we use existing MDE technologies
and tools, that are generally used for system development, and tailor them for aiding system
suppliers in demonstrating how their system development artifacts comply with the requisite
safety standards. In our work, we have used Rational Software Architect (RSA) [12] to
provide tool support. Other modelling tools with the minimum criteria that we deﬁne in the
paper in Section 4 can also be used.
Contributions. In order to empirically assess our approach, we have carried out a case
study that shows the feasibility of the proposed approach and tooling in the energy and
maritime domain. The results of the case study show that general modelling tools can be used
in realizing our approach and that our approach provides adequate guidance to suppliers in
creating the relevant evidence for certiﬁcation. The case study is followed by a survey of
domain experts to gauge their perceptions regarding our approach. The results of the survey
show that the experts perceive beneﬁt in adopting our approach in their certiﬁcation work.
Our approach uses general MDE techniques in a novel way and can be adapted to other
standards. In summary, our contributions in this paper are: (1) A general approach that uses
MDE techniques to aid preparation for certiﬁcation; (2) the adaptation of general modelling
tools used in system development to manage evidence for certiﬁcation; (3) the application of
the approach in the context of sub-sea production control systems; and (4) a survey of industry
practitioners, presenting their perceptions of our approach.
Previously, we have studied different facets of the problem of safety evidence speciﬁcation
and management. Our prior work includes a conceptual framework for the speciﬁcation of
safety evidence using UML [30] and a technique for tailoring generic evidence requirements
according to sector-speciﬁc needs (e.g., in the railways, avionics, and maritime and energy
sectors) [29]. Further, the basic formulation of the approach presented in this current article has
been previously published in a research paper at the 22th IEEE International Symposium on
Software Reliability Engineering (ISSRE’11) [28]. This article brings together ideas described
in these earlier papers and presents a deﬁnitive treatment of our approach for creating the
necessary evidence to demonstrate standards’ compliance. Speciﬁcally, we provide a more
comprehensive description of our approach (Section 3) and tool support (Section 4), along
with substantial new empirical results to show the feasibility and usefulness of our approach
(Section 5).
Structure. The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: In Section 2, we discuss
the challenges faced in creating certiﬁcation evidence based on industry standards and the
motivation for our work. In Section 3, we outline our overall approach for creating certiﬁcation
evidence for compliance. In Section 4, we discuss tool support, and in Section 5, we present
an empirical evaluation of our approach via a case study and survey. Section 6 compares our
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work with related work and Section 7 concludes the paper with a summary and suggestions
for future work.
2 Background and Motivation
In this section, we brieﬂy introduce safety certiﬁcation and outline the motivations for our
work.
A safety-critical system is one in which failure may lead to injury, death, or major damage to
property or the environment [9]. In order to gain conﬁdence that safety-critical systems meet
their safety obligations, these systems often need to undergo certiﬁcation by a certiﬁcation
body. The goal of certiﬁcation is to provide an assurance that a system has been deemed safe
for use in a speciﬁc environment. The certiﬁcation process is usually based on a speciﬁc
standard applicable to the domain in which the system is operated, e.g., IEC61508 [15] for
the certiﬁcation of electrical, electronic or programmable electronic systems that are used
in safety-critical environments, IEC61511 standard for the process industry [14], EN50129
[13] for railways, and NORSOK I-002 [22] for safety automation systems in the petroleum
industry.
During the certiﬁcation process, the system supplier needs to provide evidence demonstrat-
ing that the safety criteria envisaged by the underlying certiﬁcation standard are being met.
Since the evidence that is collected for certiﬁcation depends to a large extent on the relevant
certiﬁcation standard, there should be a consistent interpretation of the standard being used,
and all parties involved (including the supplier and certiﬁer) should know what evidence is to
be collected and maintained in readiness for certiﬁcation. Without an explicit and agreed-upon
interpretation of the underlying standard, divergent interpretations can (and commonly do)
occur because of the standards being large documents that are expressed textually and in a
language not easily understood by everyone. Redmill [32] mentions these issues in the context
of IEC61508, where readers have difﬁculty understanding the standard and engineers are
unable to interpret the standard consistently throughout an organization. Feldt et. al [10] ﬁnd
similar challenges in the space industry, where there have been problems between customers
and suppliers due to the variance that exists in the interpretation of standards. Finally, Sannier
et. al [35] highlight the gaps between the possible interpretations of the same standards in the
nuclear energy industry. These earlier investigations all lend support to the need for having a
common and formal interpretation of the requirements of a standard upon which certiﬁcation
is to be performed.
Further, when a standard is being used within an organization, the practices of the organiza-
tion will need to be aligned with the standard, allowing the organization to check which of its
existing practices comply with the standard and which new practices need to be introduced
and tailored. In order to achieve this alignment, suppliers need to relate the concepts of
their application domain to the evidence requirements of the applicable standards. However,
the majority of the evidence artifacts that the suppliers create and manage are based on the
concepts for the application domain, and not those of the certiﬁcation standards. Therefore, a
systematic procedure is needed for creating the necessary evidence, such that the supplier can
properly interpret the standard in the context of their application domain and verify whether
sufﬁcient evidence exists to satisfy all the requirements of the standard.
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Finally, the format in which the evidence is presented for certiﬁcation needs to be highly-
structured in order to ensure that the evidence is readable and assessable. Traditionally,
this has been very difﬁcult to achieve via paper-based documents that form the basis of the
certiﬁcation evidence today. Thus, there is a case for managing this evidence electronically
[7] in order to ease the navigation of the information and to allow for diversity of presentation,
delivery and re-use.
The approach that we present in Section 3 uses MDE as the main vehicle for addressing the
issues described above.
3 Approach
We propose an approach for assisting system suppliers with preparations for certiﬁcation of
their systems according to industry standards. Our solution makes use of UML proﬁles for
specifying and automatically checking the constraints that must hold for compliance with
safety standards. The solution takes into account the fact that the systems that need to be
certiﬁed usually belong to a family (class) of systems, where each system is a variant of a base
system. We consider the different levels of abstraction that are present and take advantage of
the re-use that is possible in these types of systems to create a systematic and cost-effective
solution.
The approach consists of four main steps as shown in Figure 1. Brieﬂy, we start by creating
a conceptual model of a certiﬁcation standard (step 1). The resulting model is used for
constructing a UML proﬁle of the standard (step 2). We then apply the stereotypes of this
proﬁle to a domain model of the system that is undergoing certiﬁcation (step 3). This step
results in a precise link between the concepts in the certiﬁcation standard and those in the
system. Finally, we create instantiations of the (stereotyped) domain model for a speciﬁc
certiﬁcation of the system (step 4).
Steps 1 and 2 of the approach require input from experts familiar with the certiﬁcation
process (including the standard used for certiﬁcation) but not necessarily the application
domain. Fulﬁlling step 3 requires expertise in both certiﬁcation and the application domain;
whereas, step 4 only requires knowledge of the application domain. In the remainder of this
section, we present detailed descriptions of the four steps in our approach.
3.1 Step 1: Conceptual Model of a Safety Standard
In Section 2, we noted the need for having an explicit interpretation of the underlying safety
standard. We achieve this in the ﬁrst step of our approach through the creation of a conceptual
model. A conceptual model is a formal description of some aspect of the physical and social
world around us for the purpose of understanding and communicating amongst humans [21].
It employs some formal notation which is a combination of diagrammatic and linguistic
constructs and serves as a point of common agreement amongst a team of people and can also
be used as a means of forwarding this understanding to newcomers joining the team.
A conceptual model of a safety standard should thus capture the main concepts and
relationships in the evidence information required for showing compliance to the standard.
We use UML class diagrams [24] for conceptual modeling of safety standards. In UML
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Figure 1: Methodology for the Creation of Evidence of a Safety Standard.
class diagrams, concepts are represented as classes and concept attributes as class attributes.
Relationships are represented by associations. Generalization associations are used to derive
more speciﬁc concepts from abstract ones. When an attribute assumes a value from a
predeﬁned set of possible values, we use enumerations. Finally, the package notation is used
to make groupings of concepts and thus better manage complexity.
Our choice of UML is based on the fact that it is a well-recognized and standardized
notation and that the UML class diagram notation adequately fulﬁls our needs. From a
practical standpoint, it is in general useful to ensure that the notation being employed is
already accepted in industry and at the same time easy to learn for practitioners.
Creating a conceptual model of a standard requires a careful analysis of the standard’s
text to identify the salient concepts and relationships mentioned in the text. To record the
concepts and relationships in a systematic way, we follow a process as we read through the
standard: we label each concept with a name and create a deﬁnition for it in a glossary when
it is ﬁrst encountered. As we proceed through the text, we either create new labels or reuse
previous ones based on the deﬁnitions we have. As we create the labels, we also identify the
connections between them and represent all this within a UML class diagram. This process
is in line with how qualitative data analysis [8, 20] is performed in general, whereby text is
analyzed to describe, classify and connect the information presented in it.
We exemplify the above process over a small excerpt of the IEC61508 standard that
concerns software safety life cycle requirements. The excerpt is shown in Figure 2. In the
ﬁgure, we highlight the key concepts and relationships by enclosing the relevant text in a box
and numbering it.
Box 1 shows that the concepts Phase and Activity are of importance during the software
development lifecycle. Box 2 identiﬁes some important relationships between phases and
activities. An activity is performed during a phase and has speciﬁed inputs and outputs.
Box 3 indicates that a generic life cycle is prescribed by the standard, though deviations in
terms of phases and activities are not percluded. Box 4 includes the concepts: Technique,
SafetyIntegrityLevel and TechniqueRecommendation - indicating that activities should
Utilize certain techniques based on the safety integrity level. The same concepts and
relationships can be found in several places in the standard and thus a glossary is created to
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Concepts: Phase, Activity.
Concept: Artifact.
Relationship: PerformedIn, 
InputTo and OuputFrom
Concepts: Technique, 
SafetyIntegrityLevel, 
TechniqueRecommendation. 
Relationship: Utilizes
Concepts: Artifact.
Relationship: OutputFrom
Use of general concepts for 
organizing the life cycle.
1
2
3
4
5
Figure 2: An Excerpt from IEC61508 showing the textual source of some of the concepts and relationships
ensure that consistent terms are used to refer to the same concepts and relationships. The
glossary pertaining to the concepts shown in the excerpt can be seen in Table 1.
A graphical representation of the concepts and relationships from the excerpt is given in
Figure 3. In the ﬁgure, we show some additional concepts (covered by the standard but not
present in the excerpt) to aid the discussion about the process concepts in the rest of the article.
We further note that the model in Figure 3 is still a partial representation of the concepts and
relationships relevant to the development process. A full treatment can be found in Appendix
1.
In Figure 3, we can see that an activity can include sub activities or it can be linked to another
activity by either preceding or succeeding it; these relationships are modelled by the elements
ActivityIncludes and ActivityLink, along with the properties Precedes and Succeeds.
Activities are to be performed by competent agents using techniques that are acceptable for
the safety integrity level assigned to a component. All these aspects are modelled using the
concepts Agent, Competence and Technique and the relationships Requires, CarriesOut,
Possesses and TechniqueRecommendation. An activity may require certain artifacts as
input and upon completion produce certain artifacts as output. These are modelled by the
elements Artifact, InputTo, OutputFrom, Requires, Produces, Input and Output.
Sometimes a concept appears again, not in the same form as encountered previously,
but rather as a speciﬁc case. In such instances, we use the generalization association from
UML to indicate the relationship between the general and the more speciﬁc concepts. As
an example, we show in Figure 4 a speciﬁc activity called SWModuleDesignDevelopment
during which the design for software modules and their corresponding test speciﬁcations
are created. It has speciﬁc input and output artifacts of different types. In Figure 4, we
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Table 1: Glossary of Concepts
Concept Description
Activity A unit of behaviour in a process.
Agent A person or organization that has the capability and responsibil-
ity for carrying out an activity.
Artifact One of the many kinds of tangible by-products produced during
the development of a system.
Competence The ability to perform a speciﬁc task, action or function success-
fully.
Individual Refers to a person.
Issue A unit of work to accomplish an improvement in a system.
Organization A social arrangement which pursues collective goals, which
controls its own performance, and which has a boundary sep-
arating it from its environment.
Phase A set of activities with determined inputs and output that are
carried out at a speciﬁc time during the life of a system.
SafetyIntegrityLevel The probability of a safety-related system satisfactorily per-
forming the required safety functions under all the stated con-
ditions within a stated period of time.
Source An abstract concept that can represent a person, organization or
standard that can be a source of requirements to a system.
Technique A procedure used to accomplish a speciﬁc activity or task.
Figure 3: IEC61508 Process Concepts and their Relationships
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Figure 4: Software Module Design Activity
can see two types of artifacts - Specification and Instruction, which are specialization
of Artifact. Subsequently, we have specializations of Instruction as Programming-
Guidelines and DevelopmentToolsInstruction; and specializations of Specification
as SWModuleDesign, SWModuleTest and SWSystemDesign.
The model resulting from the ﬁrst step of our approach provides an explicit and precise
interpretation of the evidence requirements in the underlying standard and is used in step 2
for creating a UML proﬁle for the standard.
3.2 Step 2: Creating a UML Proﬁle from a Conceptual Model of a
Safety Standard
The conceptual model created in Step 1 forms the basis of a UML proﬁle that we use to
establish a link between the concepts in the system undergoing certiﬁcation and the concepts
in the certiﬁcation standard being used. This link helps the supplier to verify that the collected
evidence is in line with the requirements of the standard, and helps the certiﬁer to better
understand and assess the evidence artifacts provided by the supplier.
UML proﬁles [24] are a lightweight solution for extending the UML metamodel for use in a
speciﬁc context (in our case, safety certiﬁcation). They enable the expression of new concepts,
notation and constraints by the introduction of context-speciﬁc stereotypes. Moreover, to
ensure that certain semantics are maintained in the models to which a proﬁle is applied, one
can add constraints to the stereotypes in the proﬁle using the Object Constraint Language
(OCL) [2]. The advantage of using OCL constraints is that they can be automatically checked
using an OCL validation engine, thus providing a means of efﬁciently ensuring that the
requisite evidence items are present in the model.
We create a UML proﬁle for a standard by having the concepts in the conceptual model of
the standard represented as extensions of the metaclass ’Class’ in the UML metamodel. The
attributes of each concept are represented as attributes of the class to which the stereotype
is applied. Relationships between the concepts are mapped as extensions of the metaclass
’Association’, and the properties of an association are mapped as extensions of the metaclass
’Property’. standard- and user-speciﬁc data types are captured as Enumerations. Grouping of
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Figure 5: Fragment of IEC61508 Proﬁle Concerning the System Development Process
model elements into packages is captured through extending the metaclass ’Package’. Finally,
for a given standard, a special stereotype extending the metaclass ’Model’ is deﬁned in order
to initiate the guidance process.
The actual guidance for creating the required evidence artifacts is formulated in terms of
OCL constraints and attached to the stereotypes. Speciﬁcally, we use OCL constraints for the
following purposes:
1: To ensure that the mandatory aspects of the standard are accounted for.
2: To ensure the application of correct stereotypes at the two ends of a given association.
3: To ensure that elements with certain stereotypes are connected to other speciﬁc elements.
4: To ensure that elements with certain stereotypes have speciﬁc properties - this helps
when creating instances of the model.
5: To help with the creation of user-deﬁned enumerations envisaged in the conceptual
model.
As an example, we show in Figure 5 a fragment of the proﬁle corresponding to the process
concepts package discussed earlier along with the stereotypes that extend the metaclass
’Model’ and ’Package’. We further use this fragment to show examples of the ﬁve types of
constraints mentioned above.
We note that, while the OCL constraints are attached to the proﬁle stereotypes, the con-
straints need to be validated on the model elements to which the stereotypes are applied.
Encapsulating the constraints fully within the proﬁle is advantageous from a usability stand-
point as the user is not exposed to the constraints and only has to validate them. On the other
hand, such encapsulation comes at the cost of making the constraints more complex, because
to bind themselves to model elements, the constraints will have to check which stereotypes
have been applied to which model elements at validation time.
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The ﬁrst stereotype to be applied is to the model itself, in our example using IEC61508,
this is the IEC61508Model stereotype, which starts the incremental guidance process about
which types of evidence to create. This stereotype has attached to it OCL constraints that
ensure that certain packages are present in the model to organize the different model elements
(constraints of type 1). As an example, we show the constraint on this stereotype for ensuring
that the HazardsAndRisks stereotype exists on a UML package in the model2:
self.base_Model.allOwnedElements()->
exists(e | e.oclIsTypeOf(uml::Package)
and not e.getAppliedStereotype(
’IEC61508Profile::HazardsAndRisks’).
oclIsUndefined())
The keyword self refers to the element being constrained, in this case the IEC61508Model
stereotype. Properties and attributes of an element are referenced using the dot notation. The
base_Model reference is used to access the model to which the stereotype has been applied,
which would be the domain model in our case. The allOwnedElements is an operation that
returns all the elements in the model. exists is an OCL operation that will check that at
least one element in a collection of elements satisﬁes the given constraint. The constraint in
the exists clause speciﬁes that at least one element is of type Package using the operation
oclIsTypeOf and that this element also has the stereotype HazardsAndRisks applied to it
(using the operation getAppliedStereotype).
To model the development life-cycle, we have the stereotype Phase to model the different
phases in a life-cycle and the stereotype Activity to model the activities. The Phase
stereotype has a constraint attached to it that states that every phase must have at least one
Activity deﬁned for it, i.e., there must be elements that have the stereotype Activity
in the same package and be connected to the element with the stereotype Phase. This is
enforced through two different constraints, one on the class stereotype Phase and the other
on the association stereotype PerformedIn (see Figure 3). On the stereotype Phase, we
have a constraint (of type 3) that states that there should be an association with a stereotype
PerformedIn originating from the element that has this stereotype:
self.base_Class.ownedAttribute->
collect(c:Property | c.association)->
select(a:Association | not a.getAppliedStereotype(
’IEC61508Profile::PerformedIn’).
oclIsUndefined())->size()>0
On the stereotype PerformedIn, there is a constraint that states that this stereotype can
only be applied to an association that is between a pair of elements that have the stereotypes
Activity and Phase, respectively (a type 2 constraint):
self.base_Association.memberEnd->
select(p:Property not (
p.class.getAppliedStereotype(
2For the sake of brevity, we have omitted the name and context of the constraints shown
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’IEC61508Profile::Activity’).
oclIsUndefined()))->size()=1
and
self.base_Association.memberEnd->
select(p:Property| not(
p.class.getAppliedStereotype(
’IEC61508Profile::Phase’).
oclIsUndefined()))->size()=1
Constraints are also used to create properties for the elements on which stereotypes have
been applied, or for creating user-deﬁned types. For example, an element with the Artifact
stereotype applied to it should have a property called ’State’ of type ’ArtifactStateType’ which
is a user-deﬁned enumeration (this combines constraints of types 4 and 5):
self.base_Class.ownedAttribute->
one(p:Property| p.name=’State’ and
p.type.name=’ArtifactStateType’ and
p.type.oclIsTypeOf(uml::Enumeration))
The above types of constraints allow the user to deﬁne domain-speciﬁc values for the
enumerations (the proﬁle only gives the name and type of the property).
The stereotypes together with the constraints deﬁned on them are used in Step 3 to build
a precise link between the concepts in the application domain and those in the standard’s
domain, and to provide systematic guidance on how to create these links. We name this
process elaboration and explain it in the next step.
3.3 Step 3: Elaborating a Domain Model for Compliance.
Once we have the UML proﬁle created in step 2, we can proceed to apply the stereotypes of
the proﬁle to the elements of a domain model of the system to be certiﬁed. A domain model is
a visual representation of real-world concepts and the relationships amongst them in a speciﬁc
area of interest [18]. In the context of our work, we use the term domain model to refer to
the concepts that represent the physical and abstract components of a class of systems in a
particular application area (e.g., sub-sea production systems), the environment in which the
system functions, and the key artifacts built throughout development.
We use sub-sea production systems to exemplify what constitutes a domain model in our
context. In sub-sea production systems, there are a number of subsystems working together to
extract the oil from the sea bed. In Figure 6, we show a simpliﬁed decomposition of sub-sea
production systems into their constituent subsystems along with a brief description of the
subsystems.
Within these large systems, we concern ourselves only with the Sub-sea Production Control
System. We show a fragment of the control system and how it interacts with the other
components in Figure 7. In this ﬁgure, we can see that the wellhead attaches to the CT (see the
descriptions given earlier in Figure 6). The CT connects to the manifold that is anchored to the
seabed via a structural frame called the template. Mounted on the CT is the Sub-sea Control
Module (SCM) that receives commands from the Master Control Station (MCS) that is part of
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A Christmas Tree and Well Head System has wellheads that attach to the sub-sea oil or gas wells and an assembly of control
valves, pressure gauges, and chokes put on the top of a well to control the ﬂow of oil and gas, known as a Christmas Tree
(CT). The CT is housed on a manifold that is part of the Manifold and Jumper System. The Umbilical System is a housing that
carries the power and communication line from the surface to the subsea equipment whereas the Riser System consists of all
the equipment carrying the oil from the well to the surface. The Transmission and Communication systems are responsible
for conveying the signals sent from the surface control equipment down to the sub-sea equipment. The Installation and
Workover System is used to control and monitor sub-sea equipment during installation or maintenance. Finally, the Sub-
sea Production Control System controls the valves and chokes on the CT and anywhere else on the manifold depending on
the design of the system. This is done by sending and receiving data between the surface and the sub-sea equipment, thus
allowing the engineers at the surface to monitor the sub-sea equipment.
Figure 6: Subsystems in a Sub-sea Production System
the Topside Processing Unit (TPU) located in the Sub-sea Power and Communication Unit
(SPCU). The SCM also sends signals from the sub-sea instruments to the MCS. The signals
are sent from the SCM via the Sub-sea Router Module (SRM) to a router in the SPCU that
passes the signal to the MCS. A more complete description of these components can be found
in [3, 16].
The model in Figure 7 is a generic description of a class of systems – each variant of
the system will have very speciﬁc types of oil wells, manifolds and sensors and actuators
with speciﬁc actions that should take place in order to extract the oil. Following the norm in
MDE, we assume domain models are represented as UML class diagrams [18]. We do not
concern ourselves in this article with the construction of domain models. Good references
and guidelines already exist [18].
To establish a mapping between a domain model and a standard, we apply stereotypes
from the UML proﬁle of the standard to the domain model. Speciﬁcally, the elaboration
of the domain model means the application of the proﬁle stereotypes to the appropriate
domain model elements, and reﬁning the domain model so that it satisﬁes the OCL constraints
attached to the stereotypes. These reﬁnements could include the addition of new domain
model elements or making changes to the existing ones (e.g., adding new attributes, revising
multiplicities).
As we stated in Section 3.2, our approach envisages a special stereotype extending the
’Model’ metaclass for starting the guidance process. This stereotype is applied to the domain
model itself, specifying what standard the domain model needs to comply with. We continue
our exempliﬁcation using IEC61508. Thus, the IEC61508Model stereotype is applied to
the domain model and the OCL constraints of this stereotype are validated. The violated
constraints, shown in Figure 8, are the beginning of the guidance process for creating the
evidence. The ﬁrst requirement is the creation of four packages that have the stereotypes:
Process, System, SafetyManagementSystem and HazardsAndRisks.
The rationale behind requiring these packages comes from the IEC61508 standard. The
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Figure 7: A Domain Model Fragment of a Sub-Sea Production Control System
IEC61508 standard promotes a risk-based approach for determining the required level of safety
measures for safety-relevant systems, hence the need for the HazardsAndRisks package.
Risks can only be determined based upon the hazards that will exist when the system is used,
thus it is important to have a breakdown of the system, bearing in mind both the hardware
and software aspects of the system as well as the role of human users. This breakdown will
be kept in the System package. The standard also puts emphasis on having clearly speciﬁed
technical and management activities and a clear identiﬁcation of all responsible persons within
the organization that perform these activities. The management information is kept in the
SafetyManagementSystem package whereas the technical activities speciﬁed within a safety
life-cycle and kept in the Process package.
The packages themselves can be named using the supplier’s own terminology, but the
speciﬁed stereotypes need to be applied. Once the package stereotypes have been applied, the
next set of (violated) constraints will provide guidance on what stereotypes to apply next.
Figure 9 shows that ﬁve constraints have failed once the package stereotypes have been
applied. Hazards have not yet been identiﬁed in the HazardsAndRisks package; phases have
not yet been identiﬁed in the Process package; agents and their competence have not been
identiﬁed in the SafetyManagementSystem package, and blocks have not been identiﬁed in
the System package.
First, we will show the application of the stereotypes that identify the system components.
These stereotypes are shown in Figure 10. The stereotypes describe the basic elements needed
to conceptualize safety-related control systems that involve both hardware and software. A
Programmable Electronic System (PES) is represented by the stereotype Programmable-
ElectronicSystem and is made up of one or more hardware blocks represented by the
stereotype HardwareBlock and controlled by a number of software blocks - stereotype
SoftwareBlock. A hardware block may represent a mechanical, electrical or electronic
entity, both programmable and non-programmable, hence the existence of stereotypes Non-
ProgrammableHardwareBlock and ProgrammableHardwareBlock.
By applying the stereotypes relevant to the IEC61508 standard, we are now relating the
elements of the system as they pertain to the concepts described in the IEC61508 standard.
The software of the MCS controls and monitors the sub-sea wells, so the stereotype Software-
Block is applied to this element. The system being controlled is the SCM which contains the
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Figure 8: Error Report Showing the Violated OCL Constraints of the IEC61508Model Stereotype
Sub-sea Electronic Module (SEM), which in turn links to the different instruments. Thus,
the stereotype ProgrammableElectronicSystem is applied to the SCM and the stereotype
ProgrammableHardwareBlock to the rest of the elements. The applied stereotype are shown
in Figure 11.
If we now focus on the software and validate the MCS element, the validation will fail. In
Figure 12, we show the violated constraints. All system blocks need to have a unique identi-
ﬁcation and this has not been added to the MCS element – in the petroleum industry, every
components of a system has a unique identiﬁer called a tag. The standard also recommends
version control of the system components - a version attribute has not yet been added either,
thus the violation of that constraint. A constraint on the SoftwareBlock stereotype requires
one to show the decomposition level of the software, i.e. whether it is the entire software
system or are we referring to a software module that is part of a system. The constraint
speciﬁes the name of the attribute (’Level’) and the type (’Enumeration’).
There are also various certiﬁcation artifacts that need to be created during the construction
of the software. These, among others, may be plans that guide the process of software
construction (e.g., software veriﬁcation plan), technical guidelines for the programmers such
as programming guidelines or development tool instructions, and results of testing the software
to show that it meets it’s requirements. All these are shown as required certiﬁcation artifacts
via the violation of the OCL constraints. In total, from Figure 12, we see that there are 25
different constraints that must be met for the certiﬁcation of the software of the MCS.
As it would not be possible to show all the artifacts in a small legible diagram, we show in
Figure 13 the resulting model after eight different artifacts have been added to satisfy some
of the constraints. We have added an element to depict the software safety requirements
(stereotyped with SWSafetyRequirements ) that are created during the requirements analysis
activity and a software validation plan (stereotyped with SWSafetyValidationPlan ) which
is the output of a safety validation planning activity. During the architecture design activity, the
software architecture description is created (stereotyped with SWArchitectureDescription
), as well as the software integration test speciﬁcation (stereotyped with SWArchitecture-
IntegrationTest ) and how to test the software with the hardware is detailed in the soft-
ware/hardware integration test speciﬁcation (stereotyped with SW_PE_IntegrationTest ).
The software system design activity results in the system design speciﬁcation (stereotyped
with SWSystemDesign ) and the support tool and programming language selection activity
results in the tool selection (stereotyped with DevelopmentToolsInstruction ) and coding
standards (stereotyped with ProgrammingGuidelines) to be used for development.
The unique identiﬁcation, version and software level attributes have been added as well as a
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Figure 9: Error Report Showing the Violated OCL Constraints After Application of the Package Stereotypes
Figure 10: IEC61508 Proﬁle fragment for System Stereotypes
Figure 11: Fragment of the Domain Model After Application of the System Stereotypes
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Figure 12: Error Report Showing the Violated OCL Constraints for the Master Control Station
Figure 13: Fragment of the Domain Model After Stereotyping and Adding New Elements During Elaboration
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Figure 14: Error Report Showing the Remaining Violated OCL Constraints for the Master Control Station
user-deﬁned enumerated type for the ’SoftwareLevel’. The actual literal values are set by the
user as relevant to their industry. In this case the literals used are ’System’, ’FunctionModule’,
’LogicModule’ and ’Driver’ - these were the values that were most relevant for our industry
partner. When the MCS element is validated after the addition of the new elements to the
model, we see that the constraints related to the elements we have added are not violated any
more and we can work on the remaining ones. We show the remaining violated constraints in
Figure 14.
The new artifact elements that were linked to the MCS element would be deﬁned in the
process package. This was one of the packages that was required at the beginning of the
elaboration process. The elements in the process package can be deﬁned as needed, or
be all created prior to their need and the links to the the MCS element established when
the constraints fail. In Figure 15, we show some of the elements in the process package.
Speciﬁcally, in the ﬁgure, we show the artifact elements that we have used in Figure 13.
The artifact elements are shown on the left in blue. In the center we have the activities that
lead to the creation of these artifacts, shown in orange. The development phase is software
development, shown in green. For each activity, the standard recommends that the competence
required should be documented as well as the agent who carries out the activity. We show an
example of this for the SWSafetyRequirementsSpecification activity, coloured yellow.
We can see that the user can name the elements according to their own conventions,
it is the stereotypes that are speciﬁc to the standard. For example, the software safety
requirements element is named by the supplier as ’SoftwareRequirementsSpeciﬁcation’ and
has the stereotype SWSafetyRequirements. It was created as an output from the activity
called ’RequirementsAnalysis’ and the analogous activity from the standard is identiﬁed by
the stereotype as SWSafetyRequirementsSpecification.
In the above example, we presented very simply, how elaboration happens and new elements
are added or existing ones are linked to new elements in order to satisfy the OCL constraints
linked to the stereotypes. We have only shown the constraints for some of the elements, but all
elements have such constraints and through this process of satisfying the OCL constraints, the
domain models are updated to satisfy the requirements of the applicable safety standard. For
ease of explanation, in the examples above, we show the validation of constrains per element,
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Figure 15: Fragment showing the Software Development Cycle according to IEC61508 Standard.
but they can be validated per diagram or per an entire model as well. Therefore, it is possible
to work on the model in small increments while still being able to see what the overall state
of the model is in regards to satisfying the requirements of the relevant standard. Once the
domain model has been fully elaborated, it can be used for speciﬁc certiﬁcations of that class
of systems as presented in step 4.
3.4 Step 4: Creating an Instance for a Speciﬁc Certiﬁcation.
To support the certiﬁcation of a speciﬁc system variant from a class of systems, the fourth and
ﬁnal step of the process in Figure 1 is performed. This step creates an instantiation of the UML
class diagram representing the elaborated domain model. In other words, an object diagram
of the elaborated domain model is built to represent the speciﬁc properties of a system variant,
and instances of the certiﬁcation evidence are created as speciﬁed by the elaborated model.
Note that whereas steps one and two of our approach are performed once per standard, and
step three once per class of systems, the fourth step is performed once for each variant that is
subject to certiﬁcation.
In Figure 16, we show an instance model conforming to the domain model that we presented
in Figure 13. This instance model is partial in two respects: ﬁrst, we do not show instantiations
of all the elements in the model of Figure 13 and second, for those elements that we do
instantiate, there is only one element instance. In an actual system, the number of instantiations
per element can be more. For example, we show only one instance of each of the elements
’PressureTransmitter’ and ’TemperatureTransmitter’ whereas in an actual system there are
numerous pressure and temperature transmitters. Also, for conﬁdentiality reasons, we use
sanitized names and do not give the real names of the element instances.
In the instance model shown, there is one template and one manifold. The manifold has
two CT structures on it - X1 and X2, each connected to a wellhead. X1 has a temperature
transmitter (TT1) attached to it and X2 has a pressure transmitter (PT1) attached to it. There
are two SCMs, both controlled by a single MCS. The unique Id given to the MCS is ’T1823a’,
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Figure 16: Instance Model Created from the Elaborated Domain Model
the version of the software for the MCS is 1.2 and this is the system level software version.
These attributes were added to the MCS element due to constraints on the stereotype, allowing
speciﬁc values to be set in the instance model. For the hardware equipment, the version
would store the model number or serial number of the piece of equipment. An instance of
the software system requirements artifact called the ABC_OilField Requirements is shown,
as is an instance of the software system design artifact called the ABC_OilField Software
Design. Each of these artifacts has a URL linked to it so that that actual document can be
accessed right from the tool environment. In this manner, the documents can be stored in any
location and are simply accessed via a URL. This provides a mechanism that links diverse
artifacts in diverse locations.
In this way, the evidence requirements for a speciﬁc system can be created in readiness for
certiﬁcation based on the relevant standard. Further requirements in terms of tool support for
applying this approach are presented in Section 4 and the results of applying this approach in
Section 5.1.
4 Tool Support
The tool support for our approach has to fulﬁll the following key requirements:
• Allow the creation of UML class diagrams which we use as a notation for representing
our conceptual model.
• Allow the creation of a custom UML proﬁle.
• Support the creation of OCL constraints at the level of the proﬁle.
• Support the validation of OCL constraints.
• Provide customization of the messages given to the user when a constraint is violated.
• Provide the ability to create instances of the elaborated models.
• Provide the ability to create customized reports by querying the constructed models.
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We have chosen Rational Software Architect (RSA) [12] by IBM to provide tool support
for our approach. In addition to meeting all the above requirements, RSA is a mature and
industry-strength tool with good usability, thus making it easier to apply our approach in an
industrial setting and making it more likely for the approach to be adopted by practitioners.
We have successfully used RSA version 8.03 in our case study to support all the steps of our
approach described in Section 3. Speciﬁcally, we used RSA to create the UML class diagrams
for the conceptual model of the standard as well as the domain models for elaboration. We then
used RSA to create the UML proﬁle of the IEC61508 standard. RSA supports adding OCL
constraints at the level of the proﬁle. More importantly, it has a built-in OCL validation engine
that we could utilize to provide the guidance for elaborating the domain models according to
the IEC61508 proﬁle. The messages given to the user when a constraint is violated can be
customized. RSA also includes a report designer based on Business Intelligence Reporting
Tool (BIRT) [1], that can be used to publish reports in user-deﬁned layouts based on the data
in the models. While we have not yet customized this report designer for generating safety
certiﬁcation reports, the existence of such a ﬂexible report generation framework was an
important consideration that we had to account for.
The domain models can be created in a hierarchy. This allows one to start with a high-level
view and then create more detailed models as and when necessary. Large diagrams can also
be split into a number of smaller diagrams, but if an overall view of a particular element
is required, then a ’browse’ diagram can be automatically generated. A ’browse’ diagram
shows all the elements that a chosen element is related to and helps in understanding how that
element ﬁts into the overall system depicted in the model providing a snapshot of the overall
context of an element. These diagrams are not permanent diagrams: they are generated from
the most current information in the models and hence a browse diagram can be refreshed to
show the latest state of the model elements. It is also possible to convert a browse diagram to
an editable diagram. This provides a means to both get an overall context of an element and
proceed to edit it if necessary.
RSA further allows for custom documentation to be added to the stereotypes. When the
mouse cursor hovers over a stereotype, a pop-up window displays the associated documenta-
tion, as shown in Figure 17. All stereotypes can be documented in this way to provide further
assistance to the user while applying the stereotypes.
To help in the creation of the instance models, there is a properties view that shows the
slots for the selected instance. Each slot is a mapping to an attribute of the classiﬁer that has
been instantiated and every time a value is created for a particular attribute, the properties
view is updated to reﬂect the change. The creator of the instance model can thus see which
slots have values already and which ones still need values. In this way, RSA can guide the
user in creating a complete instance model.
5 Evaluation
In this section, we present an experimental validation of our approach. First, in Section 5.1,
we report on an industrial case study performed in the maritime and energy domain. This is
followed in Section 5.2 with the description of a survey performed among domain experts
to better understand their perceptions about our approach. The case study enables us to
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Figure 17: Documentation for a Stereotype
determine the feasibility of our approach to support certiﬁcation and the survey helps assess
whether domain experts see beneﬁt in adopting our approach in a real industrial context.
5.1 Case Study
Our case study is aimed at investigating the feasibility of our approach and the level of effort
involved in its application. Below, we provide a detailed description of the context, execution,
and outcomes of the case study.
5.1.1 Nature of the Case Study
The subject of the case study is a new approach for improving upon the current practice of
safety certiﬁcation. Our case study can therefore be seen as an improvement case study as
described by Runeson et. al. [34]. The case study has been conducted in an industrial setting
and is a means for showing that the proposed approach is viable for use in industry.
5.1.2 Research Questions
The case study is targeted at answering the following research questions:
• RQ1. Is the approach feasible? More speciﬁcally, this question is concerned with (1)
whether it is possible to represent the evidence requirements of a safety standard in
terms of a conceptual model, and (2) provided that the answer to the ﬁrst part is positive,
whether it is possible to encapsulate the guidance for the creation of certiﬁcation
evidence into a UML proﬁle based upon a standard’s conceptual model. For answering
RQ1, we do not concern ourselves with the creation of the domain models and instance
models envisaged in our approach. These activities do have implication on the effort
involved in carrying out the case study (see RQ2) but are technically well-understood
in practice and do not require a feasibility study.
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• RQ2. Is the effort involved in the application of the approach acceptable? The
answer to this question is based on the level of effort spent throughout the case study.
Effort is an important factor for the successful adoption of a new approach. If practition-
ers do not ﬁnd the level of effort reasonable, they are unlikely to adopt the approach.
5.1.3 Case Selection
Our approach was motivated by the issues that our industrial partners faced during safety
certiﬁcation, both on the side of the certiﬁers and the suppliers of safety-critical systems. To
apply the approach in an industrial setting, we needed two prerequisites to be in place (1)
access to a safety-critical system that has undergone safety certiﬁcation recently, is currently
being certiﬁed, or is about to be certiﬁed in the near future. Old certiﬁcation projects were
deemed unsuitable for a case study due to the difﬁculty of acquiring sufﬁcient details about
them. (2) access to domain experts and securing adequate participation from them for the case
study. We note that safety certiﬁcation is a necessary but relatively infrequent event: entirely
new safety-critical systems that need be certiﬁed are rare and the existing systems evolve
rather slowly and require re-certiﬁcation once every few years. Due to the scarcity of cases,
we had to be opportunistic with case selection, as long as the two prerequisites above were
satisﬁed.
The system suppliers that we had access to were involved with the certiﬁcation of sub-sea
production systems (discussed earlier in Section 3). The timing of our case study coincided
with the construction of a new oil ﬁeld, whose sub-sea production system needed to be
certiﬁed in the near future. Within this system, we still had to choose a speciﬁc part to work on
as these systems are very large and performing a case study on a complete system would have
required resources beyond what was available at the time. Since we are primarily interested in
software safety certiﬁcation, we chose to concentrate our study on the software aspects of the
sub-sea production control system for the new oil ﬁeld. More speciﬁcally, the goal of the case
study was to determine whether the software development plan being used by the supplier
complied with the certiﬁcation requirements. The software development plan outlines the
activities that are carried out during software development and the resulting artifacts that are
used as evidence during certiﬁcation to show compliance. Our aim was to help the supplier
determine which artifacts to create during the development of the software for the new control
system.
The certiﬁcation standard that the supplier needed to comply with was the IEC61508 stan-
dard [15] which sets forth the certiﬁcation requirements for control systems that incorporate
both mechanical and electronic components controlled by software. The aim of the standard
is to ensure that safety-critical systems operate correctly in response to their inputs and that
the system is brought to a safe state should a hazardous situation occur - known as functional
safety. This standard is a large and comprehensive generic standard that is utilized in many
domains, making it a good indicator for the feasibility of our approach. Moreover, it has
been specialized for a number of domains such as the process industry [14], railways [13],
automobiles [17] and others. In this sense, being able to apply our approach successfully for
this standard is a good indicator of the generalizability of our work.
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5.1.4 Data Collection Procedure
The procedure taken for conducting the case study closely followed the approach described
in Section 3. In the ﬁrst step, a conceptual model was built for the IEC61508 standard by
analyzing the text of the standard. This work was done by the ﬁrst two authors. The model
was subsequently reviewed by an expert specializing in certiﬁcation based on IEC61508 and
subsequently was revised. The revised model was then presented to a group of twenty-eight
certiﬁcation experts in an industry workshop. During this workshop, the modelling notation
was explained and the model itself fully presented. A question and answer session was held.
This session resulted in no further changes to the model.
The second step was the creation of the IEC61508 proﬁle. This was carried out by the ﬁrst
author. The basis for the proﬁle is the conceptual model of IEC61508 built in the ﬁrst step. In
addition, OCL constraints were added to the proﬁle, to provide guidance in elaborating the
domain model.
The third step was the elaboration of the domain model. Since we did not have a domain
model for sub-sea control systems a priori, we had to develop one. To this end, we ﬁrst created
a generic domain model for these systems using a general description of the systems found
in [3, 16]. We then reviewed and reﬁned this model over several meetings with a domain
expert in the sub-sea domain at the supplier company where we were conducting our case
study. The resulting domain model is one specialized to the needs of the supplier and includes
concepts speciﬁc to the sub-sea control systems developed by the supplier. Once the domain
model had been created, the elaboration process was carried out. As mentioned earlier in
Section 5.1.3, a complete elaboration was not possible with the resources available to the
supplier, hence the elaboration was carried out for the parts that were most relevant to the
system supplier: the software development process - the activities and artifacts mentioned
in the software development plan used by the supplier were modelled and the elaboration
process carried out to check if these were sufﬁcient or whether other activities and artifacts
needed to be added. The fourth and ﬁnal step was the creation of an instance for the particular
system that was being certiﬁed. Steps 3 and 4 were carried out by the ﬁrst author and the
results reviewed by the experts at the partner company.
5.1.5 Results
In this section, we present the results of our case study. Parts of the case study were used to
explain the approach in Section 3. In this section we concentrate on providing an overview of
the outcomes of the case study without repeating any technical details that have already been
discussed in Section 3 along with examples from the case study.
Step 1 (Conceptual Model of IEC61508). The IEC61508 standard consists of seven parts
of which parts one, two and three contain the requirements for the functional safety of the
system. Each of these parts describes an overall safety life-cycle to achieve the required level
of safety, part one for the overall system, part two for the hardware components, and part three
for the software components. Parts four, ﬁve and six contain supplementary material such
as deﬁnition and explanations of abbreviations, examples of methods for the determination
of safety integrity levels and an overview of the measures and techniques that can be used
to show the different levels of safety that have been achieved. We went through the whole
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Table 2: Summary of Conceptual Model for IEC61508
Number of pages of IEC6108 closely examined 211
Number of textual requirements examined from IEC61508 318
Number of concepts extracted from the textual requirements 95
Number of UML packages created for grouping concepts 10
Number of relationships extracted from the textual requirements 51
Number of enumerations extracted from the textual requirements 8
standard ﬁrst and then again with an emphasis on the requirements for functional safety (i.e.,
parts one, two and three of the standard) to create the conceptual model. The full model along
with the associated glossary is given in Appendix 1.
In Table 2, we provide some statistics about the IEC61508 conceptual modeling activity
and the contents of the resulting model. The standard is expressed as numbered requirements.
A requirement in this case is a numbered item that expresses some criteria that must be met
for a system to comply with the standard. We examined 318 such textual requirements and
extracted 95 concepts of importance that are linked together by 51 relationships. We grouped
these concepts into 10 packages encompassing related concepts. This conceptual model of
the IEC61508 standard is the basis of the proﬁle described in the next section.
Step 2 (UML Proﬁle of IEC61508). In this step, all the concepts and relationships from the
conceptual model of step 1 were transformed into stereotypes in a proﬁle. We then augmented
the proﬁle with OCL constraints to provide guidance for elaborating the domain models. In
Table 3, we provide a summary of the contents of the resulting UML proﬁle. The number of
stereotypes that extend the metaclass Class is the same as the total number of concepts in
the conceptual model and the number of stereotypes that extend metaclass Association is
the same as the number of associations in the conceptual model. We then have stereotypes
extending the metaclasses Model and Package for helping to organize the model elements
and ﬁnally their are OCL constraints for elaboration; recall from Section 3.2 that we have ﬁve
different types of constraints, we show the number of each type in Table 3. This proﬁle is then
used for the elaboration process described in the next section.
Step 3 (Elaborating the Domain Model of Sub-sea Production Systems). The domain
model of the system was made in close consultation with experts in a large maritime and
energy company and based on a reading of the relevant literature where the architecture and
the components of sub-sea systems (including the control software operating on them) are
described [3, 16, 22, 36]. A fragment of the high-level breakdown of sub-sea production
systems was shown in Figure 6. The complete high-level model is shown in Figure 49 in
Appendix 1. After creation of the high-level domain model, we then concentrated on modeling
the sub-sea production control system. We modelled only a small part of this system resulting
in a model with forty-six elements and sixty-two relationships in it, of which twelve of the
elements were subsystems requiring further breakdown but were not in the scope of the
case-study. We do not show this model here as it contains proprietary information from our
supplier, however, we did present a small sanitized fragment of it in Figure 7 (Section 3.3).
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Table 3: Summary of Proﬁle Stereotypes for IEC61508
Number of stereotype extending metaclass Model 1
Number of stereotype extending metaclass Package 4
Number of stereotype extending metaclass Class 95
Number of stereotype extending metaclass Association 51
Total number of OCL constraints in proﬁle 218
Number of Type 1 OCL constraints in proﬁle 95
Number of Type 2 OCL constraints in proﬁle 53
Number of Type 3 OCL constraints in proﬁle 42
Number of Type 4 OCL constraints in proﬁle 20
Number of Type 5 OCL constraints in proﬁle 8
The elaboration of the domain model began with applying the stereotype IEC61508Model to
the domain model. We then continued with applying the system stereotypes and subsequently
concentrated on the software control system to determine whether the activities and artifacts
mentioned in the software development plan used by the supplier were in line with those
prescribed in the standard. The process was as described in Section 3.3. We added all the
artifacts that were needed to satisfy the constraints for the software.
When artifacts are added to a model, their constraints will require the addition of the
activities that generate those artifacts. This led to the creation of the complete process model
for the software development. Once all the constraints were satisﬁed for the software, we
compared the activities and artifacts created during the elaborated model with those that the
supplier had as part of their software development plan. The supplier was keen to check how
well they satisﬁed the requirements of the IEC61508 standard based on their current software
development plan. We show a summary of this exercise in Table 4. The standard deﬁnes
16 activities that are carried out for software development and the requisite artifacts that are
the output of these activities. From the 16 activities, the supplier had 10 of them deﬁned in
their software development plan and only 10 of the required artifacts were in the plan from
the requisite 27. The supplier needed to update their software development plan and add the
missing activities, artifacts and required competence and disseminate this information to their
engineers.
Step 4 (Instantiating the Domain Model). The instance model was created for the software
development process of a speciﬁc system. The model represented all the activities that would
be carried out and the artifacts generated. It also highlighted that the developer needed to
deﬁne the competence required for some of their activities. The instance diagram created for
the software development is quite large as it deﬁnes all the activities for software development
and the artifacts generated as evidence from these activities. Some of the activities are carried
out multiple times, e.g., the module design activity will be performed for every module in
the software, similarly with the module testing activity. Thus there will be as many artifacts
specifying the module design, the module test speciﬁcation and the results of testing, as the
number of modules in the system (we cannot show this information due to conﬁdentiality
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Table 4: Supplier Software Development Plan Versus IEC61508 Requirements
Number of activities required by IEC61508 for software development 16
Number of activities in the supplier software development plan 10
Number of artifacts required by IEC61508 for software development 27
Number of artifacts in the supplier software development plan 10
Number of activities requiring deﬁnition of competence in the supplier’s software devel-
opment plan
6
reasons). All this information is captured in a central place and linked to the actual artifacts
that will be necessary for certiﬁcation (as shown in Figure 16 in Section 3.3). The numbers in
Table 5 show the different types of activities to be carried out and the analogous number of
artifacts. The actual number for a system will vary depending on how the system is broken
into subsystems and modules.
5.1.6 Discussion
Below, we discuss the results of the case study focusing on answering the research questions
that we presented in Section 5.1.2.
• RQ1. Is the approach feasible? We could successfully extract concepts and relation-
ships from the IEC61508 standard based on the process described in Section 3.1. After
ﬁnishing the process, we amalgamated the different diagrams into one main diagram
that showed all the concepts and their relationships for the overall standard. For software
development, we kept separate diagrams per software activity as shown in Appendix 1.
While identifying the concepts, we tried as much as possible to use the terminology used
by IEC61508. Speciﬁcally, we were trying to use the terminology deﬁned in part four of
the standard, but we found several terms that were used in the standard but not deﬁned.
For example, the terms Activity, Competence, Enhancement and Issue all appear in
the text of the standard but no deﬁnition is given for them, the assumption perhaps being
that these are naturally understandable to readers. However, providing a deﬁnition for
each concept is an important prerequisite for creating an explicit interpretation of the
standard and minimizing the possibility of ambiguity. For the terms used but not deﬁned
by the standard, we had to develop our own deﬁnitions based on both the context of
their use and the deﬁnitions found in the literature on safety and reliability.
Providing deﬁnitions for the relationships between concepts turned out to be a more
challenging task, as the standard does not explicitly discuss the links between the
concepts. The names for the relationships were chosen based on our reading of the text;
however, we had to develop the deﬁnitions for the relationships on our own in the same
manner as for the concepts that were not deﬁned by the standard.
After revisions based on comments from the certiﬁcation expert, we presented the
model at a workshop where the participating certiﬁcation experts agreed that we had
captured the salient concepts and relationships within the standard. An important issue
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Table 5: Summary of Supplier Software Development Plan at the Partner Company
Number of activities to be carried out for software development 16
Number of artifacts to be produced during software development 27
to note here is that our model should not be viewed as a comprehensive interpretation
of IEC61508. In particular, the standard contains numerous requirements concerned
with how to perform the various lifecycle activities and how to describe the contents
of the artifact, e.g., "Coding standards shall be a) reviewed as ﬁt for purpose by the
assessor; and b) used for the development of all safety-related software", and "The
documentation shall be easy to understand by those having to make use of it". We do
not capture such requirements in our conceptual model as we are concerned with the
type of evidence required for certiﬁcation and not the quality attributes of the evidence.
At the most we can add this text to the documentation for the stereotype concerned,
thus the user will see it when using the stereotypes and be aware of these requirements.
Overall, we observed that having a graphical representation of the conceptual model
was very useful for presenting it. The certiﬁcation experts and practitioners from the
supplier agreed that the choice of UML class diagram for representing the conceptual
model was useful and easy enough to understand. This ﬁnding is conﬁrmed by the
survey that we present in Section 5.2.
With regards to the construction of the proﬁle for IEC61508, it was straightforward to
translate the concepts and their relationships from the conceptual model into stereotypes.
The challenging part was developing the OCL constraints. The constraints were not
only used to establish the properties of the stereotypes themselves but to add additional
information that would guide the user in applying the proﬁle to domain models. All
these constraints were added manually to the model. From the ﬁve types of constraints
mentioned in Section 3.2, it is possible to automate the process of adding the constraints
of type 2, 3, 4 and 5 as these are derived directly from the conceptual model based on
the type of metaclass being stereotyped. This automation can take advantage of the
fact that models can be queried and then software can be written to extract the required
information and create the proﬁle along with the OCL constraints. However, we chose
to not pursue this route as this would have involved solving technical challenges as
opposed to solving a research problem. Instead, we were more interested in assessing
whether guidance could be provided for elaboration using OCL constraints. Constraints
of type 1 were added for the software development process and required thought into
what types of constraints would provide adequate guidance and which stereotypes the
constraints should be added. Here, automation would not be possible as for types 2–5
since the constraints are not extracted directly from the conceptual model.
With regards to the domain model elaboration, we found the proﬁle to be effective in
guiding the construction of a relationship between the standard and the application
domain. For the purpose of showing feasibility, we focussed on the elaboration of
the artifacts created during software development. Even with this limited focus, the
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supplier viewed this as a useful exercise, as they could more easily see which activities
and artifacts were not part of their current software development plan. Some activities
were missing even though they were carried out but their results were never explicitly
documented for certiﬁcation - this was the case for module design, which was carried
out by the software engineers as part of the implementation work and never explicitly
documented. Other activities were missing because they were not carried out as part of
software development per se but rather as management activities - such as planning for
the safety assessment of software. Thus, elaboration helped the supplier identify the
diverse pieces of information that were relevant to software but were organized under
headings other than software. All this information could now be linked to the software
development plan and presented as such to the certiﬁcation body at certiﬁcation time.
Furthermore, the supplier realized that they needed to link the competence data that
they keep about their employees to the the activities of the developments process so as
to show that the work was being performed by people (referred to as agents in Table 4)
with the right competence. This information was also available but never linked to the
certiﬁcation information.
We note that our feasibility argument for domain model elaboration, as given above,
focusses on a small fragment of the domain model, and in this case the number of
constraints that are violated is manageable. However, we acknowledge that for a
complete model there could potentially be a large number of violations that would need
to be dealt with. In this case, it would be useful to have some form of prioritization of
which constraints should be tackled ﬁrst and which later. We do not propose a solution
for this issue in this article and leave it for future work.
In summary, we recall that our focus for showing feasibility was the construction of
the conceptual model of a standard and its use in creating a UML proﬁle to provide
guidance for the creation of certiﬁcation evidence. To this end, we have shown that both
aspects are feasible in a realistic certiﬁcation context. As we would like our approach
to be adopted in industry, we cannot rely on feasibility alone: we need to also consider
the effort required and that is the subject of RQ2, discussed below.
• RQ2. Is the effort involved in the application of the approach acceptable? The
creation and reﬁnement of the conceptual model required approximately 6 person
months. This effort also encompasses the time we spent to familiarize ourselves with
the IEC61508 standard, which is a substantial document in itself.
The creation of the proﬁle took approximately 3 person months. This includes the
(one-time) effort taken to investigate how we could use OCL constraints for guiding
domain model elaboration and implement the constraints in the RSA tool (discussed
earlier in Section 3.2).
The construction of the domain model took another 2 person months. Most of this time
was spent understanding the domain and creating the domain model. We had access to
domain experts but they were not available to create the models, only to check them
and provide feedback. Thus, the ﬁrst author spent time learning the domain of sub-sea
control systems and reading the system documentation provided by the supplier in order
to create the models which were then reﬁned based on comments from the experts.
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The process of elaboration and instantiation were both completed within one month.
This is comparatively less effort than the other tasks and was partly due to the limited
scope in steps 3 and 4. It should be noted though, that for the little effort that was spent
on these steps, the supplier was very pleased with the ﬁndings that the elaboration gave
rise to.
The largest level of effort in our study was spent on the creation of a conceptual model
for IEC61508 (the underlying certiﬁcation standard). We anticipate such conceptual
modeling to require a sizable effort for other standards as well; however, this activity
needs to be performed only once per standard, or standard revision. We expect the
effort for the creation of a proﬁle to be less on future applications, as we had to address
several technical details in relation to using OCL constraints in our ﬁrst application.
The next most effort-consuming task was the creation of the domain model of the
system which was done by a researcher unfamiliar with the domain or its terminology.
The effort may be reduced if the models are created by someone familiar with the
domain. Note that this effort is only needed once for a domain.
The experts felt that the initial effort for creating the conceptual model of the standard
and the proﬁle was a little high, however, since it is a one-time task, it was acceptable.
The justiﬁcation for this was that, given the number of projects that the supplier company
would have to certify using the IEC61508 standard in the future, this effort would pay
for itself over time. The creation of the domain model was a useful exercise to the
supplier as well. This effort too can be spread over a number of projects, as the same
model is used for all sub-sea production systems. Thus including a high amount of
re-use in the steps of the approach has been a useful choice.
5.2 Survey
Following the completion of our case study, we conducted a workshop where we presented
our solution and collected feedback from practitioners through a survey. In this section, we
discuss the design and results of this survey.
5.2.1 Data Requirements
While preparing for the survey, we had to consider what factors would be of interest to the
practitioners in assessing whether to adopt a technology, as well as what we needed to ask
our participants in order to obtain useful feedback. We found the factors in Rogers’ theory of
innovation diffusion [33] highly relevant to consider:
• Trialability is the degree to which the technology can be tried on a limited basis or
adopted in increments.
• Compatibility is the degree to which the technology is perceived to be consistent with
existing values, experiences and needs of the practitioners.
• Relative advantage is the degree to which the new technology is perceived to be better
than what is currently used.
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• Observability is the degree to which the results of using the technology would be visible
to others. This is important as visibility kindles discussion amongst peer groups and
helps the spread of the technology. In our case, we would want visibility to the other
members of the team and the certiﬁcation body as well. This would then help spread
the use of the technology.
• Complexity is the degree to which a technology is perceived to be difﬁcult to understand
or use.
All the above factors are based upon the perceptions of the practitioners. There may be
ways to objectively measure the relative advantage of a technology or its compatibility and so
forth but it is the perceived advantage in terms of a particular factor that matters most for the
adoption of the technology.
The case study described in Section 5.1 enabled us to try our approach in a small but realistic
setting, providing a suitable context to examine trialability. With regards to compatibility, we
knew beforehand that our solution presented something different from what the practitioners
were accustomed to. While the solution was developed in response to the practioners’ direct
needs, we have not yet attempted to integrate it into the current workﬂow of certiﬁcation
activities at the partner company. Therefore, we cannot at the moment address compatibility
in a direct way. The same is true for relative advantage - we did not want to compare the
current mode of working with our solution as we did not have any means to show comparison.
Instead of asking direct questions about compatibility and relative advantage, we decided to
ask a question about whether the experts would see value in adopting our approach.
As for observability, we note that the approach is collaborative by design and would entail
an evolution of work practices, thus contributing to visibly within the entire team. In fact, the
execution and the outcomes of our case study although limited in scope, already attracted
considerable attention at the partner supplier. Further and in relation to observability, we
wanted to investigate if the partner supplier would be willing to use the developed models
for interaction with the certiﬁcation body as well, in turn increasing the observability of the
approach. We have a question to this end in the survey. Finally, our survey has questions to
directly assess the perceptions of the participants about the complexity of the approach.
5.2.2 Data Generation Method
To carry out the survey, we needed to ﬁrst provide a reasonably thorough overview of our
solution to the experts. This was done in an interactive workshop lasting for two hours. We
wanted to present our work to as many relevant practitioners at the supplier company as
possible. Our sampling frame was practitioners involved with developing software for safety
critical systems that are to be certiﬁed by a third-party certiﬁcation body. Within this sampling
frame, we used the snowball sampling technique [23] combined with purposive sampling [23]
to select the participants for the survey. In snowball sampling, one person is picked from
the target sample frame, and once data has been gathered from this person, she is asked to
recommend others to contact for further data collection. This process can be repeated to add
further data samples. In purposive sampling, the sample group is hand-picked to include those
who would likely produce the most valuable data for the purpose of the research. In our case,
we had a champion who had been working with us throughout the case study and was familiar
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Q1. Is certiﬁcation an important aspect of your job?
 Yes
 No
Q2. How much experience do you have with certiﬁcation-related activities?
 Less than 6 Months
 More than 6 months but less than 12 months.
 More than 1 year but less than 2 years
 More than 2 years
Figure 18: Questions 1 and 2 of the survey
with both the purpose and technical details of the work. We asked her to contact all staff
members she knew of, who satisﬁed our sampling frame criterion. The champion sent out
an email invitation to twenty-three staff members including developers, project managers
and product managers. The email informed the invitees that a model-driven approach for
IEC61508 certiﬁcation would be presented. After this, neither we nor our champion had any
control over the sample - we surveyed those who came to the workshop.
During the workshop, we ﬁrst explained all the steps of our approach, providing examples
drawn from the partner company’s application domain. We then presented the results of our
case study, followed by a demonstration of tool support. There was time for questions so
that we could clarify any concerns. After the question and answer session, we circulated a
questionnaire for the participants to answer. The questionnaire was anonymous, although
participants were given the option to provide their name and contact information in case any
follow-up was required - the choice was up to them to participate. Due to the strict time
constraints that we had to observe, we had to be very selective with the questions that we
put on the questionnaire – we needed to cover our data requirements while ensuring that the
questionnaire was clear and succinct.
5.2.3 The Questionnaire
The questionnaire was divided into four parts. The ﬁrst section, Q1–Q2 shown in Figure 18,
was about the background of the subjects related to certiﬁcation in general. We explained in
the questionnaire that “certiﬁcation-related experience” covers the following: (1) Attending tu-
torials and workshops on certiﬁcation processes and standards; (2) Self-reading of certiﬁcation
standards; (3) Attending certiﬁcation meetings; (4) Constructing and reviewing certiﬁcation
reports and deliverables.
The second section, Q3–Q6 shown in Figure 19, was about the participants’ experience
with the IEC61508 standard for certiﬁcation. Although we had based our work on prior
knowledge about the difﬁculty in using text-based standards, we wanted to ensure that this
was also the case in this group. For this set of questions, if the answer to Q3 was “No”, the
participant was to skip Q4–Q6.
The third section, Q7–Q8 shown in Figure 20, was about the modelling of safety standards.
In particular, we wanted to ﬁnd out what the participants thought about modelling of a textual
standard.
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Q3. Is your own work (current or past) related to demonstrating compliance to IEC61508?
 Yes
 No
Q4. Have you read the IEC61508 standard?
 Entirely
 To a Great Extent
 Somewhat
 Very Little
 Not At All
Q5. Based on your experience, how easy to understand is the text of the IEC61508
standard?
 Very Easy
 Easy
 Average
 Difﬁcult
 Very Difﬁcult
Q6. Based on your experience, is the IEC61508 standard easy to use for certiﬁcation?
 Always
 Usually
 About half the time
 Seldom
 Never
Figure 19: Questions 3 to 6 of the survey
Q7. Was the presented conceptual model easy to understand?
 Very Easy
 Easy
 Average
 Difﬁcult
 Very Difﬁcult
Q8. If given a conceptual model of a standard like the one we presented, would you use
that model to help in understanding the standard?
 Deﬁnitely
 Very Probably
 Probably
 Possibly
 Probably Not
 Very Probably Not
Figure 20: Questions 7 and 8 of the survey
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Q9. How easy to follow were the steps in our approach?
 Very Easy
 Easy
 Average
 Difﬁcult
 Very Difﬁcult
Q10. Would you see value in adopting the presented approach at Company A for certiﬁca-
tion?
 Deﬁnitely
 Very Probably
 Probably
 Possibly
 Probably Not
 Very Probably Not
Q11. Do you ﬁnd the models simple enough to use for communication with a certiﬁcation
body?
 Deﬁnitely
 Very Probably
 Probably
 Possibly
 Probably Not
 Very Probably Not
Q12. Does the presented tool provide useful assistance for certiﬁcation at Company A?
 Deﬁnitely
 Very Probably
 Probably
 Possibly
 Probably Not
 Very Probably Not
Figure 21: Questions 9 to 12 of the survey
The ﬁnal section, Q9–Q12 shown in Figure 21, was aimed at obtaining feedback about the
overall approach and using model-driven engineering. For conﬁdentiality reasons, we do not
reveal the name of the collaborating company and refer to it as “Company A” in Q10 and
Q12.
5.2.4 Survey Results
Out of the twenty-three invitees, twelve attended the workshop, yielding a response rate of
approximately 52%. All groups (i.e., developers, project managers and product managers)
were represented by those in attendance.
Based on the responses obtained, certiﬁcation was an important aspect of the job for all but
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Figure 22: (Q1) Is certiﬁcation an important aspect of your job?
one participant (Figure 22). This participant was a consultant, working as a project manager
who would be engaged in certiﬁcation activities in the future and hence had chosen to attend
the workshop. Overall, 58% of the participants had over two years of certiﬁcation experience
and a further 17% had at least one year of experience with certiﬁcation (Figure 23).
Regarding the experience of the participants with the IEC61508 standard, all except two had
worked with this standard (Figure 24). From the two that had not worked with the standard,
one was the consultant mentioned earlier while the other had experience with certiﬁcation
using a standard other than IEC61508. Moreover, certiﬁcation was an important aspect of
his work and he had attended the workshop because he was interested in the application of
model-driven engineering to other standards.
From the set of participants who had used the IEC61508 standard, 40% had read the entire
standard and a further 20% had read almost the entire standard. The rest had read some parts
of it (Figure 25). Half of these participants felt the standard was difﬁcult to understand and
the rest thought it was of average difﬁculty (Figure 26). With regards to ease of use, 40%
of the participants who had read the standard indicated that IEC61508 is seldom easy to use
for certiﬁcation, while 30% found it easy half the time; only 30% agreed that the standard
is usually easy to use (Figure 27). When the ﬁndings shown in Figures 24 and 27 are taken
together, we can conclude that 83% of the participants need to use the standard as part of their
work and yet only 30% of them found the standard easy to use. This lends support to further
research targeted at making large standards like IEC61508 easier to use for practitioners. Note
that for Q5 and Q6 (Figures 26 and 27), we presented results from the subset of participants
that had used the IEC61508 standard for demonstrating compliance, as determined by Q4
(Figure 25). The remainder of the results are from the entire group of participants.
When presented with the conceptual model of the IEC61508 standard, 8% of the participants
found it very easy to understand and a further 67% found it easy (Figure 28). A further 17%
thought the conceptual model was averagely easy to understand and 8% found it difﬁcult. If
we compare this to the ease of understanding of the textual standard, we ﬁnd that 92% of the
participants found the conceptual model to be very easy, easy, or averagely easy to understand
compared to 50% ﬁnding the textual standard averagely easy while the other 50% ﬁnding it
difﬁcult to understand. Figure 29 shows that the participants unanimously agreed that they
would probably use the model to help them better understand the textual standard. This shows
that creating a conceptual model of a standard can be useful even when not employed as part
of a wider certiﬁcation strategy.
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Figure 23: (Q2) How much experience do you have with certiﬁcation-related activities?
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Figure 24: (Q3) Is your work (current or past) related to demonstrating compliance to IEC61508?
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Figure 25: (Q4) Have you read the IEC61508 standard?
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Figure 26: (Q5) Based on your experience, how easy to understand is the text of the IEC61508 standard?
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Figure 27: (Q6) Based on your experience, is the IEC61508 standard easy to use for certiﬁcation?
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Figure 28: (Q7) Was the presented conceptual model easy to understand?
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Figure 29: (Q8) If given a conceptual model of a standard like the one we presented, would you use that model
to help in understanding the standard?
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Figure 30: (Q9) How easy to follow were the steps in our approach?
The ﬁnal four questions concern our approach as a whole. As stated earlier when explaining
the questionnaire, we cannot disclose the name of our industry partner and refer to it as
“Company A”. We need to note though that the industry partner is a large supplier of safety-
critical systems, with many of its systems subject to certiﬁcation standards, IEC61508 being
one of the key ones. Thus, they were a good representative company for evaluating our
approach.
We found that 8% of the participants perceived the approach as being very easy to follow,
while 67% thought it was easy, and a further 17% thought is was averagely easy to follow;
no one found the approach difﬁcult to follow (Figure 30). In terms of adoption, 42% of the
participants thought that there was deﬁnitely value in adopting the approach and a further
50% thought the approach was very probably worth adopting. Thus, 92% of the participants
were in favour of adopting the approach. The remaining 8% were not negative either and
thought the approach was probably worth adopting as well (Figure 31). All participants agreed
that the models created during the application of a model-driven certiﬁcation approach were
simple enough to use in communication with the certiﬁcation body (Figure 32). The current
implementation of the approach using IBM Rational Software Architect [12] was also thought
to be useful: 33% of the participants believed that the tool would deﬁnitely be useful for
certiﬁcation and a further 42% thought it would very probably be useful. The remaining 25%
of the participants were spread between probably useful (17%) and possibly useful (Figure
33). No negative opinions were expressed about the tool.
In summary, the answers suggest that the approach was overall viewed to be easy to
understand and the participants thought that it would be advantageous to use it within their
context.
6 Related Work
There are two main areas of work related to the approach presented in this article: managing
certiﬁcation evidence electronically and the use of UML for the development of safety-critical
systems.
The need for constructing certiﬁcation evidence electronically has been identiﬁed by [7]
and [19] in order to manage the complexity and large amounts of information that needs to be
collated. Lewis [19] calls for an underlying information model to manage the complex links
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Figure 31: (Q10) Would you see value in adopting the presented approach at Company A for certiﬁcation?
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Figure 32: (Q11) Do you ﬁnd the models simple enough to use for communication with a certiﬁcation body?
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Figure 33: (Q12) Does the presented tool provide useful assistance for certiﬁcation at Company A?
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that exist between the various pieces of safety evidence. We propose an approach that takes
into account both the above points. Our conceptual model provides the underlying information
model for a standard and our proﬁle provides a practical mechanism for using this information
in order to create the relevant artifacts for certiﬁcation. Cockram and Lockwood [7] present
a proprietary tool that uses hypertext for linking all the diverse pieces of information for
certiﬁcation. This enables them to link information but the links are manually created without
an underlying information model to guide the creation of the evidence as we do. We use model-
driven engineering technologies, and in particular UML proﬁles, to aid with the creation of
this evidence for a particular standard. The proﬁle can be exported and used in any UML
modelling tool and the constraints provide guidance when elaborating the domain model. The
set of inter-related information items can be seen via the elaborated models and the instance
models use uniform resource locators to link to artifacts directly.
The use of model-based technologies, especially UML, is gaining pace in the development
of safety-critical software. The Object Management Group (OMG) has standardized the UML
Proﬁle for Modeling and Analysis of Real-time and Embedded Systems (MARTE) [26] and
the UML Proﬁle for Modeling QoS and Fault Tolerance Characteristics and Mechanisms
(QFTP) [25]. Both these proﬁles are used for modelling the real-time and performance
properties of safety-critical systems. Similary, Berkenkotter [4] and Hannemann [5] have
created a proﬁle for the railway domain that aids the design and veriﬁcation of interlocking
functionality. However, neither of these are meant to characterize the evidence requirements
of a standard according to which safety-critical systems are certiﬁed.
A proﬁle that deals with certain aspects of certiﬁcation is proposed by Zoughbi et. al.
[37]. Their proﬁle enables the direct addition of certiﬁcation information to software models
for compliance with the RTCA DO-178B standard [31], used in commercial and military
aerospace software. However, this proﬁle is targeted at maintaining traceability between
requirements, design and code, which is only a part of the recommendations of DO-178B.
The proﬁle that we propose deals with a complete standard and takes into account not only
evidence regarding requirements and design but also the wide range of concepts related to the
management of the development process in safety-critical systems.
Huhn and Hungar [11] discuss the proliferation of UML in the model-based development of
safety-critical software. They propose a development process where models form an integral
part of the development of a safety-critical system. However, they do concede that the use of
models for the certiﬁcation has not been adequately addressed. Our proﬁle is a starting point
for addressing this gap.
Recently, the OMG has put forward a proposal, called the Software Assurance Evidence
Metamodel (SAEM) [27], for managing safety assurance evidence. SAEM is a standard-
independent metamodel and directed towards linking the certiﬁcation evidence to safety
claims and the evaluation of these claims subject to the evidence. The approach that we
propose uses a UML proﬁle for characterizing the evidence of a speciﬁc standard. To perform
the same task, the SAEM model will still require a deﬁnition of the speciﬁc evidence needed
by a particular standard (perhaps based on a conceptual model as we have proposed). On the
other hand, a proﬁle of the SAEM could be incorporated into our approach and cover both the
evidence requirements for compliance as well as the evaluation of the evidence to ensure that
it is sufﬁcient to substantiate the safety claims. Together, these could be means to further the
ﬁeld of model-based certiﬁcation.
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Regarding compliance to a speciﬁc standard, Chung et. al.[6] study the problem of com-
pliance of a user-deﬁned workﬂow with the activities prescribed in IEC61508. They check
(process) compliance by comparing user-deﬁned activities in an organization against models
of the activities in the standard. This work is similar to what we propose in that the aim is to
model compliance information; however, we go beyond the process aspects of a standard and
provide an evidence information model for the entire standard which in turn is the basis of
our proﬁle that is used to manage certiﬁcation evidence.
Finally, we have used UML proﬁles of safety related standards in prior work [29], where
we ensure that a generic standard can be specialized for a particular domain in a systematic
manner. In contrast to this current paper, proﬁles were used in [29] as a way to keep track of
the relationships between two standards – a generic and a sector-speciﬁc one.
7 Conclusion and Future Work
In this article, we described an approach based on model-driven engineering principles and
technology to specify and analyze the safety evidence required for compliance to safety
standards. We start by establishing a sound relationship between a domain model of a safety-
critical application and the evidence model of a certiﬁcation standard. We do so by capturing
the relevant standard as a conceptual model in the UML notation and using the resulting model
as a basis for creating a UML proﬁle. The proﬁle is augmented with constraints expressed
in the OCL language to aid system suppliers in systematically relating the concepts in the
standard to the concepts in the application domain. The proﬁle is then applied to a domain
model of a safety-critical application, aiding system suppliers in clearly demonstrating how
the development artifacts of their system fulﬁl the compliance requirements of a standard. The
constraints enforced by the proﬁle can be automatically checked by existing OCL constraint
engines.
Developing conceptual models along with glossaries of deﬁnitions for standards help avoid
the ambiguity issues that can exist in text-based standards. The elaboration phase in our
proposed approach provides step-by-step guidance on how to align the concepts in the system
to the relevant standard and create the relevant evidence items. The domain models allow
different levels of abstraction to be expressed. Thus, we are able to provide an overall picture
of the system and at the same time the ﬂexibility to drill down to a speciﬁc part of the system
as necessary, while being aware of the connections between the different pieces. The different
levels of abstraction and the breakdown of the system via the domain models also proves
useful in collaborative work. Each engineer can work on the part of the system assigned to
them, and create and elaborate the models as necessary. The changes are visible to the other
engineers but need not interfere with their work unless there is some overlap.
We have applied our approach in a pilot study in the context of sub-sea production control
systems. The case study shows that our approach is feasible in a realistic environment and that
it can provide useful guidance in relating the concepts in the domain of sub-sea production
control systems to those of the IEC61508 standard. The case study further shows that the effort
involved in applying our approach was acceptable. Since IEC61508 is a generic standard that
applies to multiple domains, a successful application of our approach to it is a good indication
of the usefulness and wider relevance of our work.
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We have further conducted a survey of industry practitioners. The results show that half
of the domain experts we surveyed found IEC61508 difﬁcult to understand and only 30%
found it usually easy to use for certiﬁcation. When presented with a conceptual model of the
standard, 92% of the participants found the conceptual model to be either very easy, easy, or
averagely easy to understand while only 50% found the textual standard averagely easy to
understand. When surveyed about our approach, no one found it difﬁcult to follow the steps of
the approach and 92% of participants were in favour of adopting the approach in their work.
In future work, we would like to add a report generator to present the models in the form
of reports for upper management. This would allow the provision of relevant information
for a number of different actors in an organization. The approach itself can be extended for
the certiﬁcation of a system to multiple inter-related standards. We would also like to study
whether conceptual models can be used as means for presenting standards and whether the
use of models would make it easier to identify and take action on changes in the standards
when they are updated. Finally, we would like to extend our work to help the certiﬁcation
body with the evaluation of evidence collated according to our approach.
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1 The IEC61508 Conceptual Model
The conceptual model for the IEC61508 is shown in Figure 34 as a UML class diagram. The
conceptual model has a total of ten packages, containing abstractions for modelling the main
concepts of IEC61508. We brieﬂy explain each package. For more details, see [30]. The
System Concepts package describes the breakdown of the system and reﬂects both hardware
and software concepts; the Hazard Concepts package captures the abstraction for describing
the hazards and risks for the system and leads to the speciﬁcation of safety requirements;
the Requirements Concepts package captures the requirements for creating, operating,
maintaining and decommissioning control systems; the Process Concepts package is for
describing the development process for creating the system; the Artifact Concepts package
is for describing the different types of artifacts created as supporting evidence during the
development of the system; the Guidance package is for describing the other standards
and recommended practices that will be used to develop the system, the Issue Concepts
package is for describing the defects or enhancements that may give rise to changes; the
Configuration Management Concepts package is for describing the unique versions for all
the components that make up the system, the Justification Concepts package to capture
the assumptions and rationale behind the various decisions that are made during development;
and the Domain-Specific Concepts package for capturing the enumerations for concept
attributes in other packages (e.g., requirement type, artifact state).
Along with the conceptual model, a glossary was created for each concept and relationship,
a part of this glossary, describing the most important concepts is shown in Table 6.
Table 6: Description of Main Concepts from the IEC61508 Metamodel
Concept Description
Activity A unit of behaviour in a process.
Agent A person or organization that has the capability and responsibility
for carrying out an activity.
Artifact One of the many kinds of tangible by-products produced during
the development of a system.
Assumption A premise that is not under the control of the system of interest,
and is accepted as true without a thorough examination. Assump-
tions can, among other things, be related to the environment of
the system, the users, and external regulations.
Block Entity of hardware or software, or both, capable of accomplishing
a speciﬁed purpose.
Change A modiﬁcation made to the PES, Block or Artifact.
Competence The ability to perform a speciﬁc task, action or function success-
fully.
ControlledItem A PES, Block or Artifact for which meaningful increments of
change are documented and recorded.
Continued on next page ...
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Figure 34: The IEC61508 Conceptual Model
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Continued from previous page ...
Concept Description
Defect An error, failure, or fault in a system that produces an incorrect or
unexpected result, or causes it to behave in unintended ways.
Description A planned or actual function, design, performance or activity (e.g.,
function description).
DesignatedState The state of the EUC related to safety, the EUC is either in a safe
state or an unsafe state.
Diagram Speciﬁcation of a function by means of a diagram (symbols and
lines).
Enhancement Provision of improved, advanced, or sophisticated features.
Error Discrepancy between a computed, observed or measured value or
condition and the true, speciﬁed or theoretically correct value or
condition.
Event A single occurence in a series of occurences that cause a hazard
to occur.
Failure Termination of the ability of a functional unit to perform a required
function.
Fault Abnormal condition that may cause a reduction in, or loss of, the
capability of a functional unit to perform a required function.
GeneralStandard A standard that provides generic recommendations on a speciﬁc
subject to a number of related domains.
HardwareBlock Any entity of hardware – this may be mechanical, electrical or
electronic that is used in the composition of the system.
HazardousElement The basic hazardous resource creating the impetus for the hazard,
such as a hazardous energy source such as explosives being used
in the system.
Hazard Any real or potential condition that can cause injury, illness, or
death to personnel damage to or loss of a system, equipment or
property or damage to the environment.
Individual Refers to a person.
InitiatingMechanism The trigger or initiator event(s) causing the hazard to occur. The
IM causes actualization or transformation of the hazard from a
dormant state to an active mishap state.
Instruction Speciﬁes in detail the instructions as to when and how to perform
certain jobs (for example operator instruction).
Interface An abstraction that a block provides of itself to the outside. This
separates the methods of external communication from internal
operation.
Continued on next page ...
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Concept Description
Issue A unit of work to accomplish an improvement in a system.
List Information in a list form (e.g., code list, signal list).
Log Information on events in a chronological log form.
Mistake Human action or inaction that can produce an unintended result.
NonProgrammable-
HardwareBlock
Electro-mechanical devices (electrical) solid-state non-
programmable electronic devices (electronic).
OperatingMode The different modes that a system can be operating in, e.g. normal,
maintenance, test, emergency.
Organization A social arrangement which pursues collective goals, which con-
trols its own performance, and which has a boundary separating it
from its environment.
Phase A set of activities with determined inputs and output that are
carried out at a speciﬁc time during the life of a system.
Plan Explanation of when, how and by whom speciﬁc activities shall
be performed (e.g., maintenance plan).
Programmable-
ElectronicSystem
System for control, protection or monitoring based on one or more
programmable electronic devices, including all elements of the
system such as power supplies, sensors and other input devices,
data highways and other communication paths, and actuators and
other output devices.
Programmable-
HardwareBlock
Any physical entity based on computer technology which may
be comprised of hardware, software, and of input and/or output
units.
Rationale The fundamental reason or reasons serving to account for some-
thing.
RecommendedPractice Sound practices and guidance for the achievement of a particular
objective.
Report The results of activities such as investigations, assessments, tests
etc. (e.g., test report).
Request A description of requested actions that have to be approved and
further speciﬁed (e.g., maintenance request).
Requirement A necessary attribute in a system; a statement that identiﬁes a
capability, characteristic, or quality factor of a system in order for
it to have value and utility to a user.
ResidualRisk Risk remaining after protective measures have been taken.
Risk Combination of the probability of occurrence of harm and the
severity of that harm.
SafeState The state of the EUC when safety is achieved.
SafetyIntegrity-
Level
The probability of a safety-related system satisfactorily perform-
ing the required safety functions under all the stated conditions
within a stated period of time.
Continued on next page ...
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Concept Description
SafetyRequirement A prescriptive statement that ensures that the system carries out
its functions in an acceptably safe manner.
SectorSpecific-
Standard
A standard that provides recommendations for a speciﬁc industrial
sector (e.g., the energy sector).
SoftwareBlock Any entity of software that may be used for controlling the system
– this may be embedded or application software or even different
levels of software such as module, component, subsystem, system.
SoftwareLevel The different levels into which a software system can be decom-
posed, e.g. System, subsystem, component and module.
Source An abstract concept that can represent a person, organization or
standard that can be a source of requirements to a system.
Specification Description of a required function, performance or activity (e.g.,
requirements speciﬁcation).
Standard An established norm or requirement, typically provided as a for-
mal document that establishes uniform engineering or technical
criteria, methods, processes and practices.
Technique-
Recommendation
A particular technique recommended based on the safety integrity
level of the requirements that have been allocated to the block in
question.
Technique A procedure used to accomplish a speciﬁc activity or task.
UnsafeState The state of the EUC when safety is compromised.
UserRole An aspect of the interaction between a PES and the human ele-
ments.
1.1 Software Lifecycle Activity Packages
The IEC 61508 standard prescribes certain safety lifecycle activities for software. In this
section, we show how we have modelled the activities recommended for the software lifecycle
along with the input and output artifacts of each activity.
Software Safety Requirements Deﬁnition The goal of this activity to specify the require-
ments for software safety in terms of the requirements for software safety functions and
software safety integrity. See Figure 35.
Software Safety Validation Planning The goal of this activity is to develop a concrete
plan for validating the software in terms of safety. See Figure 36.
Software Architecture Development The goal of this activity is to create a software archi-
tecture that fulﬁls the speciﬁed requirements for software safety with respect to the required
safety integrity level. See Figure 37.
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Figure 35: Software Safety Requirements Deﬁnition
Figure 36: Software Safety Validation Planning
Figure 37: Software Architecture Development
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Figure 38: Support Tools and Coding Standard Development
Support Tools and Coding Standard Development The goal of this activity is to select a
suitable set of tools, including languages and compilers, for the required safety integrity level
over the whole safety lifecycle of the software. See Figure 38.
Software System Design Development The goal of this activity is to design software
that fulﬁls the speciﬁed requirements for software safety with respect to the required safety
integrity level, which is analysable and veriﬁable, and which is capable of being safely
modiﬁed. See Figure 39.
Software Module Design Development The goal of this activity is to design the software
modules that fulﬁll the speciﬁed requirements for software safety. See Figure 40.
Source Code Implementation The goal of this activity is to implement software that fulﬁlls
the speciﬁed requirements for software safety. See Figure 41.
Software Module Testing The goal of this activity is to verify that each software module
performs its intended function and does not perform unintended functions. See Figure 42.
Software Integration Testing The goal of this activity is to verify that all software modules,
components and subsystems interact correctly to perform their intended functions and do not
perform unintended functions. See Figure 43.
Programmable Electronics Integration The goal of this activity is the integration of the
software onto the target programmable electronic hardware and to combine the software and
hardware in the safety-related programmable electronics system to ensure their compatibility
and to meet the requirements of the intended safety integrity level. See Figure 44.
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Figure 39: Software System Design Development
Figure 40: Software Module Design Development
Figure 41: Source Code Implementation
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Figure 42: Software Module Testing
Figure 43: Software Integration Testing
Figure 44: Programmable Electronics Integration
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Figure 45: Software Operation Procedures Development
Software Operation Procedures Development The goal of this activity is to provide
information and procedures necessary to ensure that the functional safety is maintained during
the operation of the system. See Figure 45.
Software Modiﬁcation Procedures Development The goal of this activity is to provide
information and procedures necessary to ensure that the functional safety of the system is
maintained during modiﬁcation of the software. See Figure 46.
Software Safety Validation The goal of this activity is to ensure that the integrated system
complies with the speciﬁed requirements for software safety at the intended safety integrity
level. See Figure 47.
Cross-Cutting Activities: Software Modiﬁcation, Veriﬁcation, and Functional Safety
Assessment These three activities (shown in Figure 48) link to all other activities being
performed and can thus potentially affect all of them:
• Software Modiﬁcation: The purpose of this activity is to ensure that corrections, en-
hancements or adaptations to the validated software sustain the required software safety
integrity level and follow the modiﬁcation procedures.
• Software Veriﬁcation: The activity is used, to the extent required by the safety integrity
level, to test and evaluate the outputs from a given software safety lifecycle activity to
ensure correctness and consistency with respect the standards and the provided inputs.
• Software Functional Safety Assessment: The purpose of this activity is to investigate
and arrive at a judgement on the functional safety achieved by the system.
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Figure 46: Software Modiﬁcation Procedures Development
2 Domain Model of a Sub-Sea Production System
In Figure 49, we present a high-level domain model of a sub-sea production system. This was
the model created during the case study described in Section 5.1.5
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Figure 47: Software Safety Validation
Figure 48: Software Modiﬁcation, Veriﬁcation, and Functional Safety Assessment
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Figure 49: A High-level Domain Model of a Sub-sea Production System
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